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Corporate governance, compliance and performance nexus 
By 
Muhammad Arslan 
Economic globalization has encouraged debate on the differences and similarities among 
national corporate governance (CG) systems. However, in today’s world, it is pivotal to study 
how (and to what extent) CG is shaped by institutional environments both at national and firm 
levels. Consequently, this study aims to explore the key institutional determinants of good CG 
practices in Pakistan. The study identifies the barriers and drivers of good CG practices in the 
distinct context of Pakistan. At the end, the study investigates the nexus between CG 
compliance (CGI) scores and firm performance among Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) listed 
firms. Drawing substantially on the lenses of agency and institutional theories, this study 
conceptualizes CG practices and structures as institutionally resolute and directed. This study 
adopts a mixed research (i.e. qualitative and quantitative) methodology and finds that CG 
models, particularly in emerging countries, are irrelevant if they are not institutionally 
grounded and explicated. Specifically, this study explores the extent to which certain 
underlying formal and informal institutional determinants, such as the political, legal and 
culture, values, voting, shareholders’ awareness, auditing and board, play a determining role 
in CG system in Pakistan.  
Using exploratory factor analysis (EFA), this study identified five major barriers, i.e. firm level 
barriers (lack of auditor independence, board ineffectiveness, lack of shareholders’ awareness), 
external barriers (political and governmental interference in business activities, weak legal 
control and enforcement, high levels of corruption), social barriers (strong social ties among 
different stakeholders, interpersonal connections among boards of directors (BoDs), education 
and training barriers (lack of professional education and training among stakeholders) and legal 
barriers (fewer voting rights) which restrain good CG practices in Pakistan. In addition, this 
study identified four major drivers i.e. internal drivers (auditors’ independence, board 
heterogeneity, board independence, initiation of training and educational programs to raise 
awareness), regulatory drivers (enhancing and empowering professional regulatory bodies), 
motivational drivers (encouraging participation in events and conferences related to corporate 
governance) and collaborative drivers (enhancing partnership with international bodies) which 
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can promote good CG practices in Pakistan. The findings of multiple hierarchical regression 
analysis reveal that the CGI score has a significant positive relationship with both return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Hence, CG practices can increase firm performance 
of PSX listed firms. At the end, drawing on the findings of this study, a model of good CG 
practices in Pakistan is proposed which not only identifies institutional determinants but also 
identifies the most influential barriers hindering the implementation of CG practices and 
reforms in Pakistan. Most importantly, drivers that can promote CG practices and ultimately 
firm performance are also highlighted in the proposed model. This study emphasizes the 
necessity to revisit the foundation of institutional and agency theories in the environment of 
developing countries. It also suggests the reassessment of the implication of executives in 
agency theory literature concerning developing countries, relying on the general lack of 
knowledge by shareholders with respect to benefits of CG practices and their rights. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the overview of this thesis. Section 1.2 presents the background of the 
study, followed by the research problem in section 1.3. The research objectives and research 
questions are presented in sections 1.4 and 1.5 respectively. A brief summary of the 
methodology is presented in section 1.6 while section 1.7 presents the significance and 
implications of the study. At the end, section 1.8 presents the structure of the thesis and 
concludes this chapter.  
1.2 Background of the Study 
Across the globe, the economic crisis has amplified the significance of good corporate 
governance (CG) and increased regulation as complementary to the “over-liberated” freedom 
of modern capitalism (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). On the other side, classic cases of 
corporate fraud such as WorldCom, Enron and Arther Anderson, one of the top audit firms, 
have been ascribed to weak CG practices (Ntim & Danbolt, 2012) and triggered the need for 
stringent CG mechanisms. However, in most comparative CG research, it is assumed that 
national institutions determine firm-level CG practices (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Mallin 
(2007) and Iturriaga (2009) argued that CG codes have gained popularity due to these mega 
corporate failures and evolving investors’ awareness. Consequently, CG regulations and 
reforms have become a primacy agenda for market regulators and governments (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Agency theory was prominent in fostering contemporary CG 
discussions. Nonetheless, researchers debated that CG is shaped by institutional factors, 
especially, in the international context (Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & 
Chen, 2009; Williamson, 1989). Thus, the institutionalism based CG literature has advanced 
considerations beyond the boards of directors (BoDs) to the legal structure and financial 
markets, and to the broader cultural understanding about the role of the corporation in a modern 
society (Davis, 2005).  
Researchers acknowledged that divergence in global CG practices is due to divergence in 
institutional environments across countries (Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 2008). This has led to a 
growing appreciation of the institutional effects on CG in developed countries (Adegbite, 
Amaeshi, & Nakajima, 2013; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera, 2005; Lubatkin, Lane, 
Collin, & Very, 2007; Sauerwald & Peng, 2013), conversely, a comparative gap still exists in 
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the CG literature for developing countries that are usually characterized by weak institutions 
(Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011). Specifically, in the socio-economic environment of Asian 
developing countries, the corporate context is critically exaggerated through informal social 
relations (Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008) which are highly socially valued. The governance 
structure of any country can be determined by its de facto realities of the corporate environment 
(Khanna, Kogan, & Palepu, 2006), firms’ articles of association and the legal and regulatory 
framework.  
In this debate, the questions arise as to how the institutional environment affects CG practices 
and how local and international firms can, by themselves, promote good CG in weak 
institutional settings. Consequently, this study explores the key institutional determinants of 
good CG practices in Pakistan and also finds ways to promote good CG practices at the firm 
level. In addition, this study also identifies the barriers to good CG practices and, finally, 
examines the nexus between CG compliance (CGI) score and firm performance on a sample 
of Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) listed firms.  
In Pakistan, the detailed provisions, regarding CG mechanisms, are provided by the Code of 
Corporate Governance (CCG) issued by the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
(SECP) in March 2002. However, in 2012, the SECP carried out a reform of CCG 2002 and 
made most of the provisions mandatory for the listed companies. All the listed companies need 
to comply with CCG 2012 to remain listed on PSX, consequently, many firms delisted from 
PSX. Besides all these efforts by SECP, the problem still exists regarding true compliance with 
the corporate governance code4. After the reform in CCG 2012, the CCG has many mandatory 
provisions related to auditing, board structure and disclosure for listed companies but there are 
still some voluntary provisions (SECP CCG, 2012). These provisions challenge the 
discretionary power of the state and families and have great impact on a company’s 
management. Therefore, they are unwilling to regard the CG code in its true spirit and 
compliance with the CCG is in form not in substance. A recent study conducted by Khan (2014) 
documented that tick box practice is very common among PSX listed firms and CG provisions 
are not complied with in the true sense. He also documented that senior officers of SECP 
confirmed that the CCG is not complied in the true sense as many public listed firms are family 
owned (FOBs) in Pakistan. Therefore, in such firms, family members are elected as executive 
and non-executive directors. Additionally, these firms also appoint family members as 
                                                          
4 SECP introduced a new code of corporate governance in 2017, implemented from 2018, which is beyond the 
scope of this study.  
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independent directors with a few shares. Many FOBs have appointed their children as 
independent directors with a few shares to fulfill the requirement of the CCG 2012. He further 
concluded that “law in books” is not enough; it should be implemented to be considered as 
“law in action”. Similarly, Samza (2016) conducted a study in Pakistan to identify weaknesses 
of CG and explored opportunities for its improvement. She documented that many of the CCG 
provisions overlap with the Companies’ Ordinance 1984 which is problematic. She further 
documented that the SECP and the Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) should 
have a strategy to increase awareness about the benefits of adopting corporate governance. 
Yakasai (2001) and Ahunwan (2002) argued that the weak institutional context makes self-
regulatory initiatives impractical and corporate law enforcements naive. Hence, it is noticed 
that CG in developing countries faces several challenges (Berglöf & Claessens, 2006; Okpara, 
2011; Reed, 2002) including weak institutional frameworks (Adegbite et al., 2013; Adegbite 
& Nakajima, 2012; Aguilera, 2005), inefficient adoption of Anglo-American models 
(Kraakman & Hansmann, 2017; West, 2006), various deviations in firm level governance 
(Klapper & Love, 2004; Okike, Adegbite, Nakpodia, & Adegbite, 2015) and principal-
principal concerns (Chen & Young, 2010; Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Similarly, Rwegasira (2000) debated that the institutional environment 
needs to be accounted for before and during the establishment of CG systems in developing 
countries. Okpara (2011) reinforced this argument and documented that CG challenges during 
its development could be expounded by the quality of the underlying institutional environment 
in the developing economies. In addition, researchers debated that board effectiveness depends 
on the firm’s institutional environment (Gillan, 2006; Mangena, Tauringana, & Chamisa, 
2012), consequently, governance theories may need reforms or improvement in order to 
achieve a robust CG system. According to a report of the World Bank (2013), emerging market 
firms are playing a compelling part in reforming the global industrialisation process. Therefore, 
it is critical to establish effective CG mechanisms in these emerging economies because the 
prevalence of a weak CG system in these economies could have global implications. Drawing 
substantially on agency and institutional theories, this study, therefore, explicitly contributes 
to CG literature in developing countries (Douglass, 1990; Scott, 2013; Zucker, 1987), 
especially in Pakistan.  
1.3 Research Problem 
The East Asian crisis has injected fresh fuel into the promulgation of various CG codes in this 
part of the world. Nevertheless, low compliance and loose CG rules are blamed as the causes 
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of the crisis in 1997-1998 (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). On the other side of the world, failure of 
big companies such as Enron and WorldCom has been ascribed to weak CG practices (Ntim & 
Danbolt, 2012). Mallin (2007) and Iturriaga (2009) argued that globalization, corporate 
collapses and increased investors’ awareness have prompted the diffusion and worldwide 
popularity of CG practices. Hence, around the globe, the evolving attention has made CG 
regulations and reforms a primacy topic for market regulators and governments. Similarly, 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) documented that corporate governance has received 
ample consideration from academics and policy makers due to the implications of CG reforms, 
specifically in the socio-economic environment of Asian developing countries where the 
corporate environment is affected by highly appreciated informal social relations (Hussainey 
& Al-Nodel, 2008). Most of the existing CG literature revolves around larger companies in 
developed countries; however, it is still emerging in developing countries. Baydoun, Maguire, 
Ryan, and Willett (2013) conducted a study in Arab countries and found high ownership 
concentration and family dominant firms. Consequently, interest is evolving in exploring the 
CG in the Islamic environment of Arab countries (Alsaeed, 2006; Baydoun et al., 2013). Islam 
provides comprehensive guidelines for all facets of the Muslim community including business 
and economic practices. 
The Islamic principles profoundly guide daily life in Pakistani society, including economics, 
law, business and other areas. Additionally, the socio-economic factors of developing 
countries, particularly Pakistan, are quite different from developed countries in terms of legal, 
political and social systems. Thus, these imperative and distinct contextual, regulatory and 
institutional divergences can have substantial significance for the efficacy of accountability, 
CG disclosure and performance. In Pakistan, most firms are family owned and they usually 
recruit family members or close relatives and friends. In this context, merit is compromised in 
employing the employees. Mostly, employees are hired on the basis of personal relationships 
or social linkages with the owner of the firm. These appointments can have negative impacts 
on internal CG mechanisms like board structure, audit committee structure, internal auditors 
and corporate governance monitoring systems. In Pakistan, most of the public listed firms are 
dominated by politicians. Researchers also found that CG practices are greatly influenced by 
these political connections and appointments are made to corporate boards of firms (Hussainey 
& Al-Nodel, 2008). Correspondingly, all these have negative effects on the independence and 
composition of BoDs. In Pakistan, agency problems may be exaggerated due to the high 
ownership concentration (Javid & Iqbal, 2008b).This high ownership concentration may 
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influence the recruitment process in family firms. Baydoun et al. (2013) conducted a study 
among Arab countries but it is also applicable to the Pakistani environment. They suggested 
that high ownership concentration and dominance of family businesses in Arab countries have 
great influence on employees’ recruitment in some listed firms and only close relatives and 
friends are appointed to corporate boards, so consequently, board independence is 
compromised in those firms. Besides these, poor CG practices may not only cause the loss of 
the domestic but also of the foreign shareholders. In addition, the weak corporate governance 
regime exacerbates information asymmetry in Pakistan and consequently has adverse effects 
on local and foreign investment in the country.  
In Pakistan, few empirical studies have been conducted to examine the link between individual 
CG mechanisms and firm performance (Cheema, Bari, & Saddique, 2003; Humera, 2010; 
Ibrahim, 2006; Iqbal, 2006; Shaheen & Nishat, 2005). Existing literature reveals that  several 
studies have been conducted to explore CG reforms, to find the determinants of CG disclosure 
and level of compliance with CG standards (Ashraf & Ghani, 2005; Hermes, Hooghiemstra, 
Van Der Laan, Postma, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Javid & Iqbal, 2008b; Nadeem, Zongjun, 
& Shoaib, 2013; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). Nonetheless, the results of these few empirical studies 
are inconclusive. Additionally, existing empirical evidence reveals that poor quality 
regulations may not only increase the compliance cost  but also cause uncertainty and 
complexity of regulatory obligations which moderate the capacity of government to achieve its 
objectives (OECD, 2008). There is emerging but still premature literature on exploring the 
relationship between CG compliance and performance (Rose, 2016; Talaulicar & Werder, 
2008; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). In addition, in Pakistan, the relevant market pressures like market 
for corporate control and shareholder activism are either corrupt, non-vibrant or absent.  
Nevertheless, these research problems provide an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive 
study in Pakistan, taking into account indigenous socio-economic conditions in order to explore 
the key institutional determinants of good CG practices in Pakistan. In addition, on the basis 
of these institutional determinants of CG practices, this study also identifies the most influential 
barriers and important drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan. At the end, this study examines 
the nexus between CCG compliance and firm performance and proposes a good CG model for 




1.4 Research Objectives 
On the basis of the above research problem, this study has the following research objectives: 
 To explore the institutional determinants of good CG practices in Pakistan 
 To explore the most influential barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan 
 To explore the most important drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan 
 To investigate the nexus between CG compliance and financial performance among 
PSX listed firms. 
1.5 Research Questions 
Considering above research objectives, the following research questions have been developed: 
 What are the key institutional determinants of good CG practices in the Pakistan 
socio- economic context? 
 What are the most influential barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan?  
 What are the most important drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan?  
 What is the nexus between CG compliance and financial performance among PSX 
listed firms? 
1.6 Methodology 
The research methodology is significantly influenced by the researcher’s epistemological and 
ontological stand (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011) and research 
objectives (Holden & Lynch, 2004). The engagement with research paradigms is discussed in 
chapter four of this thesis. Section 4.2 guided the researcher’s preference for employing mixed 
research (i.e. qualitative and quantitative) methodology. The methodology of this study is 
divided into two phases. In phase I, qualitative research is applied, and semi-structured focus 
group interviews were conducted with the professionals and regulators of CG in Pakistan (see 
section 4.5.2) and an open-ended questionnaire was used. Consent was obtained before 
conducting the interview and an interview guide was followed to increase the validity and 
reliability of qualitative data. The semi-structured focus group interviews were transcribed and 
analyzed by using NVivo as a tool to explore the key institutional determinants of CG practices 
in Pakistan. A total of eight aggregate themes emerged with their sub themes.  
In phase II, the quantitative research method was applied, and primary data related to 
demographic information, CG compliance, barriers and drivers of good CG practices in 
Pakistan were collected from respondents through the survey questionnaire (see section 4.15). 
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The validity and reliability of data were ensured, and Cronbach’s alpha was calculated. The 
descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and multiple 
hierarchical regressions were employed. The summary of the research methods is presented at 
the end of chapter four.  
1.7 Significance and Implications of the Study 
In the contemporary corporate world, due to corporate scandals (e.g. Enron, WorldCom) and 
financial disasters, CG has become a considerably important issue. These incidents reflect the 
absence of CG, consequently companies with flimsy and futile CG frameworks are anticipated 
to face austere consequences. Even though, in Pakistan, the SECP introduced the CCG in 2002 
and a reform in 2012, the CG compliance is still not up to the mark and researchers have 
identified ineffective CG practices and tick box practices among PSX listed firms (Khan, 2014; 
Samza, 2016). On the other side, researchers have highlighted the importance of institutional 
factors in the effectiveness of CG practices (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011; Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003; Young et al., 2008). Through addressing the embeddedness of corporations in a nexus 
of formal and informal rules, institutional theory supplements under socialized views of 
corporate governance (Douglass, 1990). In the literature, researchers debated that the efficacy 
of CG practice depends on its legitimacy within broader sets of institutions that vary over time 
and across societies (Dobbin, 1994; Fhgstein, 1990; Scott, 2004) and their fit with the task 
environment of the organization (Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 1998). However, this 
improvement has generated a stream of categories and themes5 intended to address central 
institutional concerns. This study explored eight distinct institutional determinants, divided 
into formal and informal institutional classifications, which could sufficiently expound the 
current state of CG practices and reforms in Pakistan. These institutional classifications are 
consistent with prior studies (see Nakpodia, Adegbite, Amaeshi, & Owolabi, 2018) and unveil 
the institutional environment in Pakistan. Regarding the theoretical contribution, it must be 
noted that agency theory is the starting point for CG research, while institutional theory serves 
as complementary theory in this regard. In addition, this study identifies the most influential 
barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan that hinder the implementation of good CG practices 
and effectiveness of CG reforms. The study identified different drivers that can promote CG 
practices in Pakistan and increase the CG compliance among PSX listed firms. This study 
proposes a model of good CG practices in Pakistan that emphasizes the need to increase the 
                                                          
5 (see Giddens, 1984; Hall & Taylor, 1996) 
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level of awareness among different stakeholders through motivation, subsidies, tax rebates and 
enhanced collaboration with international regulatory bodies.   
At the end, this study finds positive relationship between CG compliance and firm 
performance. It is expected that firms are not complying the CCG 2012 in spirit. Hence, high 
CGI score does not indicate the actual compliance of CCG 2012. Thus, caution is need while 
evaluating the positive relationship between CG compliance and firm performance. The study 
highlights the need of more qualitative CG research aimed at developing new streams of CG 
frameworks and advancing existing governance theories. This study takes a step further in this 
matter by collecting data from multiple sources (i.e. interviews, survey and secondary data) 
which contextualized elucidation of good CG practices. Most of existing CG literature 
emphasized to employ qualitative research design (Zattoni, Douglas, & Judge, 2013), this study 
contributes to existing literature by offering more nuanced insight. The institutional effects on 
CG practices in Pakistan have abetted to shed more understanding on legitimacy, necessity, 
dynamics, applicability and effectiveness of certain CG mechanisms in weak institutional 
settings. Therefore, it is imperative that good CG models are not inhabited in seclusion of the 
rest of the institutional reinforcements (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011; Nakpodia, Adegbite, et 
al., 2018; Nakpodia, Shrives, & Sorour, 2018). This study highlights the effectiveness of an 
institutional analysis in understanding firm behavior (Lau, Fan, Young, & Wu, 2007; Lu, Xu, 
& Liu, 2009)in weak institutional contexts (Adegbite, 2015). The findings have significance 
implications for CG reforms in emerging economies especially for Pakistan (Fatima, Mortimer, 
& Bilal, 2018; Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016; Siddiqui, 2010). 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
As presented in Figure 1, this thesis consists of seven chapters. A brief synopsis of each chapter 
is presented below: 
Chapter One:  Chapter one offers the introduction of this study. It presents the background of 
the study, the research problem, research objectives and questions. In addition, this chapter 
also provides a brief outline of the adopted methodology and the rationale and significance of 
the study. At the end, the structure of the thesis is presented.  
Chapter Two: This chapter aims to conduct a comprehensive literature review on CG. It 
presents theoretical deliberations of CG applicable to this study. The chapter also presents 
objectives of CG, types of CG structures, socio-economic factors, CG compliance in developed 
and developing countries and determinants of CG practices identified in prior literature. In 
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addition, the chapter presents the nexus between CG compliance and firm performance both 
from developed and developing countries. At the end, the summary of the chapter is presented.  
Chapter Three: This chapter presents the detailed CG environment in Pakistan. It presents the 
historical development and the corporate sector of Pakistan. In addition, this chapter also 
presents the voting rights, enforcement mechanism and literature gap addressed by this thesis.  
Chapter Four: This chapter presents the detailed qualitative and quantitative methodology, 
adopted in this thesis. It presents the research paradigms, research design, research questions 
and relevant chosen methodology, triangulation and possible challenges in implementation 
mixed research methods. Furthermore, the chapter also presents the detailed qualitative and 
quantitative research methods including validity, semi-structured interview, sampling 
technique, reliability and validity, ethical considerations and analyses of qualitative and 
quantitative data of the study.  
Chapter Five: This chapter aims to explore the institutional determinants of CG practices in 
Pakistan and addresses the first research question of this study. Drawing on analysis of semi-
structured focus groups, this chapter presents eight aggregate themes with their sub themes. 
The chapter also presents how these institutional determinants are affecting CG practices in 
Pakistan and presents the institutional determinants of CG practices in pictorial form. At the 
end, a summary of the chapter is presented.  
Chapter Six: This chapter presents the analysis of the quantitative primary data which is 
collected thorough a survey questionnaire. The chapter presents the analyses that address the 
remaining three research questions of this thesis. Regarding the second research question, the 
chapter presents the demographic information of respondents followed by the most influential 
barriers to CG practices in Pakistan. Regarding the third research question, this chapter also 
presents the drivers of CG practices in Pakistan which can improve good corporate governance 
systems. At the end, this chapter presents the nexus between CG compliance and firm 
performance among PSX listed firms and addresses the last research question of this thesis. At 
the end of this chapter, the discussion, proposed CG model and chapter summary are presented. 
Chapter Seven: This is the final chapter and presents a brief summary of the findings of this 
study. This chapter presents the contributions of the study, followed by recommendations. At 
the end, the limitations of the study and an area for future research are presented.   
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This chapter aims to review existing literature on CG and identifies the significance of this 
study. The chapter helps to identify the gaps in existing literature especially in the context of 
emerging economies. Section 2.2 presents the background of corporate governance while 
section 2.3 discusses the different theoretical approaches, mainly agency theory, institutional 
theory, resource dependence theory, managerial signaling theory, stewardship theory and 
stakeholders’ theory. This section also provides implications of these theories in Pakistan, 
substantially focusing on agency and institutional theories. Section 2.4 presents objectives of 
CG regarding accountability and firm performance while section 2.5 discusses different types 
of CG structures with the help of existing literature. Section 2.6 presents the nexus between 
socio-economic perspectives and corporate governance while section 2.7 debates compliance 
with the CG code in developed and emerging economies. Section 2.8 identifies the 
determinants of CG in existing literature while section 2.9 presents the nexus between CG and 
firm performance. Section 2.10 presents qualitative studies on CG while section 2.11 presents 
a chapter summary and concludes this chapter.  
2.2 Corporate Governance 
The word governance is a broad and general. The particular application of governance is called 
corporate governance (CG) and it has subsets like organizational, political and economic 
governance. CG is a division of governance which is related to governance within an 
organizational structure. It indicates two things. The first is power that is related to the decision-
making process and the second is accountability that is related to the execution of this power 
and its subjectivity. CG is as old as the creation of early economic activities in history in the 
form of partnerships. However, it has gained the attention of policy makers in recent years due 
to serious financial crises in well governed jurisdictions (Ronald J. Gilson, 1996). CG can be 
defined both in narrow and broad senses. In the narrow sense, the emphasis is on the idea of 
shareholder values. Consequently, it is applied to ensure that the company is acting on behalf 
of its shareholders to increase their wealth. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 1) defined CG in a 
narrow sense. They documented that “Corporate governance is a set of mechanisms through 
which outside investors protect themselves from expropriation of insiders”. In addition, 
Cadbury (1992) documented that CG mechanisms provide assurance of a return on money 
invested by investors either in the form of interest or dividend. The entire process of 
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accountability and decision making has ended up with profit maximizing and increasing the 
value of shares (Shleifer, Vishny, Porta, & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2000). 
In the broader sense, it also includes interests of creditors, employees and the public at large 
besides directors and shareholders. CG has been explained in a broader sense by the OECD 
principles (2004) that define it as “a set of relationships between management, board and 
stakeholders”. The next section presents the theories of CG relevant to this thesis.  
2.3 Theories of Corporate Governance 
Several theories have been presented by academics that are related to CG. The interests and 
power of relevant groups are given priority over others. These theories have been drawn from 
a range of subjects that include finance, accounting and economics (Durisin & Puzone, 2009). 
Different theories present different definitions of CG and accounting and finance scholars are 
not agreed upon these definitions. This section discusses CG with the help of different theories 
on one hand with the implications of these theories in the contextual setting of Pakistan on the 
other hand.  
2.3.1 Agency Theory  
In CG literature, agency theory is the fundamental theory and mostly studies rely on it 
(Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009). The British economist, Adam Smith identified potential agency 
conflicts in modern organizations as separation of ownership and control (Smith, 1776, pp. 
606-607) by saying that: “The directors of companies who are also the managers of other 
people’s money cannot look out for others’ money as of their own. It is expected that negligence 
and cornucopia will prevail in management and affairs of the company”.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) expounded the agency contract as agreement between agents and 
principals to operate firms in the best interest of shareholders. Agency theory was developed 
first by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and they suggested the possibility of conflicts between 
managers and owners. Agency theory tries to reduce the agency conflicts between agents and 
principals and prevent the expropriation of shareholders by aligning their interests. It is also 
found that executive directors exploit insider information in their best interest (Black, Jang, & 
Kim, 2006; Chalevas, 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and executive directors can take excess 
pay in the form of bonuses and salaries to exploit shareholders’ wealth (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003; Berle & Means, 1932; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012). Jensen and Meckling (1976) debated that 
company managers can also exploit shareholders’ wealth by taking more fringe benefits in the 
form of greater sectorial support and office space.  
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Researchers argued that CG mechanism can be introduced to minimize agency cost and 
mitigate managerial deviousness (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Solomon, 2010). Agency theory 
helps with the establishment of legal contracts to monitor managers and advocates a reduction 
in executive BoDs which can increase the independence of the board (Chen, 2011; Solomon, 
2010). Allegrini and Greco (2013) argued that audit, remuneration and nomination committees 
are crucial tools to monitor managerial behaviors. The internal control mechanism also helps 
in reducing the expropriation of shareholders’ wealth (Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2011). 
Researchers also found that establishment of a managerial incentive system encourages 
managers to increase their performance (Li & Wang, 2016; Murphy & Sandino, 2010; Ntim, 
Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 2014). 
In Pakistan, the government has taken various steps regarding CG reforms within the country. 
The establishment of SECP in 1999, introduction of CCG in 2002 and recent CG reform in 
2012 established the foundation of CG reforms in the country. By decreasing the conflicts 
between shareholders and directors, CCG 2012 expects an increase in accountability, 
transparency and responsibility. Due to prevalence of high ownership concentration in 
Pakistan, there are more chances of conflicts between minority and majority shareholders and 
majority shareholders can also exploit the rights of minority shareholders (Baydoun et al., 
2013). Additionally, managers and directors can be appointed by majority shareholders or 
politically associated personalities regardless of their capability and experience (Boytsun, 
Deloof, & Matthyssens, 2011). These managers and directors may neglect the interests of all 
shareholder and only work in the best interest of majority shareholders. In short, the agency 
theory suggests that good governance can lead to decreasing the agency costs. While in 
Pakistan, mostly firms are family owned and consequently, provide a big hurdle in reforming 
the CG structure. BoDs are dominated by family members and they discourage any governance 
reform. There is a need to undermine family dominance in BoDs and comply with governance 
reforms in their true form.  
2.3.2 Resource Dependent Theory 
The resource dependent theory suggested that BoDs are a vigorous connection between firm 
resources which are essential for the growth of firms (Pfeffer, 1972). Similarly, Chen and 
Roberts (2010) also documented that firms have to rely on the environment for survival as they 
are not self-sufficient. The crux of resource dependent theory is to focus on process of 
organizations to get dynamic resources which are needed for growth and survival (Chen & 
Roberts, 2010). Consequently, resource dependent theory relies on two assumptions. 
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According to the first assumption, besides the monitoring role, the BoDs also play a significant 
role by providing critical resources that include knowledge, business contracts and expertise 
(Bouwman, 2011; Chen, 2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). As per the second assumption, they 
also represent the interests of different stakeholders (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson & 
Kiel, 2007). Researchers have also argued that BoDs can serve as a link between the firm and 
its environment to gain competitive advantage (Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
This theory suggests that BoDs can play a significant role in acquiring capital and resources. 
In Pakistan, most of the firms are family owned and families utilize their own funds to sustain 
managerial control. Similarly, governments can help in acquiring more funding for firms with 
higher levels of government ownership. Consequently, firms need to build strong relations with 
all the stakeholders to easily fulfill their funding requirement.  
2.3.3 Managerial Signaling Theory 
Managerial signaling theory expounds behavior when managers and shareholders have 
different information (Black et al., 2006; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). 
Researchers documented it as an extension of agency theory (see Buskirk, 2012). This theory 
further expounds that information is critical and insiders (such as managers and directors) hold 
more information than outsiders (shareholders). Jensen and Meckling (1976) documented that 
those managers who are working as agents of principals can use this information for their 
personal benefit and exploit the interests of principals. Moreover, Conyon and He (2011) 
argued that weak ethics and the opportunistic behavior of modern organizations are the 
foundation of this. The information asymmetry and market uncertainty can be reduced by 
adopting good CG practices within organizations. Therefore, this reduction can provide high 
liquidity by providing more local and foreign investment, reducing agency problems and 
enhancing market control (Chung & Zhang, 2011; Klein, Shapiro, & Young, 2005; Sharma, 
2013). The managerial signaling theory provides recommendations that those companies who 
publish corporate reporting have an advantage over other companies and financial institutions 
in that they are better as compared to others. Thus, they attract more investment and a better 
reputation as compared to their counterparts (Salman & Siddiqui, 2013).  
The companies should disclose more information as per the requirements of law and 
regulations. In contrast, the less disclosure of information will itself be a negative sign. It is 
necessary for companies to pick disclosure over non-disclosure to flag themselves as superior 
compared to normal companies. The introduction of the CCG in 2002 by the SECP in Pakistan, 
was intended to improve transparency and disclosure to reduce asymmetry information. The 
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recent reform of CG in 2012 mandates all listing companies to reveal information regarding 
change in board and ownership structure, financial change and performance of business. 
Consequently, this CG compliance and disclosure may reduce asymmetric information which 
may increase external funding and reduce funding cost.  
2.3.4 Stewardship Theory  
The steward theory is contradictory to the prophecies of agency theory. The main theme of the 
theory is reliance on the motivation of managers through the objectives of principals not by 
individual interests (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Consequently, stewardship 
theory advocates that managers of firms are trustworthy (Siebels & Knyphausen‐Aufseb, 
2012). The researchers also argued that managers (agents) have access to information which 
provides ample support to take appropriate decisions for the welfare of the firm (Nicholson & 
Kiel, 2007). Hence, they also try to employ resources for maximization of the firm’s value. 
This theory is based on some assumptions. The first assumption is about alignment of 
managers’ interests and shareholders’ interests (Davis et al., 1997). The second assumption is 
about CEO duality that advocates it as most appropriate system to run a company (Siebels & 
Knyphausen‐Aufseb, 2012). This theory also implies that managers do not misconduct for the 
sake of their career and reputation (Conyon & He, 2011).  
On the basis of the above discussion, stewardship theory is in divergence from agency theory 
as it suggests no agency conflicts exist (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). In Pakistan, CCG 2012 also 
mandates appointing at least one independent director and the maximum number of executive 
directors cannot be more than 1/3 of total elected directors including the CEO (SECP CCG, 
2012, p. 38). Moreover, the CEO and chairman cannot be the same person (SECP CCG, 2012, 
p. 39). The objective of CG is to make managers accountable by increasing supervision and 
monitoring. However, this is opposite to steward theory which suggests that mangers are 
trustworthy and reliable. It can be applicable to the Pakistani corporate environment where 
family ownership is high, and relatives are appointed in these family firms and are expected to 
be trustworthy.  
2.3.5 Stakeholders’ Theory  
Stakeholder theory offers a wider outlook on corporate governance. Stakeholders are defined 
as a broad range of groups and individuals who can affect corporate governance activities 
(Freeman, 1984). Contrary to agency theory, stakeholders’ theory undertakes the notion that 
managers are held responsible  all the stakeholders (Friedman & Miles, 2006). Accordingly, 
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firm needs to protect the interests of different stakeholders (Clarke, 1998; Solomon, 2010). 
Conversely, the expectations of stakeholders differ from company to company. Employees 
expect a good salary, job security and fringe benefits while shareholders expect handsome 
returns. The expectation of creditors is related to the strong financial position of the company 
to secure their investment through minimizing risk. Additionally, policy makers expect that 
CG compliance should be increased and shareholders’ rights should be protected. This theory 
emerged as a result of the shareholder model (Sternberg, 1997). Nonetheless, the stakeholder 
model is not much appreciated in those countries like US and UK where they provide more 
protection for shareholders by adopting Anglo-American orientation (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012) while it is much appreciated and favored in countries (such as 
Germany, Sweden, Japan) that adopt the Continental European model (Letza & Kirkbride, 
2004). Moreover, researchers also documented that a two tier board system is followed in these 
countries which usually comprises  both supervisory and managing members (Clarke, 1998; 
Conyon & He, 2011). Sharma (2013) argued that firms protect the interests of different 
stakeholders by employing the Continental European-Asian governance model. There are some 
fundamental assumptions regarding stakeholder theory. The first assumption is about the 
financial benefits and interests of society. The owners should not operate firms only for their 
own benefits, but interests of the relevant broader society should also kept in consideration 
(Chen & Roberts, 2010). The second assumption is about the accountability of executive 
directors. The researcher argued that executive BoDs are answerable to all stakeholders 
(Clarke, 1998). The third assumption is about morality and corporate social responsibility in 
doing business (Westphal & Zajac, 2013). Although, this theory is extensively implanted in 
CG codes (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), the researcher criticized in two ways 
(Sternberg, 1997). First, the main objective of firms is to maximize the wealth of shareholders 
and is contrary to the assumption of stakeholders’ theory. Second, it contradicts the agent 
principal relationship which advocates that managers are accountable only to shareholders. 
Consequently, it is incompatible with basic principles of corporate governance. However, 
researchers have still documented it as key CG theory (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Solomon, 2010). 
2.3.6 Institutional Theory 
This theory is a dominant perspective in macro organization theory (Dacin et al., 2008), 
contributes to crucial fundamentals of economic theories (Zahra, 2007) and strengthens the 
application and knowledge of other theoretical approaches (Suddaby, 2010). Scott (2004) 
defined institutional theory as “A theory on the deeper and more resilient aspects of social 
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structure” (p.2). Researchers have linked the institutional theory with agency theory (Judge et 
al., 2008) and proposed that the institutional theory of CG was compelled by the lack of a 
framework to address underlying institutional elements of the agency model (Mitnick, 2006). 
The studies relating to institutions have evolved substantially over time due to growing concern 
over agency theory (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). 
Researchers also argued that prevailing culture in emerging markets contributes to the weak 
CG practices in those countries (Rafiee & Sarabdeen, 2012) and suggests the adoption of 
cultural-cognitive system which may improve CG practices by harmonizing the key elements 
of normative and regulatory systems (Scott, 2013). It is also found that firms must understand 
and negotiate to different environmental influences, including politics and culture, for its 
survival (Patel & Xavier, 2005). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that firms are similar to 
each other in different areas and this concept is called isomorphism. Firms can imitate the 
activities and operations of another firm in a certain environment to become similar (Dacin, 
1997). The institutional isomorphism can be manifested in three forms (i.e. Mimetic, 
Normative and Coercive). In mimetic isomorphism, a firm deliberately tries to imitate the 
practices of established competitors in highly unpredictable environment for survival. While 
in normative isomorphism, there is no deliberate attempt of a firms to imitate its established 
competitors. Normative isomorphism emerges due to engagement of operatives and managers 
from its competitors. Coercive isomorphism is demand for change due to formal and informal 
pressure from societal culture and other organizations upon which firms depend (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). This highlights the importance of institutional environment to CG. Similarly,  
Knack and Keefer (1995) utilized the robustness of institutional environments to expound 
countries into developing and developed. Consequently, the developed countries should have 
relatively strong corporate governance as compared to developing countries due to having 
sound institutional framework, however, the classic cases, such as Enron, highlights concern 
regarding corporate governance in developed countries (Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2003). It 
implies that though the institutional environment is critical to corporate governance discourse, 
key players in a business could equally affect the emergence of (negative) isomorphic 
tendencies in a business environment. 
Since 1980s, the agency paradigm of corporate governance has been dominated in the existing 
literature (Brudney, 1985; Coffee, 1984), however, a number of recent CG studies emphasized 
on more holistic view and accounted the organizations’ nexus with society and different 
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stakeholders (DAVIS & USEEM, 2002). Aguilera and Jackson (2003) argued that the agency 
theory is an "under-socialized" approach which is impervious to how institutions share the 
interests and identities among actors in CG system. In addition, agency theory only focuses on 
managers and shareholders. Though different countries offer distinctive level of investor 
protection and therefore, effect the agency costs (Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1998), the role of institutions is very restricted from agency perspective. Sociological strands 
of institutional theory offers an alternative justification for firm behavior in terms of 
“understandings that organizational actors share, independent of their interests” (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983, p. 3). Institutional theory does not make projections on based on self-interested 
actors with bounded rationality but ascertains the normative, regulative and cognitive 
mechanisms that shape the interests and identities broad range of stakeholders.  
Aoki, Greif, and Milgrom (2001) argued that different stakeholders may adapt socially 
legitimate and institutionally accessible CG practices to build different coalitions. The firms 
have high ownership concentration in emerging markets (Fan & Wong, 2005) and state or a 
family holds most of the stake (Berglöf & Von Thadden, 1999). Jackson (2010) argued that 
different forms of agency conflicts take place across different countries due to different 
shareholders concentration and social identifies of block holders. Firms in emerging markets 
may have different organizational activities from firms in developed market(Wright, 
Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005; Young et al., 2008), therefore, CG problems may differ 
in these emerging markets and require different solution from the one which generated from 
agency perspectives (Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, & Very, 2005). Another criticized is the notion 
of effectiveness within agency theory is too narrow to be applied to CG in very different 
settings. Similarly, Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson (2008) argued that effectiveness 
of different CG practices depends mainly on their fit to broader organizational context. Recent 
CG studies emphasized that CG systems are embedded in larger institutional and legal 
frameworks (DAVIS & USEEM, 2002) and how wider political, social and cultural factors 
shape the cross-national diversity of actors and settings in corporate governance (see Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2010).  
Emerging markets have institutional differences from developed markets, and these should be 
integrated to CG policies while adapting the CG codes from developed markets. In addition, 
the policies designed for developed markets may be ineffective in emerging markets (Young 
et al., 2008) due to weak institutions (Gugler, Mueller, & Burcin Yurtoglu, 2003) and different 
capital market structure (Singh et al., 2005). Hence, the utilization of agency theory is 
19 
 
questioned. It is pivotal to see rich and comparative insights into institutions in order to 
understand CG systems worldwide (Filatotchev, Jackson, & Nakajima, 2013). Similarly, 
Mangena et al. (2012) and Filatotchev et al. (2013) argued that the institutional environment 
does affect board and ownership structures. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen 
(2003) argued that it is critical to categorize the institutional differences between rich and poor 
countries. Hence, it is imperative to comprehend existing studies related to institutional 
influence on CG. In developing countries, like Pakistan, some individuals might exercise their 
power which provide an opportunity to those individuals to influence institutional elements to 
achieve personal objectives and interests. Consequently, it is critical to manage and develop 
this knowledge to promote CG in developing countries.  
2.4 Objectives of Corporate Governance  
This section presents the objectives of CG. Two main perspectives of CG are discussed in this 
section. Section 2.4.1 discusses the firm performance perspective while section 2.4.2 talks 
about the accountability perspective. The delegation of power between shareholders and 
indicators of firm performance are also presented in this section. 
2.4.1 Financial Performance 
In the extended literature, the debate about good governance on financial performance is 
unresolved. A number of indicators reflect the performance of stock exchanges and firms. The 
mostly documented indicators for firm performance are return of capital, stock prices and 
return on assets, while stock market indices are used for indicating stock market performance 
(Black et al., 2006; Drobetz, Schillhofer, & Zimmermann, 2004). Financial performance is 
considered as evidence for the success of firms and there is always found to be a link between 
good CG and financial performance. Nonetheless, it is problematic to find type and causality 
empirically. In existing literature, researchers found diverse relationships. Some scholars found 
a positive relationship between CG components and financial performance while others found 
negative (Brown & Caylor, 2006; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). Although the literature provides 
correlation of some specific governance measures with financial performance, the link with 
overall governance mechanisms is still unresolved (Aguilera, Florackis, & Kim, 2016). 
Moreover, the extent of the relationship of individual and specific governance features on 
financial performance is still challenging. Endogenous and exogenous forces may affect 
financial performance (Aguilera et al., 2016; Souha & Anis, 2016). In a similar vein, the share 
price of a firm may be affected by multiple factors that include but are not limited to economic, 
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political and security issues. Besides this, domestic and global incidents may affect the share 
price of firms that ultimately will have an impact on the market index. Such external variables 
that affect performance are exogenous factors (Connor & Korajczyk, 1986). The overall 
structure of the firm, the distribution of powers between directors and shareholders, statutory 
governance mechanism, and structure of BoDs come into the domain of endogenous forces. 
The separation of the effect of both exogenous and endogenous variables is also problematic 
and it is challenging to find a casual relation between overall governance components and 
financial performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). 
Researchers also documented that mostly investors are anxious about performance rather than 
compliance with good CG practices (MacNeil & Li, 2006b). Consequently, if firms are already 
performing well, investors may ignore compliance with good CG practices. It is also 
noteworthy that caution is required in the adaptation of such an approach in developing 
countries such as Pakistan. It is well acknowledged that performance is pivotal to investors and 
companies who are following good CG practices may establish an example for other 
companies. Therefore, it creates a culture of compliance with good CG practices that ultimately 
can attract more investment. The link between specific governance measures and performance 
cannot be demonstrated in developing countries like Pakistan. Therefore, compliance with 
good CG practices can help in endorsing and enhancing investors’ confidence in the country. 
Additionally, it will provide incentives and attract investments for poorly performing firms 
which will ultimately help in boosting stock markets.  
2.4.2 Accountability  
This is linked to power. In contemporary companies, especially public companies, it is not 
viable to involve shareholders in every decision-making process. Thus, power is given to a 
certain people who are nominated by shareholders. BoDs must be accountable to shareholders 
when power is given to them as they are not the real owners of the company.  The removal of 
non-performing directors is also a form of accountability. In the UK, there is an easy process 
for the removal of directors, although, directors have all the power. A simple resolution is 
needed to remove a director and accountability is linked to controlling shareholders as well. 
The controlling shareholders can also expropriate funds of a company for their own interests 
and benefits. They may approve a contract that is in favor of their own interest rather than in 
favor of the shareholders of the company (Companies Act 2006, s 168). Consequently, the 
whole concept of accountability revolves around the powers of shareholders to hold directors 
and controlling shareholders accountable. The CG code requires disclosure which helps 
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shareholders to take actions and also facilitates controlling rebellious shareholders. Therefore, 
accountability can occur outside the legal framework as codes make provisions that are not 
implemented in a formal legal way.  
2.5 Types of Corporate Governance Structures 
This section presents the different types of CG structures. Section 2.5.1 presents dispersed 
ownership while section 2.5.2 presents concentration of ownership structures. The government 
ownership structure is presented in section 2.5.3, while family-based enterprises are presented 
at the end of this section. The section discusses different aspects of CG structures that helps in 
comprehending the contextual environment of the underway study.  
2.5.1 Dispersed Ownership 
The structures in which shareholders are dispersed are called dispersed ownership structures. 
Hence, it is very difficult to gather, discuss and convince all shareholders if some quick action 
is needed. Additionally, more cost is involved and sometimes it is impossible to convince all 
shareholders. The elementary feature of this structure is problems of collective actions of 
shareholders and dispirited attitude as well (Gower, 1979). Consequently, it provides 
opportunity for managers to exploit shareholders and manipulate decision making. Moreover, 
they also control proxy mechanisms and agenda of meetings that ultimately weaken 
shareholders’ control (Cubbin & Dennis Leech, 1983). Dispersed ownership does not prevail 
in many countries but is limited to the UK and the US (Silanes, La Porta, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1997) while concentrated ownership is dominant in the rest of the world especially in emerging 
economies. Mostly families, states and groups control the corporate sector. Conversely, 
dispersed ownership is not  a substandard management monitoring system for the performance 
of managers (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Diverse types of governance systems are developed 
over time to monitor the performance of managers and making them accountable. Additionally, 
the role of the market cannot be neglected in this regard. The non-performing firms and 
managers can be punished in a developed and active markets. Minority rights, takeovers, 
institutional investors, strong regulators and enforcement mechanisms may act as powerful 
market features to monitor and protect shareholders’ rights. Countries such as the US and the 
UK, have particularly different views on the development of such a system. In the US, 
dispersed ownership occurred through political forces and historical developments, not 
economic efficiency (Roe, 1991). 
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Silanes et al. (1997) documented that there is a positive connection between security of 
property rights and legal protection of investors. They further reported that such legal 
protection is directly associated with effective CG and is reflected in developed markets and 
dispersed ownership (Silanes et al., 1997). In contrast, Cheffins (2001) documented that law 
was not the main contributing factor in the evolution of a dispersed structure in the UK. He 
further argued that the main contributing factors were social and financial environments, 
independent and self-regulation, an impartial and professional judiciary, while alternative 
institutional structures also played their role in it (Brian R. Cheffins, 2000). The legal 
environment of a country can be the key driving force for effective CG in the absence of an 
institutional structure in the UK that provides confidence to investors. Moreover, the legal 
structure helps in the dispersion of investors’ finance to different investments with confidence. 
This spectacle also inspires the development of the capital market. In contrast, if there is no or 
less legal protection for investors they will prefer block holdings and be reluctant to have 
minority shareholdings (John C. Coffee, 1999). In existing literature, a number of researchers 
documented diverse reasons for dispersed ownership, but legal protection is still the 
dominating reason. It is also noticed that market discipline also plays a pivotal role in 
prerogatives with dispersed shareholdings that can also be seen in the implementation of the 
UK Code of CG, although the code is attached in an annex to listing regulations and is not part 
of it. It is also not considered as part of the legal framework but only part of soft law. The code 
is based on either complying with or explaining principles and is self-regulated. Moreover, it 
is also applicable to premier companies that are listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
The companies are required to either comply with or explain in the case of non-compliance 
with the code. Conformance with the code is also required for listing on the LSE. The United 
Kingdom Listing Authority (UKLA) has some certain rules and regulations which require 
disclosure of certain information and, if the company is not disclosing that information, a fine, 
suspension and public censure may be sanctioned. Consequently, market monitors the CG 
compliance and also accept the valid justification for non-compliance. The market may punish 
companies for non-compliance by reducing their share price that ultimately leads towards an 
increase in the cost of capital.  
2.5.2 Concentrated Ownership  
Shareholders control the firm through divergent techniques in concentrated ownership. They 
can control firms either by holding more that 50% of the share of a firm or by holding more 
voting rights. On the other side, they can control a firm by implementing pyramid structures 
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by holding fewer shares in a subsidiary company while holding more shares in a holding 
company (Javid & Iqbal, 2008b). Moreover, they may control firms through cross 
shareholdings and appoint different family members. Generally, cross shareholding is a 
subcategory of a pyramid structure. And few families can control the firms for their own 
benefits. Concentrated ownership is a general practice in Asia and Europe and in such a system, 
the financial institutions such as banks play a pivotal role (Fan & Wong, 2002; Javid & Iqbal, 
2008b). Consequently, investors invest though financial intermediaries if they feel direct 
investments are not secure. If governance and legal systems do not provide protection to 
investors, then shareholders control firms by implementing concentrated ownership.  
2.5.3 Government Ownership 
Governance structure is a subset of concentrated ownership in which the state or government 
controls the regulators and shareholders. Consequently, it is very hard for regulators to punish 
themselves thus making this system less efficient. In some underdeveloped and social 
economies including Pakistan, the majority of the economy is operated through state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Additionally, politicians have direct or indirect control over most firms 
through state ownership or regulations. Moreover, they also have power and try to repel the 
reforms to maintain their status quo, which is not good (Milhaupt, 1998). In recent years, the 
financial crises in Asia, the failure of socialism and recession around the globe have prompted 
the attention of international bodies and host countries to enhance the governance structure of 
poorly performing countries. Consequently, international financial institutions also offered 
loans to emerging countries and compelled them to do necessary reforms. The corporatization 
of State Owned Enterprises was also included in the reform agenda (Metzger, 2003). Thus, 
these reforms reduced the control of states over those enterprises which were running 
bureaucratically.  
2.5.4 Family Owned Businesses (FOBs)  
Another form of concentrated ownership structure is FOBs in which families hold most of the 
shares and control the key part of the economy. Nonetheless, they tailor governance structures 
for their own benefit. Lim (2001) documented examples of such structures from Japan and 
Korea that include Keiretsu and Chaebol, respectively. The families control their firms by 
applying different forms such as shareholder interlocking, pyramiding and shared ownership. 
These families monitor and manage the company which leads towards poor internal 
governance. Consequently, this type of structuring has a negative impact on CG practices. 
These path dependencies also create resistance to reform which can monitor their  powers (Lee 
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& Park, 2008; Miyajima, 2005). It is the same in the case of Pakistan, where families control 
and hold firms. Moreover, these families also have connections with politicians and are 
sometimes directly involved in politics.  In such firms, shareholders have control but not as per 
their proportion. They control management and the whole firm. Mostly, family members are 
appointed as directors in these firms. Although, there is no ideal system for corporate 
governance, concentrated ownership is regarded more attentive paralleled by dispersed 
ownership as managers may be held accountable by controlling shareholders (Cheffins, 2001). 
Nevertheless, managers have more opportunities in dispersed ownership to expropriate 
minority shareholders as they do not have enticements to monitor managers’ behavior.  
2.6 Socio-economic Perspective and Corporate Governance 
Usually, there is no connection between religion and the CG issue, but it can have an impact 
in an ideological country. Amir et al., (2005) and Bebchuk and Roe. (1999) documented that 
the ideology and culture of a country also determines governance mechanisms and choice of 
corporate law. Additionally, researchers argued that investor protection can vary due to the 
country’s main religion (Stulz & Williamson, 2003). They found that creditor rights were 
strong in Protestant countries as compared to Catholic countries. Hilary and Hui (2009) 
conducted a study in the US and found that religiosity also matters in the decision-making 
process of firms. They found that firms with high religiosity show lower investment, less risk 
exposure and higher undiscounted profits. Researchers also found a negative association of 
religiosity with earnings management, option backdating and executive compensation in the 
US (Grullon, Kanatas, & Weston, 2009). Similarly, McGuire, Omer, and Sharp (2011) 
investigated the impact of religion in financial reporting. They found a negative relationship 
between religiosity and accrual-based earnings management. In prior literature, researchers 
documented that ethical norms and social commitments are key components of Islamic 
business within the framework of Sharia (Ahmad, 2000). Asyraf (2006) documented that 
Sharia embargoes intermingling of Islamic financial transactions for ethical and socially 
responsible reasons on one hand while prohibiting illegal activities on the other hand. Islam is 
viewed as a practical religion which defines and leads every field of life.  
Islam is extended to the whole life of Muslims rather than limited to few rituals. It has also 
recognized the broad principles and ethics of doing business (Khan, 2014). Additionally, an 
Islamic economy provides honesty, fairness and justice which is also considered as its main 
characteristic. Pakistan is an Islamic country and its constitution is based on Islam. Therefore, 
religion is dominant in cultural, political, social and also in business affairs and Islam is 
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recognized as the state religion by the Constitution of Pakistan. Additionally, the Constitution 
of Pakistan also safeguards the Islamic spirit thorough bringing all existing laws in conformity 
within the embargoes of Islam as laid down by the Quran and Sunnah. Correspondingly, it also 
explains that no law shall be sanctioned that is obnoxious to such embargoes. Different 
institutions have been established to check conformity with the law and ensure compliance 
with the provisions of the constitution. Moreover, different steps are taken by the government 
to bring conformity with the embargoes of Islam under directions of these institutions. Being 
an Islamic state, Pakistan may drive its CG mechanisms from Islamic norms. But traditionally, 
this has endured only as a weak force. Due to colonial influence, Pakistan inherited its corporate 
laws from British rule, but historical status developed its corporate sector which differs from 
the British. However, Islamic norms in Pakistan and around the world can still play a pivotal 
role in the development of the corporate sector of Pakistan. Although researchers have tried to 
establish a link between religion and corporate governance, it is still emerging (Amir N. Licht 
et al., 2005; Asyraf, 2006; Bebchuk & Roe., 1999; Grullon et al., 2009; McGuire et al., 2011; 
Stulz & Williamson, 2003).  
Culture is distinct (Ronen & Shenkar, 2013). As per the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981), 
cultural norms affect individual behavior and persist within the environment. Religion and 
culture are positioned at the top and affect economic outcomes (Williamson, 2000). In a similar 
vein, Zheng, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Kwok (2012) suggest that individuals’ behavior and 
decision making are affected by informal constraints such as culture which ultimately influence 
economic outcomes. Roe (2000) documented that political and ideological conditions have an 
impact on the development of the CG system of a specific country. Besides this, a number of 
studies have also documented that country characteristics excluding state investor protection 
have substantial effects on the country level of the measure of corporate governance. Bushman, 
Piotroski, and Smith (2004) also support this argument. They documented that political 
environment physiognomies are pivotal for some types of financial disclosures. Hope (2003) 
conducted a study to investigate the impact of culture and legal origin on disclosure. He found 
that culture is important and provides explanatory power for disclosure. In a similar vein, 
Daniel, Cieslewicz, and Pourjalali (2012) conducted a study to investigate the impact of culture 
and institutional environment on corporate governance practices. They employed structural 
equation modeling and found that culture has an influence on corporate governance practices 
through the institutional environment. Keeping in view the above discussion, this thesis seeks 
to explore the effect of key institutions on good CG practices in Pakistan. 
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2.7 Compliance and Corporate Governance Disclosure 
In existing literature, researchers argued that the primary objective of a CG code is to enhance 
transparency, accountability and CG disclosure (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Bouwman, 
2011). Moreover, researchers also found that development in CG is still progressing as there 
are some cultural and regional differences which affect implementation and compliance with 
CG code (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012). In some 
countries, compliance with a CG code is mandatory while in some it is comply or explain. 
According to the UK Cadbury Report (1992), compliance with the CG code is “comply or 
explain” while as per the US Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), it is mandatory. Consequently, much 
attention has been given to measuring compliance with the CG code and its influence on the 
performance nexus (Bozec, Dia, & Bozec, 2010; MacNeil & Li, 2006a). This section seeks to 
explore the level of CG compliance in developed and developing countries and factors that 
affect CG compliance.  
2.7.1 Level of CG Compliance and Disclosure  
It is evident from existing literature that CG compliance differs from country to country and 
firms have different levels of CG practices (MacNeil & Li, 2006a; Samaha, Dahawy, 
Hussainey, & Stapleton, 2012). Recently, many developed and developing countries have 
introduced different CG codes to increase CG practices among firms. Therefore, researchers 
have also given considerable attention to examine factors affecting CG disclosure (Allegrini & 
Greco, 2013).  
2.7.1.1 CG Compliance in Developed Countries 
The level of compliance is high in developed countries. Conyon (1994) found through his 
survey research that CG practices improved among firms after the introduction of the UK 1992 
Cadbury Report. He further argued that there was great change among firms regarding 
separation of role of CEO and chairperson. The separation of CEO and chairperson was 57% 
before implementation of the code and increased to 77% among UK firms after 
implementation. Correspondingly, Conyon and Mallin (1997) conducted a literature review 
related to CG compliance and found that firms were adhering to the code by increasing the 
number of non-executive members on committees and boards. Werder, Talaulicar, and Kolat 
(2005) conducted a study among German firms to investigate the level of compliance. They 
found high levels of CG code compliance in the listed firms of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 
They used a sample of 408 German firms for the year 2003. Correspondingly, Cromme (2005) 
also conducted a study among German listed firms to investigate compliance with corporate 
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governance principles in 2003. He found that 3/4 of listed firms were complying with good CG 
principles. In 2010, researchers conducted a study among UK firms to investigate compliance 
with the 2003 Combined Code (Hegazy & Hegazy, 2010). They found that the average degree 
of CG compliance among UK firms was around 70%. They took samples of FTSE 100 firms 
and analyzed annual reports for the year 2008 by employing content analysis.  
Hussainey and Al‐Najjar (2012) conducted a study by taking a sample of non-financial listed 
firms of the UK. They took 130 firms as a sample of study over the years 2003 to 2009. The 
findings of their study showed high levels of compliance with the Corporate Governance 
Quotient (CGQ). On the basis of the above studies, it can be argued that UK firms are 
improving disclosure and governance practices by complying with the UK combined code. 
Allegrini and Greco (2013) conducted a study among Italian listed companies. They developed 
an index with 60 provisions of 2007 Italian CG code and documented that levels of governance 
practices and voluntary disclosure had increased among Italian listed companies. 
Correspondingly, Salterio, Conrod, and Schmidt (2013) conducted a study among Canadian 
listed firms, taking a sample of 742 Canadian listed firms, and used 16 CG recommendations. 
The study findings revealed that only 39% listed firms were fully complying while 82% were 
partially complying with CG codes. In conclusion, it can be argued that CG compliance is high 
in developed countries. Researchers also documented that robust economic, legal and cultural 
systems in these developed economies are effective in ensuring and ascertaining compliance 
with good CG practices (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Salterio et al., 2013).  
2.7.1.2 CG Compliance in Developing Countries 
Researchers found extensive inequality with levels of compliance with CG disclosure among 
developing countries (Solomon, 2010). Existing empirical studies also expounded that the CG 
compliance differs due to the type of government at the country level (MacNeil & Li, 2006a; 
Samaha et al., 2012) and some studies found weak levels of compliance in developing 
countries. Researchers conducted a study to determine an overview of the Turkish CG system 
(Ararat & Ugur, 2003). They uncovered some weaknesses in the Turkish CG system and 
concluded that low compliance in Turkish listed firms is due to weak enforcement and 
supervision of regulatory authorities (Ararat & Ugur, 2003). Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros 
(2006) conducted a study by taking a sample of 160 Cyprus listed firms for the year 2002. They 
found that only a marginal number of firms were complying with the provisions of the CG 
code. The CG code introduced in 2002 in Cyprus and it may be a possible reason for the 
marginal number of listed companies. Furthermore, researchers also emphasized that time was 
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very short for the implementation of CG reform to improve CG practices (Renders, 
Gaeremynck, & Sercu, 2010). Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, and Onumah (2007) developed a CG 
index and took a sample of 22 Ghana listed firms over the year 2001 to 2002. The findings of 
their study show a 52 % average score for disclosure and transparency. Similarly, Samaha et 
al. (2012) conducted a study to determine the level of voluntary disclosure by taking a sample 
of 100 Egyptian listed firms for the year 2009. They used a disclosure index with 53 provisions 
of corporate governance. Researchers conducted a study to determine the degree of voluntary 
disclosure in the Brazilian stock market (Schiehll, Terra, & Victor, 2013). They examined the 
degree of disclosure with the Executive Stock Option plan (ESO) which was released in 2007. 
They used data of 68 publicly traded firms and the findings of their study reveal that Brazilian 
companies were not complying with all the recommended provisions. Companies were 
complying with only 10 provisions out of 23 and disclosing limited information about ESO 
plans.  
In contrast, some studies found that CG compliance improved substantially in some developing 
countries after the introduction of the CG code. Researchers also conducted a study to 
determine levels of corporate disclosure in Portuguese firms (Alves & Mendes, 2004). They 
found a significant improvement after the publication of the Portuguese CG Code in 1999. The 
gradual increase was also found in the level of CG compliance among 54 listed firms of Kenya 
for the year 1999 after the development of corporate governance principles (Barako, Hancock, 
& Izan, 2006). Additionally, Chalevas (2011) conducted a study among Greek companies to 
determine the level of compliance with CG standards from the years 2000 to 2003. He found 
that the level of compliance improved among Greek companies for the investigated period. 
Similarly, Ntim and Danbolt (2012) conducted a study to determine the effect of King II report 
on CG practices by taking a sample listed firms of South Africa. They developed a CG index 
with 50 provisions. They found improvement in corporate governance standards after the 
release of the King II report in 2002; specifically the level of CG compliance reached 69% in 
2006 from 47% in 2002.  
Furthermore, there are some studies that focused on cross countries. In 2002, researchers 
conducted a study among 19 emerging markets to investigate compliance level. They took 354 
firms over the period 1998 to 2000. They documented that South African and Asian markets 
have considerably higher levels of disclosure and transparency as compared to Eastern Europe, 
Latin America and Middle East markets. Furthermore, Klapper and Love (2004) employed a 
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CLSA index to find deviation in firms’ levels of CG disclosures6. They drew sample from 14 
developing countries for the year 2000 and found great variation in firms’ levels of governance 
disclosures. In a nutshell, it can be summarized that variance in compliance with corporate 
governance standards is due to differences in the cultural, social and legal systems of countries 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012). It can also be concluded that compliance 
with corporate governance has been improved with the introduction of a code of good CG in 
some countries. Consequently, Bozec et al. (2010) documented that developing countries adopt 
good CG practices to attract more investors as they are already suffering from a weak legal 
system in the country.  
After issuance of the CG code 2002, only limited number of  studies have been conducted to 
investigate CG compliance in Pakistan (Javid & Iqbal, 2008a; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). These 
studies only took the CG code 2002 and examined the compliance with a few CG provisions. 
Javed and Iqbal (2007) examined the CG compliance by taking 50 KSE listed firms over the 
period of 2003 to 2005. They only constructed the CG index by taking 22 provisions and found 
possible improvement in levels of compliance and disclosure. These few provisions may not 
represent the level of compliance in a true form. Additionally, Javid and Iqbal (2008a) 
conducted a study to examine CG standards among 50 KSE listed companies over the period 
of 2003 to 2007. They found that CG compliance improved due to monitoring of SECP. 
Recently, Tariq and Abbas (2013) employed a weighted index consisting of 50 provisions for 
119 PSX listed firms over the period of 2003 to 2010. They documented that although CG 
compliance has improved since issuance of the CG code in 2002 it is still minimal. The above 
studies have some limitations in the shape of fewer provisions, methodology and fewer 
observations7. Additionally, these studies only considered the CG code 2002. This study fills 
this gap by employing mixed methods and constructed CG compliance scores through a survey 
questionnaire.  
2.7.2 Corporate Governance and Institutions in Emerging Economies  
Researchers have documented that institutions are predetermined and shaped by the distinct 
national system of the country (Douglass, 1990; Gustafsson, Knudsen, & Mäki, 2003). Gilson 
(1996) argued that the economic success of firms is also dependent on the institutions of a 
particular country in which they are expected to compete. Sorour and Howell (2012) conducted 
                                                          
6 CLSA index stands for Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia.  
7 These studies only focused on CG code 2002 and ignored the recent CG reform in 2012. In addition, the CG 
index is constructed from annual reports that may not be truly representative of CG compliance due to tick 
practices  (see Khan, 2014).  
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a study in Egyptian banks and found that powerful agents drive the political process of CG. In 
a similar vein, Jizi, Salama, Dixon, and Stratling (2014) argued that powerful CEOs take liberal 
decisions which may not be in best interest of firms. Thus, it is evident that economic actors 
appear to endure more effect on the discretion of CG. Researchers also investigated the impact 
of low education on political institutions and found that well educated countries exhibit  more 
stable democracies from those poorly educated countries (Hanushek & Wößmann, 2007; Jones, 
2016; Karatnycky, 2002). These findings expounds the political institutions are more pertinent 
in educated countries as compared to their counterparts (Lipset, 1960). Cuervo (2002) 
examined the deficiencies in shareholders’ protection in Anglo-Saxon and continental 
European systems of CG. He found that the enforceability issue in Continental Europe restricts 
the use of codes. The existing literature also provides evidence that the dominant religion 
(Hilary & Hui, 2009; McGuire et al., 2011) and prevailing culture (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), 
for example, are vital for the effectiveness of CG codes. In addition, legal institutions can also 
be confronted by legitimacy issues that also emasculate their effectiveness. Judge et al. (2008) 
found three pillars (such as legal institutions, culture and particularly, corruption) of 
institutionalization which driving the perceptions of CG at the country level. In addition, global 
CG systems cannot be restricted to the Anglo Saxon or Continental European models (Judge 
et al., 2008).  
Researchers also found issues of legal protection of minority shareholders in emerging 
economies (Hasan, Kobeissi, & Song, 2014; Klapper & Love, 2004) which raises the question 
about the role of legal institutions in those economies. Similarly, corruption is associated with 
societal elites in many weak institutional contexts. Despite the importance of the institutional 
framework, researchers have questioned its significance in creating a robust CG system 
(Adegbite et al., 2013; Johanson & Ostergren, 2010; Przeworski, 2004). Some researchers 
agreed that institutions matter (Adu-Amoah, Tsamenyi, & Mensah Onumah, 2008) while 
others documented that institutions do not matter absolutely (Przeworski, 2004). It is not 
possible to design an effective CG system without taking political and social factors into 
account (Adu-Amoah et al., 2008).  
In a nutshell, it is documented that institutions do play a significant role in developing CG 
systems; however, it depends on the extent of institutional sophistication. However, the 
intuitional sophistication may be affected by the conditionalities which are intrinsic in a 
specific system.  The effects of these conditions depend on economic development of particular 
country. Therefore, these conditions are flabbergasted by the robustness of existing institutions 
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in developed countries while it is divergent in emerging economies and affects the CG model 
adopted in emerging countries.   
2.8 Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Existing literature reveals divergence in disclosure level among firms. Researchers also 
emphasized that corporate ownership and board characteristics are leading determinants for 
CG disclosure (Chalevas, 2011; Nadeem et al., 2013; Samaha et al., 2012). It is also evident 
from existing literature that most empirical studies were conducted in American firms till 1990s 
to examine corporate governance and voluntary disclosure (Bozec et al., 2010). Similarly, La 
Porta et al., (2002) conducted a number of studies to make international comparisons by 
making cross country studies and found that poor investors’ protection is cause of lower 
valuation (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). Consequently, keeping in view the limited literature 
in developing countries, particularly in Pakistan, this study adds to existing CG literature by 
exploring the key institutional determinants of good CG practices. There are some mechanisms 
needed for effective corporate governance. Jensen (1986) classified internal and external 
mechanisms as effective corporate governance mechanisms. Consequently, researchers 
documented ownership structure and BoDs as internal mechanisms of corporate governance. 
Moreover, the researcher also documented that external mechanisms are mainly connected to 
rules and regulations regarding control and operation of companies (Jensen, 1986).  
2.8.1 Ownership Structure and CG Disclosure 
Existing studies revealed that ownership structure is a pivotal determinant of good CG practices 
(Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Konijn, Kraussl, & Lucas, 2011; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999). It is expected theoretically that large shareholders can manage and control 
managers that can enhance disclosure and CG practices (Edmans & Manso, 2011; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Consequently, researchers emphasized that institutional ownership attracts 
foreign investors by improving disclosure and CG practices (Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, & 
Tehranian, 2007; Kansil & Singh, 2018; Nashier & Gupta, 2016). However, empirical evidence 
on exploring the nexus between disclosure and ownership structure are still inconclusive 
(Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). 
2.8.1.1 Government Ownership and CG Disclosure 
It is documented that government ownership is a key factor in emerging countries that can 
influence corporate governance disclosure as concentrated ownership is extensive among these 
countries (Cornett, Guo, Khaksari, & Tehranian, 2010). Researchers also acknowledged that 
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the agency problem arises in government ownership (Eng & Mak, 2003). Additionally, 
researchers also recognized that poor corporate governance structure in firms is caused by the 
intervention of government in operating firms (Konijn et al., 2011). Some researchers 
documented that government can use its power to appoint CEOs and directors irrespective of 
their qualifications and experience (Cornett et al., 2010). From the stewardship theory 
perspective, executive directors and CEOs may not be affected by government ownership due 
to alignment of their interests with corporate owners (Davis et al., 1997). Consequently, CEOs 
have to improve firm performance in order to protect their reputation and career growth 
(Conyon & He, 2011). Similarly, resource dependence theory supports the argument that 
government ownership may grant tax subsidies and government contracts that ultimately 
improve disclosure and performance (Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2012). The empirical literature on the relationship between government ownership and CG 
disclosure is still emerging (Eng & Mak, 2003; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012) and it provides an 
opportunity to made contributions internationally. Eng and Mak (2003) took a sample of 158 
listed firms of Singapore for the year 1995 to examine relationship between government 
ownership and voluntary disclosure and found a positive relationship. Additionally, Conyon 
and He (2011) examined the relationship between government ownership and corporate 
governance practices. They took a sample of 1342 Chinese firms over the years 2001 to 2005 
and documented a positive relationship between them. In a similar vein, Ntim and Danbolt 
(2012) conducted a study in South African listed firms and found a positive link between 
government ownership and voluntary CG disclosure. Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, and Fadzil (2012) 
conducted a study in Saudi listed firms to explore the effect of government ownership on 
corporate disclosure. They employed a corporate governance index consisting of nine 
provisions with a sample of 42 listed firms. They found a positive effect of government 
ownership on corporate governance disclosure.  
2.8.1.2 Institutional Ownership and CG Disclosure 
Institutional investors are more proficient in monitoring and improving corporate governance 
disclosure (Barako et al., 2006). Jensen and Meckling (1976) acknowledged that monitoring 
helps in mitigating the conflicts between investors and directors (Solomon, 2010). 
Additionally, the institutional investors have  greater spurs to protect investment particularly 
when existence for firms is costly (Chung & Zhang, 2011). Therefore, they also ensure high 
levels of accountability between top management and shareholders (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, 
& Matos, 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Existing studies reveal that institutional ownership 
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can mitigate agency cost through monitoring the behaviors of managers. Healy and Palepu 
(2001) suggested that improvement in corporate governance disclosure may lead towards high 
share prices that ultimately increase firm value. In a similar vein, Ntim and Danbolt (2012) 
also provided similar suggestions. It is evident that institutional shareholders can help in 
reducing information asymmetry (Aggarwal et al., 2011). These findings are also consistent 
with the argument of Chung and Zhang (2011) that institutional shareholding increases the 
quality of CG among firms. On the other hand, Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011) also 
documented that it is not necessary that institutional investors will perform as leading element 
in improving the level of transparency and disclosure. They can also play a weak role in 
motivating good CG practices in order to get short term benefits. A number of empirical studies 
documented a positive relationship between institutional ownership and corporate disclosure 
(Aggarwal et al., 2011; Chung & Zhang, 2011; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012). Barako et al. (2006) 
conducted a study by taking a sample of 53 Kenyan listed firms and found a significant positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and transparency. In a similar vein, Bushee, 
Carter, and Gerakos (2013) conducted a study and found a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and corporate governance practices. Chung and Zhang (2011) 
conducted a study by employing a large sample of 12093 firm year observations for the years 
2001 to 2006 in the US financial market. They found a positive relationship between the level 
of corporate governance compliance and institutional investors. It is evident from developed 
and emerging economies that institutional ownership has a positive association with corporate 
disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012). 
2.8.1.3 Block holders Ownership and CG Disclosure  
The stakeholders’ theory suggests that block holders have a dominant effect on CG disclosure 
(Edmans, 2014; Konijn et al., 2011; Yermack, 2017). Researchers also argue that outside block 
holders have considerable power and consequently they have power to limit excessive 
compensation (Conyon & He, 2011; Konijn et al., 2011). Additionally,  Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) expounded that block holders have power to control opportunistic behavior of managers 
as compared to small shareholders that ultimately reduces agency cost. Correspondingly, 
Konijn et al. (2011) suggested that large shareholders take more interest in monitoring the 
performance of managers and reduce the problem of free riders. In addition, block holders have 
more funds to support a firm financially and can improve firm performance (Chen, Chen, & 
Wei, 2009). On the other side, large shareholders can expropriate corporate resources and small 
shareholders by conspiring with managers (Ntim, Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 2015). In literature, 
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the empirical studies documented a negative or no association of block holder ownership with 
level of corporate governance disclosure. Barako et al. (2006) found a negative association 
between block holder ownership and voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Al-Bassam, Ntim, 
Opong, and Downs (2018) also found a negative relationship between them which is also 
consistent with findings of Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013). In contrast, Konijn et al. (2011) found 
no link between shareholders rights and block holders among US firms. Researchers argued 
that this deviation in findings may be due to different contextual settings (Robertson, Diyab, & 
Al-Kahtani, 2013). Emerging countries suffer weak legal systems (Adegbite et al., 2013; 
Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008; Judge et al., 2008) while developed countries have efficient 
external CG mechanism that ultimately helps with improvement in CG disclosure (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). 
2.8.1.4 Director Ownership and CG Disclosure 
The board of directors play a significant role in CG disclosure policies (Chalevas, 2011; Eng 
& Mak, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Keeping in view the agency perspective, the nexus 
between CG disclosure and director ownership is still inconclusive (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
Moreover, if directors need some information to maximize their own wealth, they will seek 
that information for themselves not for the firm (McConnell & Servaes, 1990). In contrast, low 
director ownership can cause low performance due to lower CG disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) documented that agency problems can be mitigated if shareholders 
monitor the board’s behavior and ultimately this increases the monitoring costs. Therefore, CG 
disclosure can enhance monitoring mechanisms of directors and CG practices (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; Eng & Mak, 2003). On the other hand, director ownership affects the outside 
shareholders and directors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Additionally, if the interests of 
shareholders and directors are aligned, directors seek to improve transparency and disclosure. 
Existing empirical literature suggests a negative link between CG disclosure and director 
ownership. Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) conducted a cross country study of 14 countries 
by taking 130 firms for the year 2000. They documented a negative association between closely 
held shares of insiders with corporate governance practices. Moreover, Samaha et al. (2012) 
conducted a study among 100 Egyptian listed firms to examine the association of board 
ownership and disclosure. The findings of their studies do not support a positive association 
between board ownership and CG disclosure. Similarly, some scholars also found a negative 
relationship among UK firms (see Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012). 
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2.8.2 Board of Directors (BoDs) 
BoDs are pivotal in examining CG disclosure (Allegrini & Greco, 2013). The following 
sections review related literature.  
2.8.2.1 Independent BoDs and CG Disclosure 
Independent directors have gained significant consideration from academic research and CG 
regulations (Chen, 2011; Johanson & Ostergren, 2010). Moreover, independent directors have 
a great capacity to limit managerial opportunism behavior as suggested by agency theory 
(Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Chalevas (2011) documented that an 
independent board has the capability to reduce agency costs and protect shareholders. 
Consequently, agency theory also predicts that information asymmetry can be reduced in the 
presence of independent directors (La Porta et al., 2002). Additionally, independent directors 
can provide support and guidance to committees and boards through their experience and 
knowledge (Barako et al., 2006). Hence, they are very important resource for firms. Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) conducted a study in Malaysia by taking a sample of 167 listed firms over 
the year 1995. The findings of their study revealed that accountability and transparency were 
improved in the presence of independent directors. In a similar vein, García-Meca and 
Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) conducted the literature review by applying a meta-analysis. They 
found that board independence protects the rights of shareholders. Chau and Gray (2010) 
conducted a study to investigate the association of board independence and corporate 
governance disclosure and found that independent chairman and BoDs can reduce exploitation. 
Samaha et al. (2012) conducted a study among 100 Egyptian listed firms and documented a 
significant association between disclosure and a higher proportion of independent directors. 
Most of existing literature found significant association between independent BoDs are CG 
disclosure. Hussainey and Al‐Najjar (2012) also documented similar results by conducting a 
study among 130 UK listed firms over the period 2003 to 2009. Their findings reveal the 
association of an independent board of directors and corporate disclosure. In contrast, some 
researchers did not find any relationship between board independence and CG practices. 
Allegrini and Greco (2013) conducted a study among Italian listed firms to examine the 
association of board independence and CG disclosure. They did not find any relationship 
between board independence and CG disclosure. Using the self-constructed index of corporate 
governance, Al-Matari et al. (2012) found positive relationship between the presence of 
independent directors and CG. In a nutshell, many existing studies documented a positive 
relationship between board independence and CG disclosure.  
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2.8.2.2 Corporate Governance Committee and Corporate Disclosure 
Several CG codes and reforms have made recommendations about the existence of CG 
committees. The focal purpose of  a CG committee is to provide support in the implementation 
of CG standards that ultimately increase CG disclosure (Ntim & Danbolt, 2012). The 
stakeholder theory defines that the role of CG is to provide equal protection to shareholders 
and stakeholders (Solomon, 2010). Consequently, the presence of a CG committee is to provide 
further protection to stakeholders’ rights. Additionally, corporate governance also helps in the 
reduction of variation in information and sends signals to markets about firms’ commitments 
towards good corporate governance practices (Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain, & Yao, 2009). 
Nonetheless, only a few empirical studies documented the association between the presence of 
CG committee and CG disclosure (Ntim & Danbolt, 2012).  
2.8.2.3 Board Size and Corporate Disclosure 
Keeping in view the agency perspective, researchers documented that shareholders select BoDs 
to represent their interests and anticipate high disclosure from BoDs (Davidson, Nemec, & 
Worrell, 1996). Board size is a decisive factor in monitoring management behavior as advised 
by agency theory (Allegrini & Greco, 2013). Moreover, researchers also documented that 
increased managerial monitoring has a positive influence on voluntary disclosure (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). In the literature, researchers also documented that knowledgeable, 
experienced and independent directors are related to board size (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
Consequently, it can be argued that large firms are more likely to have larger board size due to 
complexity of activities (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008). On the other hand, large board size 
may lead to co-ordination, communication and interaction problems among directors and 
consequently, it can have disastrous effects on the accountability of management and directors. 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) conducted a study in Malaysia to examine the extent of disclosure. 
They used an already developed corporate governance index and took data (i.e. year 2002) 
from 94 Malaysian listed firms. They found that board size is linked with CG disclosure. The 
limitation of their study was to employ an adopted index that was developed by Meek, Roberts, 
and Gray (1995). This index was developed for developed countries rather than emerging 
countries. Subsequently, some scholars could not consider contextual differences like legal, 
cultural and economic systems among developed and developing countries (Akhtaruddin et al., 
2009; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Robertson et al., 2013). Researchers 
also documented that board size is a core determinant of corporate governance disclosure (Ntim 
& Danbolt, 2012). Ntim and Danbolt (2012) conducted a study among 169 South African firms 
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to determine association of board size and corporate disclosure and found a significant positive 
relationship between them. In a similar vein, Samaha et al. (2012) also documented that firms 
with larger boards tend to disclose more CG information as compared to their smaller 
counterparts. Schiehll et al. (2013) conducted a study among Brazilian listed firms on the Sao 
Paulo Stock Exchange to examine the association of board size and executive stock options 
plans. By employing a sample of 68 companies, they found a positive association between CG 
disclosure practice and board size. On the other hand, Hussainey and Al‐Najjar (2012) 
conducted a study among 130 listed firms of the UK and found no significant association 
between board size and CG disclosure. While Samaha, Khlif, and Hussainey (2015) also found 
that board composition, size and audit committees have significant positive relationship on 
voluntary disclosure.  
2.8.2.4 Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Disclosure 
As per agency and resource dependence theories, diversity enhances the level of CG 
compliance and disclosure (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010). Agency theory emphasized on the 
role of BoDs in monitoring managers to protect shareholders’ interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Consequently, the experiences and capabilities of BoDs provide additional support to them to 
manage and evaluate strategies which may enhance the CG disclosure of firm. Resource 
dependence theory also emphasizes the significance of a board’s role in ensuring the provision 
of resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In a similar vein, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argued 
that the BoDs work as a source of information among executive members and shareholders 
which is likely to boost CG disclosure. Prior studies examined the nexus between different 
types of diversity on boards and different corporate decisions (Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Rose, 
2007). Some scholars found that female directors have influence on firms’ boards (Carter, 
D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Yu, Lord, Peni, & Vähämaa, 2010) while others argued 
that gender diversity can boost CG disclosure due to unique methods to information disclosure 
(Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009).  
2.8.2.5 Audit Firm Size and Corporate Disclosure  
From stakeholder and agency theories’ perspectives, audit firms can have impact on the quality 
and level of CG disclosure (Barako et al., 2006). It is evident from existing literature that audit 
firms are external CG mechanisms that are pivotal in overseeing managers through 
investigating disclosure and firm performance. Therefore, audit firms can have significant 
implications for disclosure. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) documented that audit firms can assist 
in reducing agency conflicts by limiting agents’ opportunistic behavior. Additionally, CG 
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practices can be enhanced through external auditing (Eng & Mak, 2003). In a similar vein, 
Alsaeed (2006) argued that the big four audit firms have better auditing standards as compared 
to other audit firms. In support of this argument, Barako et al. (2006) highlighted that big audit 
firms have more qualified, trained and experienced teams as compared to small audit firms 
which helps in conducting rigorous audits. Moreover, the big four audit firms also try to protect 
their reputation by providing high levels of disclosure. On the other side, small audit firms may 
have weaker capacity to negotiate for high quality disclosure due to financial constraints as 
compared to their larger counterparts (Alsaeed, 2006). Ntim and Danbolt (2012) documented 
a positive relationship between the level of CG disclosure and audit firm size among South 
African firms. In a similar vein, Schiehll et al. (2013) documented that the big four audit firms 
tended to increase executive stock option disclosure among Brazilian firms. Alsaeed (2006) 
conducted a study among Saudi firms and found no significance effect of audit firms on CG 
disclosure.  
2.9 Corporate Governance and Financial Performance 
In recent decades, plenty of studies have been conducted to investigate the impact of CG on 
financial performance but a comprehensive literature review reveals a lack of consensus among 
researchers (Bhagat & Black, 2001; Bozec, 2005; Davidson et al., 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, 
& Wells, 1998; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Iqbal, 2006). Some studies reported a significant 
positive effect of CG on financial performance while others not. Drobetz et al. (2004) 
conducted a study among German firms to investigate the relationship between CG and firms. 
They documented that firms’ values such as Tobin’s Q and market to book value are 
significantly related to good CG practices. In similar vein, Brown and Caylor (2006) 
constructed a CG index with 51 external and internal attributes and found a significant positive 
association between Tobin’s Q and constructed CGI. Additionally, Mohanty (2003) also 
documents a significant positive relationship between CG practices and financial performance 
in the context of developing economies. He employed Tobin’s Q and excess stock return as a 
measure of financial performance among Indian firms. Black et al. (2006) conducted a study 
among Korean public companies to investigate the association of overall CGI with market 
value. They documented that stronger CG predicts higher market values. Moreover, they also 
documented that investors appreciate better CG and ultimately it leads towards a reduction in 
the cost of capital. Besides these, Ehikioya (2009) conducted a study to examine links between 
CG structure and firm performance by taking a sample of 107 Nigerian listed firms. He 
documented a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance on 
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one hand while on other hand, no association was found between board composition and firm 
performance. He further documented that concentrated ownership protects interests of 
stakeholders and investors. Huang (2010) conducted a study to investigate the relationship 
between board, ownership and performance of banks in Taiwan. The findings provide evidence 
of a positive influence of board size, number of outside directors and family owned share on 
the performance of banks. This is consistent with the findings of Varshney, Kaul, and Vasal 
(2012), who documented that good CG has a positive effect on firm performance as measured 
by economic value added. Nonetheless, this relationship becomes invalidated when traditional 
performance measurements like return on capital, Tobin’s Q and return on assets are employed. 
Though, marvelous efforts have been made by the OECD to improve the linkage between CG 
best practice and firm performance, this association is still not clear in both emerging and 
transition economies. Consequently, Aboagye and Otieku (2010) conducted a study among 
rural and community banks of Ghana and found no association between CG and financial 
performance. In contrast, Hassan Al-Tamimi (2012) conducted a study among UAE national 
banks and documented an insignificant positive relationship between CG practices and 
performance level. In a similar vein, Elsayed (2007) conducted a study among Egyptian firms 
to investigate the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance. By taking 92 
firms for the period from 2000 to 2004, he found no evidence regarding the impact of CEO 
duality on corporate performance. Nevertheless, a significant positive effect can be noted in 
the presence of low corporate performance.  
Omran, Bolbol, and Fatheldin (2008) took a sample of 304 firms from Arab equity markets 
including Jordan, Oman, Egypt and Tunisia to investigate the association between ownership 
structure and corporate performance. They documented no significant impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. In contrast to agency theory and stewardship theory, 
Elsayed (2010) expounds that appropriateness of board leadership structure depends upon the 
age, size and ownership structure of the firm. Furthermore, he also documented that board size 
has a positive association with corporate performance in the absence of CEO duality while this 
association becomes negative in presence of CEO duality (Elsayed, 2011). In a similar vein, 
Wahba (2015) documented that an increase in the proportion of non-executive directors has a 
negative effect on firm financial performance in the presence of CEO duality. 
2.10 Qualitative Studies in Corporate Governance 
The research in the area of CG has been growing and evolving since classic corporate collapses. 
O‟Higgins (2002) conducted a study to analyze the selection of non-executive BoDs in Ireland. 
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They conducted interviews from 26 prominent directors and chairpersons. They found that 
incisive thinking, beneficial contributions and practical business experience were pivotal in the 
selection of non-executive BoDs. In a similar vein, Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles (2005) 
conducted a study to examine the effectiveness of BoDs. They conducted interviews with 40 
directors who were commissioned for Higgs Review. They documented that live experiences 
of non-executive and other BoDs are quite divergent from traditional agency theory and 
stewardship. Parker (2007) conducted an observational study by involving 80% in all board 
meetings along with sub committees. He argued that boardroom culture is a compelling factor 
in the internal corporate governance process. Correspondingly, Brundin and Nordqvist (2008) 
conducted a study to explore the effect of emotions in board meetings and tasks performance. 
They observed emotion in real time over a period of 18 months. They found that emotions 
matter in board meetings and tasks performance of board members. Additionally, Soobaroyen 
and Mahadeo (2012) conducted a study in an emerging economy (Mauritius) which may also 
be applicable in Pakistan. They investigated the effect of corporate governance provisions on 
the accountability of boards of directors of companies. They conducted 24 semi structured 
interviews from BoDs of listed and non-listed firms. They found substantial change in BoDs 
and noted empowered maximalist boards. 
On the other hand, some researchers conducted qualitative studies to investigate the effect of 
corporate governance on audit committees. Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2002) 
conducted a study to examine CG factors on the audit process. They conducted 36 semi- 
structured interviews with 36 practicing auditors. They documented that audit committees lack 
sufficient power and strong governance mechanisms in the view of auditors. The reasons for 
this were inexperienced audit committee members and power to take decisions. On the other 
hand, Gendron, Bedard, and Gosselin (2004) conducted a field study to determine the  
effectiveness of audit committees. They conducted a field study in three Canadian public 
corporations. They documented that audit members were responsible and aware of their 
responsibilities. During their interviews, they found that audit committee members placed 
significant attention on a few matters and assessed the responses of managers by cross 
questioning during meetings. Although the trend of adopting qualitative methodology is 
increasing in recent decades, there is still a dire need to blend qualitative and quantitative 
methods to explore the CG mechanisms further.  
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2.11 Chapter Summary 
The chapter presents a theoretical and empirical review of literature regarding corporate 
governance, compliance and performance nexus. The chapter was divided into ten main 
sections. The first section presented the introduction to the chapter while the second section 
defined the corporate governance. The third section discussed the most relevant theories that 
underlie CG disclosure in the context of Pakistan. Consequently, the study adopted a multiple 
theoretical approach, including different CG theories and substantially focusing on agency 
theory and institutional theory. The applicability of these theories in the Pakistani context was 
also presented in this section. Section 4 presented the objectives of corporate governance. In 
this regard, two perspectives are discussed i.e. financial performance and accountability. The 
fifth section presented different types of ownership structure and assisted in understanding the 
contextual environment of the study underway. The sixth section presented the nexus between 
the socio-economic perspective and corporate governance. Section seven reviewed the 
literature regarding CG compliance and disclosure with corporate governance codes. This 
section discussed the level of compliance both in developed and developing countries with 
particular focus on Pakistan. The literature suggested divergence in the level of compliance in 
both developed and developing countries and suggested that this difference in the level of 
compliance may be attributed to socio economic factors. The nexus between institutions and 
CG mechanism was also presented in this section. Section eight presented the determinants of 
CG with an extensive literature review. This section identified ownership structure, board and 
audit characteristics as the main determinants of corporate governance. The ownership 
structure is made up of director, institution, government and block holders while board and 
audit characteristics are made up of independent directors, audit committees and size. The 
nexus between CG and financial performance is presented in section nine. At the end, the 
qualitative studies related to CG were presented in section ten. 
This chapter was mainly related to theories and the literature review of CG while the next 
chapter presents the overview of the corporate sector of Pakistan. The next chapter assists in 





CG ENVIRONMENT IN PAKISTAN 
3.1 Introduction   
This chapter presents the overview of the CG environment in Pakistan. Section 3.2 presents 
the historical development of the corporate sector of Pakistan while the nature of the corporate 
sector of Pakistan is presented in section 3.3. The voting rights in the corporate law of Pakistan 
are presented in section 3.4 and section 3.5 presents enforcement mechanisms in Pakistan. The 
overview of CG in Pakistan is presented in section 3.6. Section 3.7 presents gaps in the existing 
literature which are addressed by this thesis while a chapter summary concludes this chapter. 
3.2 Corporate Sector of Pakistan: History and Development 
The British rulers introduced company law which is the foundation of Pakistan company law. 
After independence in 1947, Pakistan adopted the Indian Companies Act 1913 (amended in 
1936) with necessary amendments. The former Companies Ordinance 1984 which was 
introduced on 8 October 1984 by imitating the Indian Companies Act 1913, was replaced by 
the Companies Act 20178. Consequently, the companies are supposed to register under 
ordinance if they want to operate their headquarters in Pakistan. The scholars conducted a study 
and discussed the historical development of the corporate sector in Pakistan (Cheema et al., 
2003). They highlighted the private sector as the main contributing factor of industrialization 
in Pakistan. Moreover, Amjad (2008) also documented that some specific families (44 
monopoly houses) were controlling 48% of gross fixed assets of the large scale manufacturing 
sector in 1970. These families were also receiving benefits from cheap imports of capital goods 
and generous fiscal incentives. Additionally, these monopoly houses were controlled by the 
same person and hence there was a lack of separation and ownership. In mid-1972, the 
democratic government implemented policies that reduced the industrial concentration in the 
private sector. It also nationalized a number of industrial units which led to a 50% reduction in 
assets of 11 monopoly houses. Therefore, the investment in the public sector increased from 
13% to 78% from 1972-73 to 1976-77. By nationalizing the banking sector of Pakistan, the 
government created political control over the entire financial sector (State Bank of Pakistan, 
1974). Moreover, several governments rejuvenated the role of the private sector during the 
                                                          
8 The Companies Act, 2017 came into effect on 30th May 2017, except for a section dealing with real estate 
companies, the enforcement of which has been deferred for the time being. The Companies Ordinance, I984 has 
simultaneously been repealed except for certain sections concerning non-banking finance companies. 
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1980s and 1990s. However, state and family control are still dominant in the corporate sector 
of Pakistan.  
As the Ordinance aped the Companies Act 1913, provisions of minority rights were retained 
in Ordinance. The minority protection provisions failed to create dispersed ownership and 
ultimately capital markets (Shleifer et al., 2000). Due to the specific cultural, social, political 
and economic conditions, concentration of ownership created and led to underdeveloped 
capital markets. Moreover, institutions remained underdeveloped due to corruption, weak 
enforcement and bad rule of law. Since 1990s, the corporatization and privatization of 
institutions have been the focal agenda of the Government of Pakistan (GOP). The main 
contributing factors in endorsing corporate governance included but were not limited to 
international financial institutions, globalization, foreign investors and overseas listings which 
resulted in major reforms in the corporate sector (Hasan et al., 2014). The main motive of these 
reforms was restructuring of regulators and stock exchanges. The GOP has privatized a number 
of state-owned enterprises with agreement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 
1990 but the rapid privatization has been hindered by corruption. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
of Pakistan cancelled some key privatization processes, including steel mills, due to corruption 
and irregularities. Presently, the GOP is planning to privatize its power supply companies and 
Pakistan International Airline (Mehreen, 2016). Regardless of these privatization processes, 
families are still dominant in family owned companies while the state is dominant in state 
owned. Although researchers conducted qualitative studies, these studies are limited to 
relationships between corporate governance, audit committee, BoDs and management (Cohen 
et al., 2002; Gendron et al., 2004; O‟Higgins, 2002; Roberts et al., 2005; Soobaroyen & 
Mahadeo, 2012). There are limited studies exploring the institutional effect on CG compliance 
and mechanisms. There is a dire need to conduct a comprehensive study to explore the key 
institutional determinants that shape the CG system in Pakistan. This thesis seeks to fill this 
gap by exploring the key institutional determinants of CG in the first part and barriers and 
drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan in the second part. Finally, this thesis examines the 
nexus between CG compliance score and financial performance and proposes a model of good 
CG practices in Pakistan. 
3.3 The Corporate Sector in Pakistan 
Pakistan adapted the Anglo-Saxon model of CG while the nature of the corporate sector of 
Pakistan is the reverse and ownership concentration is high. The corporate sector is controlled 
by government and family ownerships and mostly private and public firms are controlled by 
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family members or politicians. It is also a matter of concern that more than 50% of private 
firms are controlled by husbands and wives who just fulfilled the minimum requirements of 
the companies’ ordinance 1984. Moreover, these groups or families also own 75% or more 
shares in listed firms to control decision making and avoid any minority representation on the 
BoDs. These families and groups use several tools and techniques that include direct 
shareholding, pyramid structure and interlocking management. Consequently, these tools also 
create liquidity problems in the market on one hand. On the other hand, the understanding of 
these pyramid structures and interlocking management is a complex phenomenon for investors. 
These families also appoint their trustworthy family members as executive and non-executive 
members of the board regardless of their prerequisite qualifications and experience. These all 
help families to control decision making, cash flows and taking private benefits by utilizing the 
company’s resources. Additionally, decisions are made without calling formal board meetings. 
The state-owned companies are the second largest stakeholder in Pakistan. These include 
incorporated and unincorporated companies.  
During recent decades, the Government of Pakistan corporatized a number of SOEs while 
others are on the agenda. Every time, newly elected government takes control of top listed 
SOEs after coming into power. The political influence is remarkable in these SOEs. The board 
of directors and management of companies remain in their positions at the pleasure of the state. 
The appointments are made purely on the basis of political affiliation rather than qualifications 
and experience (Boytsun et al., 2011). However, these families and state owned corporations 
are the main sources of corporate growth and development of capital markets in Pakistan and 
these growth and developments are discouraged by control maximization (Cheema et al., 
2003).  
It is also observed that many FOBs in Pakistan do not have awareness of the underlying rewards 
of incorporating CG practices (Khan, 2014). As a result, this unawareness creates a tepid 
response towards governance reforms on one hand with strong family and government control 
of public listed firms on the other hand. Additionally, these companies resist governance 
reforms and sometimes go for delisting of their companies (Metzger, 2003; Milhaupt, 1998). 
In a similar vein, there was extensive delisting after announcement of the CCG in 2002 and the 
recent reform in 2012 (Pakistan Stock Exchange, n.d). As the multinational companies are 
entering financial markets, they are in the position of playing a significant role in the equity 
market of Pakistan. Most of these multinational companies are from the US and UK where 
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there is a strict requirement to comply with the corporate governance code. Henceforth these 
firms can set a good illustration for domestic firms by incorporating a code of CG.  
3.4 Voting Rights in the Corporate Law of Pakistan 
According to the Companies Act 2017, the default voting rule is ‘one share’ one vote (Roland, 
2016, p. 268), while firms can issue shares with more voting rights and shares without any 
voting right as per Companies Share Capital Rules 2000. Consequently, this provides an 
opportunity to family members to control management and board by having more voting rights. 
Although, the differential voting rights technique is considered legal, most of the stakeholders 
do not consider it good. In some countries like the UK, the companies are allowed to issue 
differential voting rights, but they do not do it, while companies do this in Pakistan which 
might dilute the voting rights of minority shareholders.  
3.5 Enforcement Mechanisms in Pakistan 
In prior literature, researchers documented the rights of shareholders as a pivotal determinant 
for good corporate governance and development of capital markets (La Porta et al.,1997) while 
the rights of minority shareholders are not protected in Pakistan. The corporate law of Pakistan 
provides protection for some shareholders’ rights but the main problem is its enforcement 
(Javid & Iqbal, 2010). Additionally, the rights of minority shareholders are only on paper not 
in reality (Bari, Cheema, & Siddique, 2003). The judiciary is not able to enforce these laws due 
to corruption, inefficiency and lack of skill. Moreover, politicians have great impact on 
judiciary which is also a key contributing factor towards futile enforcement of these laws.  
3.6 Overview of Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
It is well supported from literature that effective governance mechanisms retain investors’ 
confidence. The good CG regulations and rules persuade prospect investors to make investment 
decisions both in local and international equity markets. As evident from the law of demand, 
capital markets compete with each other to attract more local and international capital to meet 
contemporary financial needs. Consequently, corporate characteristics have importance to a 
large extent. Therefore, Pakistan has to comply and raise governance standards in order to 
compete in the global financial sector by obtaining equity financing and attracting more foreign 
direct investment. The protection of minority shareholders, transparency of capital markets and 
financial disclosure are considered as prerequisite of such governance structures (SECP Code, 
2002). Additionally, in March 2002, SECP provided the detailed provisions regarding 
governance mechanisms in Pakistan. The CCG 2012 provides detailed guidelines and 
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provisions regarding boards of directors, financial reporting, governance structure and 
responsibilities of all stakeholders. It is also acknowledged that CG practices have numerous 
benefits both for developed and emerging countries like Pakistan. Consequently, these 
practices also provide support to emerging economies in getting sustainable and higher growth 
rates. Furthermore, these are also supportive in mobilizing savings and increasing the ability 
of capital markets to enhance investors’ confidence in the national economy of the country. 
These also help in raising investment rates and encourage growth by protecting rights of both 
small and larger investors (Javid & Iqbal, 2008b; Rwegasira, 2000). In Pakistan, the Companies 
Act 2017 sets rules and regulations for governing companies and other associations which are 
based on common law.  
The financial institutions such as Banks are regulated by regulations of the State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP) and Banking Company Ordinance 1962. The Security and Exchange Ordinance 
1969, the Security and Exchange Commission Act 1997 and the Companies Act 2017 are 
fundamental bodies of corporate governance and SECP is stabled under Security and Exchange 
Ordinance Act 1997 as principal regulator of listed companies, non-listed companies, banks 
and security markets such PSX. The major role of Security and Exchange Ordinance 1969 and 
Companies Act 2017 is to provide security delisting, fraud prevention and protection of 
investors. Additionally, the listed Companies Ordinance 2002 establishes ownership disclosure 
rules and takeovers.  Listing rules also have special regulations regarding transfer pricing and 
listed companies are obliged to inform PSX about their change in BoDs, dividends, change in 
capital and annual general meetings (AGMs). In Pakistan, the code of CG is introduced by 
mutual efforts of SECP the Chartered Accountants of Pakistan in collaboration with the Cost 
and Management Accountants of Pakistan (ICMAP) and PSX. The CCG has numerous 
recommendations align with international CG standards. The key contributions of CCG include 
but are not limited to improving external and internal audits, reforms of better disclosure of 
information and BoDs in order to make companies responsible to all shareholders. However, 
the CCG has voluntary provisions regarding independence of BoDs and question the risk 
management. Consequently, SECP revises its CCG 2002 in 2012 through a reform and made 
most of provisions mandatory for listed companies. In recent reform of CCG 2012, SECP has 
given significant attention to transparency and disclosure and remuneration of BoDs. In 
addition, SBP mandated compliance of CCG 2012 for all listed and non-listed banking 
including development finance institutions and this requirement has made significant 
improvement in baking systems. SECP also issued a separate CG code for insurance companies  
47 
 
In addition, international bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (WB) and the Organization for  Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
usually encourage emerging countries to make CG a priority agenda, including facilitating the 
introduction of codes of good CG practices (Clarke, 2004; Rwegasira, 2000). 
The main problem is the compliance with CG codes. After reform in 2012, the Code of 
Corporate Governance (CCG) has many mandatory provisions related to auditing, board 
structure and disclosure for listed companies, but there are still some voluntary provisions 
(SECP CCG, 2012). These provisions challenge the discretionary power of state and families’ 
influence on companies’ management. Consequently, they show hesitant to perceive the CG 
Code in its true spirit. The compliance with CCG is in form not in substance.  A recent study 
conducted by Khan (2014), documented that most of provisions are ticked in a box not in a 
true sense. He also documented that senior officers of SECP confirmed that CCG is not 
implemented in a true sense as most public listed firms are family owned in Pakistan. The 
family members are elected as executive and non-executive directors. Moreover, the firms also 
appoint family members as independent directors with a few shares. Most family firms are 
appointing their children as independent directors with a few shares to fulfill the requirement 
of CCG. He further concluded that “law in books” is not enough; it should be implemented to 
be considered as “law in action”. In a similar vein, Samza (2016) conducted a study in Pakistan 
to identify weaknesses of corporate governance and explore opportunities for its improvement. 
She documented that many of SECP CCG provisions overlap with the Companies’ Ordinance 
19849 which is problematic. She further documented that SECP and PICG should make a 
strategy to increase awareness about the benefits of adopting corporate governance.  
Although some researchers established the relationship between CG and firm performance by 
conducting quantitative studies, while others documented no relationship between CG and 
financial performance (Aboagye & Otieku, 2010; Javid & Iqbal, 2008b; Renders et al., 2010; 
Tariq & Abbas, 2013). In short, the opinion is mixed about CG and firm performance. These 
diverse outcomes invite scholars to further explore the relationship between CG and financial 
performance. The existing qualitative studies also tried to explore the ways to improve CG 
mechanisms in Pakistan but these studies have their limitations (Khan, 2014; Samza, 2016). 
These studies only adopt one method to identify weaknesses in the CG system and explore 
opportunities for its improvement. Khan (2014) recommended that further research is needed 
                                                          
9 See note 5.  
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to adjacent to a Western CG system inside the boundaries of Islam. Aguilera et al. (2016) 
recommended that future researchers can adopt mixed methodology while Samza (2016) 
recommended the use of structured or semi-structured interviews.  
3.7 Gap in the Literature addressed by this thesis 
This section highlights the research gap in existing literature that are addressed by this thesis. 
Existing literature is critically reviewed which not only yields significant understanding, but 
also validates the aims and objectives of the study. After conducting a literature review, it is 
confirmed that it is worthwhile to investigate topics which specifically impact on CG and firm 
performance while country in general. The following paragraphs provide gaps in existing 
literature which are addressed in this study related to each research question.  
Although a number of studies advocate the importance of a CG code for better performance, 
only few studies are conducted mainly in the Pakistani context. Existing studies talk about the 
old version of CG code 2002 except Samza (2016) who analyzed CG code 2012 for the first 
time. However, she employed only content analysis and recommended the use of interviews in 
her study (Samza, 2016). This study addresses this gap by incorporating both qualitative and 
quantitative methods and also analyses the CG code 2012. This the first study which is 
employing mixed methodology in the Pakistani context. This thesis fills the gap by exploring 
the key institutional determinants of CG in the first part and barriers and drivers of good CG 
practices in Pakistan in the second part. At the end, this thesis investigates the nexus between 
CG compliance score and financial performance and proposes a model of good CG practices 
in Pakistan. 
Existing literature has emphasized the issue of proper compliance with CG and enforcement of 
CG principles. A few studies have been conducted and confirm the weak enforcement 
mechanisms in Pakistan without providing any solution and measures to improve CG 
compliance. This study provides solutions and measures to address those weakness and issues 
in CG compliance. Prior studies have small sample size and short time span (Javid & Iqbal, 
2008a; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). In contrast, this study first conducted focus group interviews 
with participants and second, it gathered the primary data from PSX listed firms. Moreover, 
the prior studies used the CG index by considering a few provisions of CG code 2002 which 
may not present the true level of compliance with the CG code. 
Distinctively, this study employs the five-point Likert scale for construction of corporate 
governance compliance scores (CGI) with provisions from the CG code 2012. The use of the 
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five-point Likert scale questionnaire provides more validity in determining levels of CG 
compliance10. Researchers found that firm ownership structure and characteristics of boards of 
directors are the key determinants of CG disclosure (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012). This study explores the key institutional determinants 
of good CG practices in Pakistan. It is pivotal to explore those institutional determinants that 
shape the CG practices in a country. In addition, according to the researcher’s best knowledge, 
this is the first study which identifies the most influential barriers of good CG practices in the 
unique context of Pakistan. The study also recommends the ways to improve good CG practices 
in Pakistan through identifying the most important drivers of CG practices. At the end, the 
study investigates the nexus between CG compliance and firm performance of the sampled 
firms and proposes a model for good CG practices in Pakistan.  
3.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides the overview of the CG environment in Pakistan. The history and 
development of the corporate sector in Pakistan are expounded in this chapter. Pakistan 
recently introduced the Companies Act 2017, formerly known as the Companies Ordinance 
1984. In addition, Pakistan followed the Anglo-Saxon model of CG while ownership 
concentration is high. SECP introduced the CCG in 2002 in Pakistan with voluntary provisions 
while in the recent reform of CCG 2012, SECP has made CG provisions mandatory. There is 
also a lack of minority shareholders’ protection and shareholders do not have enough voting 
rights. The chapter also expounded the enforcement mechanisms in Pakistan and identified the 
gap in existing literature.   
  
                                                          
10 Researchers documented that tick box practice is common regarding compliance with the CG code (see (Khan, 
2014; Samza, 2016). Hence the five-point Likert scale questionnaire (rating) provides more validity through going 






The suitable method is pivotal in completion of a research study. Section 4.2 explores the 
philosophical assumptions of research paradigms and approaches underlying each paradigm. 
Section 4.3 presents the appropriateness of the employed research method, while section 4.4 
expounds the challenges in employing a mixed methods research design followed by phase I 
(qualitative research design) and phase II (quantitative research design). The chapter summary 
is provided at the end of chapter in section 4.20.  
4.2 Research Paradigms 
This section presents the motivation of using two research paradigms i.e. interpretivism and 
positivism and use of the mixed research approach by combining an inductive (qualitative) and 
a deductive (quantitative) approach. The extensive literature review has shown a lack of CG 
research in Pakistan by employing quantitative and qualitative research (mixed) methodology. 
The development of a conceptual model and qualitative analysis suggests that resulting 
interpretations can be applied by employing an inductive research approach (Bernard & 
Bernard, 2012). Additionally, Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2012) documented that the 
appropriateness of different research philosophies mainly depends on their application to the 
development, extensions and refinement of theories. They further documented that research 
design and processes are influenced by research philosophies. Saunders (2011) documented 
that research philosophies rely on perception, analysis and infer meaning from data for 
development of knowledge. These features are also extended into three distinctive 
philosophical perspectives i.e. interpretivism, positivism and realism (Saunders, 2011) and 
interpretivism and positivism are mainly used in management research (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
Interpretivists explore the social phenomena and rely on idealism while positivists document 
that knowledge is founded on pragmatism. The use of interpretivist philosophy is justified 
through the literature review and development of the conceptual model while positivism is 
justified by testing of the proposed model. 
Neuman and Robson (2014) defined interpretivism as “the systematic analysis of socially 
meaningful action through the direct detailed observation of people in natural settings in order 
to arrive at understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain their social 
worlds” (p. 86). While Saunders (2011) documented interpretivism as an alternative to the 
orthodoxy of positivism, researchers also identified problems of overdependence and 
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unidirectional inferences by employing a single research philosophy (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
Consequently, a combination of interpretivism and positivism is employed in this study to 
reduce overdependence and avoid data biases. Drawing on interpretivism methodology, semi 
structured focus group interviews are employed to explore the key institutional determinants 
of good CG practices in Pakistan, followed by statistical analysis of quantitative data which 
helps in comparing (Saunders, 2011) and developing a deep understanding of the results (Boyd, 
Franco Santos, & Shen, 2012).  
In order to understand the notion of CG and development of a CG framework, it is necessary 
to discuss them with professionals, practitioners, managers and decision makers. Positivism 
presents not only provable, testable causalities but also expounds this causal relationship 
among variables that helps in theory building from results (Saunders, 2011; Smith et al., 2012). 
Consequently, positivism generates objective facts similar to experimental research while 
interpretivism generates values and meanings without offering a direct nexus between subjects 
and objects (May & Williams, 2002). The positivist paradigm is employed in this study to 
identify barriers and drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan and to examine the empirical 
nexus between CG compliance and firm performance.  
The research philosophies of interpretivism and positivism are closely aligned to inductive and 
deductive research approaches. Trochim (2006) mentioned these “broad methods of reasoning 
as the inductive and deductive approaches” (p.1).  Trochim (2006) documented that moving 
from specific to general is called the inductive approach, whereas moving from general to 
specific is referred to as the deductive approach. He also documented that arguments which are 
based on observation and experience can be best articulated inductively whereas arguments 
which are based on rules and regulations are best articulated deductively. Creswell and Clark 
(2011) documented inductive and deductive approaches as bottom up and top down 
approaches. They argued that deductive researchers start from a theory to hypotheses to add to 
or contradict the theory. In contrast, inductive researchers start from participants’ views to 
build broader themes and develop a theory by integrating those themes. Table 1 presents the 




Table 1 Assumption of Interpretivism and Positivism Paradigms 
Assumptions Concept  Interpretivism Positivism 
Ontological Nature of reality 
Reality is subjective, 
socially constructed 
and may change. 
Reality is objective 
and external  
Epistemological 
Relationship of 
researcher with that 
being researched 
Researcher interacts 




Axiological Role of values in 
research 
Research is value 
laden and biased 
Research is value 
free 
Rhetorical Language of research Informal style and 
personal voice 
Formal style and 
passive voice 
Methodological Process of research 
Inductive, small 
sample, in-depth, 




sample, context free 
Source: (Creswell & Creswell, 2017) 
 
This study is conducted in the socio-economic environment of Pakistan that contains 
regulators, stakeholders and firms. One aspect of the study is to explore the key institutional 
determinants of good CG practices in Pakistan; hence, a qualitative approach is applied. In 
contrast, CG compliance is determined in PSX listed firms, thus, a quantitative approach is 
applied to find a nexus between CG compliance and financial performance. Additionally, this 
study also identifies the most influential barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan and also 
provides recommendations to promote CG practices by identifying the most important drivers 
of good CG practices in Pakistan. This implies multiple perspectives. Epistemological research 
investigates the nexus among scholar and what is being explored. Interpretivism confines the 
distance among researcher and that under research (Collis & Hussey, 2013) while positivism 
reduces the biases by the appropriate sampling method. Therefore, qualitative research differs 
from quantitative research because it allows the observing of social phenomena (Collis & 
Hussey, 2013). Therefore, interpretivism suggests interacting with practitioners and 
conducting semi-structured focus group interviews to explore institutional determinants of CG 
practices in Pakistan. In contrast, barriers and drivers of good CG practice and the nexus 
between CG compliance and financial performance are investigated empirically by using 
primary data, collected from survey questionnaire and annual reports and enable the scholar to 
remain independent of what is being explored.  
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The axiological assumption reinforces the role of values in this research. Thus, qualitative 
research deliberates more research ethics and value-laden and deliberates compared to 
quantitative research. The institutional determinants of good CG practices are not measured 
quantitatively but through a descriptive assessment of interviewees. In contrast, this study 
constructed a CG index to determine CG compliance and nexus with the financial performance 
of PSX listed firms. The rhetorical assumption emphases on the use of language in the study. 
Interpretivism prefers an informal writing style and reflects the immediacy of research (Collis 
& Hussey, 2013) while positivism is showed in formal and impersonal language grounded on 
acknowledged positions (Creswell, 1994). The methodological assumption is related to the 
process of undertaking the research. This study employs an inductive approach to explore the 
institutional determinants of CG practices in Pakistan while employing a deductive approach 
to explore CG compliance and identify barriers and drivers of good CG practices. Semi-
structured focus group interviews are the most appropriate method in an inductive approach 
which helps in exploring the institutional determinants of CG practices in the distinct context 
of Pakistan, On the other hand, the deductive approach helps in identifying barriers and drivers 
of good CG practices and investigating the nexus between CG compliance and firm 
performance.  
4.3 Research Design 
This section expounds mixed research method i.e. qualitative and quantitative methods with 
respect to the research objectives and questions of the study. This section also presents the 
appropriateness of mixed methodology for this study.  
4.3.1 Mixed Methods Research Design 
The use of both qualitative and quantitative data in one research is called mixed methods 
(Saunders, 2011) and these can be used one after the other (sequential) or at the same time 
(parallel). The mixed methods studies have gained attention around the world due to integration 
of qualitative and quantitative data (Boyd et al., 2012) and also provides profound 
understanding of CG reforms (Molina-Azorin, 2012; Zattoni et al., 2013). Moreover, the mixed 
method supports in overcoming the insufficiencies in a research which arise by using a 
quantitative or qualitative approach (Creswell & Clark, 2011). The exploratory sequential 
design is used in this research (Figure 2)11.  
 
                                                          
11 (see Creswell & Clark, 2011) 
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Source: (Creswell & Clark, 2007, p. 73) 
 
This design is useful especially when the scholar needs to identify and test unknown variables 
quantitatively (Creswell & Clark, 2007). Moreover, scholars identify the unknown variables 
from the qualitative phase or stating the propositions for a test based on a framework. 
Consequently, this connects the qualitative phase to the subsequent quantitative phase and 
more emphasis is given to the qualitative phase. This study primarily employs the qualitative 
phase to explore the variables to test during the quantitative phase. The data is analyzed 
separately for both stages i.e. qualitative and quantitative, thus, two sets of results are merged 
during discussion and interpretation phases of this study. The following paragraph expounds 
the justification for choosing a mixed methods research design (i.e. qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches) in the Pakistani CG context.  
It is evident that qualitative research approaches have gained attention and popularity among 
scholars over time (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). The evolving use of qualitative research in 
recent years is due to study of human behavior (Atieno, 2009; De Lisle, 2011; Gilbert, 2008; 
Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). Consequently, both qualitative and quantitative techniques 
provide a unique opportunity to expound and understand the exact phenomena in a study. The 
literature also provides support for using interviews to conduct exploratory studies (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). Additionally, the reason for using a mixed methodology approach is its scope 
and appreciation by scholars (Molina-Azorin, 2012).  
In the extended literature, mixed methods have gained attention of management scholars 
(Baydoun et al., 2013; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Zattoni et al., 2013) due to unwarranted 
consideration given to firms’ and individuals’ behaviors (Clarke, 1998). Furthermore, Boyd et 
al. (2012) acknowledged that mixed methods studies provide more credible and reliable results 
as compared to single method studies. In a similar vein, Molina-Azorin (2012) found that the 
















shows that mixed methods studies are more acknowledged by scholars, consequently, due to 
employing mixed methods, this study adds a significant contribution to existing studies on 
emerging economies and CG literature. Furthermore, Tariq and Abbas (2013) documented that 
mandatory compliance with the code beyond certain levels does not contribute to improvement 
in the financial performance of Pakistani firms. They also documented that high scores on the 
CG compliance index are not a true indictor that firms are complying with the code of CG in a 
true spirit. Similarly, Khan (2014) also found that code compliance is in form not in substance. 
These findings indicate an alarming sign for regulators and policy makers.  
A lack of understanding with regard to the code is also found in the Pakistani context. 
Consequently, the need arises to conduct a comprehensive study implementing an integrated 
research design to explore more deeply and provide profound guidelines in the best interests 
of policy makers and practitioners. In this regard, the integrated research design provides more 
room for comprehending the effect of CG reforms, compliance and performance nexus among 
PSX listed firms. Additionally, these approaches enable the researcher to find more 
perspectives and development of propositions through triangulation and extensive exploration 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015; Smith et al., 2012). Therefore, a mixed methods design is more suitable 
to address the research objectives and questions of this study as discussed in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 reveals that this study seeks to achieve several research objectives to explore CG 
practices and reforms in Pakistan. This study aims to explore the key institutional determinants 
of good CG practices in Pakistan. Therefore, the study conducted semi- structured focus group 
interviews with key stakeholders to achieve this objective. Based on identified determinants of 
good CG practices, the study also explores different barriers and drivers of CG practices in 
Pakistan. At the end, the study examines the nexus between CG compliance and financial 
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4.3.2 Research Questions and Chosen Methodology 
As included in Figure 3, the first research question is: What are the key institutional 
determinants of good CG practices in Pakistan? A triangulation approach (including literature 
reviews and semi structured focus group interviews) is employed to explore the key 
institutional determinants of good CG practices in Pakistan. The literature suggested board 
characteristics and ownership structure as main determinants of CG practices (Javid & Iqbal, 
2008b; Lee & Park, 2008; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Schiehll et al., 2013; 
Soobaroyen & Mahadeo, 2012) and this study explores new institutional determinants of CG 
best practices besides these determinants by conducting semi-structured focus group interviews 
with professionals and regulators. In addition, this research question helps in exploring and 
comprehending CG reforms in more detail by highlighting the level of CG awareness. The 
existing empirical CG studies (e.g. (Cohen et al., 2002; Khan, 2014; Samza, 2016; Tariq & 
Abbas, 2013) recommended the use of interview method to investigate the effectiveness of CG 
practices and reforms in Pakistan.  
The second question of the study is: What are the most influential barriers to good CG practices 
in Pakistan? Based on identified determinants, the different barriers are identified and tested 
quantitatively through the survey questionnaire to highlight the most influential barriers to CG 
practices in Pakistan which restrain the implementation of a good CG system. The third 
question of the study which is: What are the most important drivers of good CG practices in 
Pakistan? Based on identified determinants, the different drivers are identified and tested 
quantitatively through the survey questionnaire to highlight the most important drivers of CG 
practices in Pakistan which can play a pivotal role in promoting CG practices.  
Finally, the fourth question (i.e. What is the nexus between CG compliance and financial 
performance among PSX listed firms?) is explored via a self-constructed CG compliance index 
which is developed from the provisions of SECP CCG 2012 on a five point Likert scale, as 
evident from the recent CG studies (Ammann, Oesch, & Schmid, 2013; Michelberger, 2017; 
Nadeem et al., 2013; Tariq & Abbas, 2013; Varshney et al., 2012),  and a CG compliance score 
is constructed to answer this question.  
4.3.3 Triangulation 
The concept of triangulation is often used by surveyors; however, social scientists use this 
notion for the reduction of methodological errors (Robson & McCartan, 2016) and the 
validation process of assessing the veracity of research results (Mertens & Hesse-Biber, 2012). 
The application of triangulation is to identify and minimize errors by employing multiple 
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theoretical, methodological and analytical lenses across the entire research process (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). Therefore, triangulation not only increases the validity of findings and 
recommendations but also the contribution and application of the research (Miles, Huberman, 
& Saldana, 2013). In addition, triangulation is a partnership among different methods in data 
collection and confirming of results in one study. This study applies the following four types 
of triangulation as proposed by Miles et al. (2013). 
Theoretical triangulation:  This is the use of multiple theories or hypotheses to examine a 
phenomenon (Denzin, 2017). The intent is to conduct the study through multiple lenses and 
questions in mind to refute findings. This triangulation is applied in this study by considering 
greater possible variables from literature and qualitative and quantitative categories in the 
Pakistan context.  
Methodological Triangulation: This is commonly referred to as multi method triangulation. It 
is used to refer to the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods and is a process of 
gathering information pertaining to the same phenomenon through more than one method to 
identify convergence and increase the validity of research findings (Kopinak, 1999). It involves 
the use of multiple methods (i.e. qualitative and/or quantitative) to investigate the phenomenon. 
For example, the results of interviews, focus group, and quantitative data could be compared, 
and validity is established if conclusions are same from each method. This triangulation is 
applied by using both inductive and deductive approaches.  
Data Triangulation:  It involves using different sources (i.e. stakeholders) of information to 
increase the validity of the study (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In the analysis stage, the feedback 
from stakeholders would be compared to determine the area of agreement and divergence. This 
triangulation is applied by collecting primary data through semi-structured focus group 
interviews and survey questionnaires from stakeholders in addition to secondary data from 
annual reports of PSX listed firms.  
Data Analysis Triangulation: The method of data analysis is very important. Smaling (1987) 
described three approaches (i.e. intuitive, procedural and intersubjective approaches) of 
analysis of qualitative data. This study employs the procedural approach by documenting each 
step to make it transparent and replicable.  Moreover, the study employs multiple analyses and 
evidences to test the hypotheses, including literature review, thematic analysis on qualitative 
primary data and other statistical techniques on quantitative primary and secondary data. 
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4.4 Challenges in the Implementation of a Mixed Methods Research Design 
This section expounds the challenges in applying qualitative and quantitative research. 
Although the mixed method has gained attention over recent years, it may not overcome all the 
research problems (Creswell & Clark, 2011). Some scholars debate issues related to 
incompatibility of both quantitative and qualitative research (Foss & Ellefsen, 2002) while 
others debate that mixed methods provide a better picture of the study (Begley, 1996). 
Nevertheless, they all agree that mixed methods increase the robustness and accuracy of the 
research results (Begley, 1996; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Foss & Ellefsen, 2002; Saunders, 
2011; Sekaran, 2003). In general, it is not easy to combine qualitative and quantitative methods 
due to their having different epistemological and philosophical frameworks (Creswell & Clark, 
2011; Morgan, 1998). A challenging issue may arise if the results of one method contradict the 
findings of other (Foss & Ellefsen, 2002). Another challenge is the lack of commonality in 
mixed research methods. 
Some scholars believe that mixed methods serve a quantitative paradigm (Howe, 2004) while 
giving auxiliary status to qualitative methods (Creswell, Shope, Plano Clark, & Green, 2006). 
In addition, researchers have argued that the mixed methods studies collide due to inability of 
researchers and gaps in the literature to integrate qualitative and quantitative results (Bryman 
& Bell, 2015; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989). At the end, the 
cost of collecting qualitative data is another problem. Researchers may need to travel from one 
place to another to conduct the interviews which may be costly while quantitative data 
collection is easy and convenient. In sum, a researcher should keep all these issues in mind 
before choosing mixed research methods. As discussed in section 4.3.1, this study employed 
the sequential research design which is divided into two phases as shown in Figure 4. The 
phase I presents the inductive/qualitative approach while phase II presents the 
deductive/quantitative approach. The next section presents the detailed explanation of the 




Figure 4 Sequential Research Design of this Study 
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This section presents the qualitative research which is employed to address the first research 
question i.e. exploring the key institutional determinants of CG practices in Pakistan. 
Moreover, these qualitative findings help in the development of tool for phase II and integration 
of the qualitative and quantitative results of the study. This section presents the theoretical 
framework of qualitative research, the validity and reliability of qualitative research and the 
interview process, followed by ethical considerations and finally this section expounds an 
analysis qualitative data. 
4.6 Qualitative Research 
In recent years, qualitative research has received great attention in CG literature as well in 
social sciences (Saunders, 2011; Soobaroyen & Mahadeo, 2012). In a similar vein, Zattoni et 
al. (2013) argued that mixed conclusions in CG studies have served as enthusiasm for 
researchers to use qualitative methods. Therefore, in this situation, a qualitative study is more 
desirable in exploring the key institutional determinants of good CG practices in Pakistan. 
Additionally, Mengoli, Pazzaglia, and Sapienza (2009) argued that the robustness of results 
increases by integrating the qualitative and quantitative findings. 
In recent years, qualitative research has become common among social science researchers 
(Scott & Garner, 2013) due to close studying of human behavior (Lichtman, 2013) and it 
discovers in-depth social reality (Collis & Hussey, 2013). Consequently, qualitative research 
is a holistic approach, generates knowledge from various viewpoints (Scott & Garner, 2013) 
and aims to provide more robust results (Creswell & Clark, 2011). Corbin and Strauss (2008) 
documented three objectives to conduct qualitative research, i.e. (1) it offers a detailed 
explanation of social life and, (2) it explores social reality and (3) it expounds social 
phenomena while Becker, Bryman, and Ferguson (2012) suggested three key steps to conduct 
qualitative research. First, the researcher needs to determine the research problem and 
questions. The next step is to select suitable methods while the last step is analyzing and 
interpreting the data. Researchers documented that a few points need to be considered to 
conduct qualitative research (Bryman & Bell, 2015). First, qualitative research uses an 
inductive approach, thus, it does not develop hypotheses. Secondly, it is a flexible approach 
(Silverman, 2015), hence, there is no single method which fits into every research (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). It explores the phenomena in detail; hence, it focuses on a limited number of 
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themes and sample size. The next section expounds the validity and reliability of qualitative 
research.  
4.6.1 Validity and Reliability of Qualitative Research  
Researchers have argued that validity and reliability are pivotal in qualitative research (Bryman 
& Bell, 2015) and heavily dependent on data gathering and analysis procedure (Creswell & 
Creswell, 2017; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). Therefore, no such tests exist which can 
determine the reliability and validity of qualitative research. Reliability denotes to the prospect 
of replicating the same results in repetitive research (Collis & Hussey, 2013) while validity 
means interpretation of results to reflect the phenomenon. Silverman (2015) suggested three 
ways to increase the reliability of interviews: (1) development of an interview guide), (2) 
accurate recording and transcription to make more reliable findings, and (3) maintaining inter-
coding reliability. Additionally, the validity of interviews can be determined through selection 
and willingness of respondents to provide knowledgeable data (Louise Barriball & While, 
1994). Researchers argued that qualitative validity depends on the accuracy of  findings 
through explicit procedures while qualitative reliability implies the consistency of the 
researcher’s approach through various projects (Creswell & Clark, 2011; Gibbs, 2018). 
Similarly, Creswell and Clark (2007) documented that validity is a strength in qualitative 
research and can be ensured through applying different validity strategies including 
triangulation, member checking and clarifying the researcher’s bias. Hence, triangulation, 
member checking and researcher bias are applied in exploring the questions and verifying the 
results. 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that both reliability and validity depend on data 
collection and the interview process and no such tests exist to measure validity and reliability 
in qualitative research (Gibbs, 2018).  
4.7 Interviews 
Researchers have emphasized the importance and use of interviews within qualitative research 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). Interview is an research technique to gather data via perceptions and 
life experiences of individuals (Scott & Garner, 2013) and it provides flexibility in data 
collection and analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Interviews have three main types i.e. structured 
interviews, unstructured interviews and semi-structured interviews (Silverman, 2015). The 
structured interviews depend on particular answers (Scott & Garner, 2013) and are frequently 
used in quantitative research, while semi-structured interviews provide liberty to diversify and 
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ask questions according to given answers (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Semi-structured 
interviews are generally in depth and informal (Robson, 2002), thereby allowing the researcher 
to explore other areas of interest. In semi-structured interviews, the researcher develops an 
interview guide which guides the discussion about all issues (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The next 
section expounds the semi-structured focus groups that are employed in this study.  
4.7.1 Semi Structured Focus Group 
A focus group is a interview that is conducted with a small group of people on a particular 
topic (Patton, 2002) and has been widely used in social science research for qualitative data 
collection (Morgan, 1998). Focus groups are useful in exploring, clarifying and reacting to 
ideas (Krueger, 2014). They are an informal discussion among a group of selected individuals 
about a topic (Wilkinson & Silverman, 2004) and usually consist of 6 to 10 participants and a 
moderator (Howell, 2012). The rationale of this group size is to ensure information diversity. 
In addition, the focus group also offers a collective set of observations, experiences and values 
which are interpreted in the context. Moreover, it is a qualitative research instrument that 
demonstrates the essential bias for systematic attention to specify additional solid ground 
(Morgan, 1998). In addition, it is particularly helpful in obtaining and discovering new 
information on the same topic (Krueger, 2014) and is more economical. 
Though there are benefits in using a focus group, it has some limitations as well12. Compared 
to one on one interviews, a focus group may not explore more in-depth information. In addition, 
participants may not be as cozy as in one-on-one interviews and may not expose sensitive 
information.  Researchers generally need quite high levels of interviewing expertise to conduct 
focus group interviews. For instance, they require ‘gatekeeping’ skills to help avoid ‘group 
think’ outcomes and preventing any individuals from dominating conversations as well as 
teasing contributions from quieter members. That said, where the focus group does not present 
any of these dilemmas the researchers should be mostly anonymous, often only needing to 
contribute to commence, prompt occasionally and finalize the session. 
To overcome the limitations of the focus group, this study employed a semi-structured focus 
group in which interviews are conducted individually (one-on-one), following the interview 
protocol and guide to keep the same context and ensure validity and reliability.  
 
                                                          
12 (see Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffin, 2013) 
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4.7.2 Selection of Interviewees and Interview Instrument  
Researchers have argued that the data quality determines the quality of findings (Saunders, 
2011) and it is critical to develop a criteria for the selection of interviewees. This study 
employed a purposive sampling technique and only those respondents were considered who 
had the required experience of corporate governance in Pakistan to obtain informed opinions 
(see Bailey & Peck, 2013). In line with other studies, this study carefully recruited interviewees 
and focused on quality of data rather than quantity (see Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
Consequently, this enhanced the reliability of the data.  
After identifying the targeted respondents, the researcher invited them to participate in the 
study through email and/or telephonic invitations and provided them with a research 
information sheet, detailing the objectives of the study, time required for interview and 
processing to ensure their confidentiality and anonymity. These procedures increase 
creditability and encourage respondents to contribute to the study (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). 
After using these techniques, a focus group was identified consisting of eight participants. The 
first interview package – including an initial invitation email, a follow up email and/or phone 
call, a consent form and an interview guide – was prepared for conducting interviews with the 
agreed participants.  
4.7.3 Interview Protocol 
Table 2 presents the interview protocol. It can be seen that the duration of interviews ranged 
from 28 minutes to 43 minutes and interviews were conducted with directors/CEO or CG 
experts and/or consultants. A total of eight semi-structured focus group interviews were 
conducted, however, two participants did not allow recording of the interview. After getting 
approval from the Human Ethics Committee (HEC) of the concerned university, written 





                                                          
13 The whole process took eight months starting from taking HEC approval to conducting interviews.  
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Table 2 Interview Protocol 
Interview Type  Semi-structured focus group 
Duration of Interview  28 - 43 minutes 
Level of interviewees  Director/CEO/ CG experts or consultants 
No. in semi-structured focus group  8 
Purpose and style  Information extraction and exploration 
Interview Place  Online or office 
Language  English  
Confidentiality High  
Morality and Ethics  
Took Human Ethics committee approval from 
relevant university. Written consent is taken from 
participants 
Recording responses  
At the start of interview, interviewer told 
respondents that it will be recorded, and recording 
is started after their approval.   
Information exchange 
Detailed information was provided about the 
project and process. Preliminary questions were 
addressed in advance.   
Question Types  Open ended (see Appendix B) 
4.7.3.1 Interview guide 
A interview guide is employed to guide the discussion and extract the information from 
participants (Smith, 2015). Similarly, Bryman and Bell (2015) suggested that the interview 
guide needs to be comprised of questions that address the underlying research problem to 
conduct a semi-structured focus group. Hence, an interview guide, consisting of brief 
questions, is used to conduct the semi-structured focus group (see Appendix C). 
4.8 Final Interviews 
The initial contacts were made through email invitation, followed up by email and or/ 
telephone. As only eight participants agreed to participate in the research, the interviews were 
conducted face to face and/or over skype, following the same interview protocol to ensure 
consistency among interviewees; however, different probes and prompts were used to gather 
as much as possible in-depth information from each interviewee. In addition to audio recording 
of interviews, notes were taken as back up. 
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4.9 Ethical Considerations 
In qualitative research, it is pivotal to consider ethical issues (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The 
research ethics are considered in three stages including before, conducting interviews and 
collection (Saunders, 2011). Similarly, Bryman and Bell (2015) suggested that interviewees 
should know about the purpose, the nature of the study and their rights of withdrawal from the 
interview. The research ethics are considered during data analysis and reporting of findings by 
keeping the confidentiality of interviewees. Similarly, Linck and Netter (2008) argued that 
interviewees’ information should be treated confidentially and the interviewees’ privacy 
ensured at every stage (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In addition, Lichtman (2013) argued that the 
researcher should ask appropriate questions and avoid questions about personal lives of 
interviewees. This research study is approved by the Human Ethics Committee of Lincoln 
University, New Zealand (see Appendix A). 
4.10 Analysis of the Semi Structured Focus Group 
All the semi structured focus group interviews were transcribed verbatim into Microsoft Word. 
Only the researcher was involved in the transcription process in order to achieve the highest 
level of familiarity with the data before commencing analysis. Each respondent was assigned 
a pseudonym to hide their identity. Table 3 presents the summary of all the interviews: 
Table 3 Summary of Interviewees 
Pseudonym Experience Position Interview Status 
R1 20 years Director Recorded and notes were taken 
R2 11 years Consultant- Corporate Governance Recorded and notes were taken 
R3 9 years Director Recorded and notes were taken 
R4 8 years Director Recorded and notes were taken 
R5 17 years Director Recorded and notes were taken 
R6 14 years Head of CG Compliance Recorded and notes were taken 
R7 9 years 
Legal Consultant-Corporate 
Governance 
Not recorded- only notes were 
taken 
R8 16 years 
Senior Manager – Corporate 
Governance 




The transcribed data were transferred to a qualitative software package called NVivo for 
analysis. The use of software reduces the chances of making mistakes, analyzes the data more 
effectively and avoids missing key concepts (Quinlan, 2011). NVivo data analysis involved 
summarizing data into different categories based on concepts and themes (Neuman & Robson, 
2014; Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). The study employed a coding process, consisting of three 
stages. Open coding is the first stage where the researcher goes through the transcribed 
interview to abridge the data into codes based on research interests. This stage creates 
numerous codes considered as sub-categories. Axial coding is the next phase, where the 
researcher finds common and repeating ideas by looking for the relationships and links among 
the sub-categories. This stage creates fundamental categories from the previous stage sub-
categories (codes). Selective coding is the final stage in the coding of qualitative data where 
the researcher discovers the aggregate themes by looking into all the categories and sub 
categories. These new generated themes are called core themes (Creswell & Clark, 2011; 
Neuman & Robson, 2014; Quinlan, 2011) and directly related to the research questions.  
The first stage of the coding process generated 131 open codes. In the second stage, the primary 
codes were revised by grouping similar codes with the same ideas in order to produce axial 
codes. This stage resulted in 11 key codes and 41 sub-codes/themes. The researcher then 
scanned all generated codes and sub-codes to develop the final core codes. This final coding 






























5. Shareholders’ awareness 
Shareholders’ Rights Protection 














This section presents the phase II of the research methodology used in this thesis. First of all, 
this section expounds the quantitative research followed by population, sample size and data 
collection including primary and secondary data through the survey questionnaire and annual 
reports. Second, the section presents the question design and development of the questionnaire. 
Secondly, the section also presents the procedure of development of the survey questionnaire. 
This section also provides the pilot study and Cronbach’s Alpha to check reliability and 
validity. At the end, this section also presents the models used in data analysis of the 
quantitative data.  
4.12 Quantitative Research 
This study adopted deductive approach and positivist paradigm. Quantitative research was 
more suitable in achieving the objectives of this study. A positivist research paradigm and 
deductive approach have been adopted and quantitative research is necessary to achieve the 
aims and research questions of the study. Quantitative research can be explanatory, predictive 
and confirmative in nature. Survey is a famous type of quantitative method which offers 
information on what people perceive (Nardi, 2018; Neuman & Robson, 2014).   
4.13 Population and Sample 
A population is an entire set of individuals, events or subjects of interest that the researcher 
wishes to investigate (Mugenda, 2003; Sekaran, 2003) and it is pivotal to define the population 
and sample to ensure that the sample is an accurate representation of the population. The 
population of study consists of all the 579 firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) 
and the sample should be drawn carefully to represent the whole population. However, 
researchers also documented some determinants such as research objectives, time and cost, 
proposed analysis and size of population that may affect decisions regarding selection of the 
sample size (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016; Veal, 2005). In addition, Kothari (2004) suggested that 
the sample size should not be too large nor too small. Consequently, this research used a 
purposive sampling technique to recruit the sample. This technique has been widely used in 
the existing studies on CG in different countries (Anis, 2013; Fuzuli, Pahala, & Murdayanti, 
2013; Mariri & Chipunza, 2011; Nur'ainy, Nurcahyo, Sri Kurniasih, & Sugiharti, 2013). This 
is a type of non-probability sampling technique in which the sample is selected in view of the 
purpose and defined criteria (Zikmund et al., 2013). This research excluded the financial 
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companies from the sample due to their different CG structure. In a similar vein, Neuman and 
Robson (2014) argued that a purposive sampling technique is appropriate when researcher aims 
to attain the profound understanding of underlying research theme and have already selected 
their sample. The sample is recruited on two basic criteria. First, only those companies were 
contacted which had recent annual reports available (2017 or 2018)14 because the study used 
the performance data from annual reports of the companies. Second, the survey was conducted 
from different respondents including managers, accountants, auditors or other members of 
organizations who were involved in the preparation of CG reports. Based on the above criteria, 
the questionnaire was distributed to 350 respondents15, however, only 120 questionnaires were 
received. Out of 120 filled questionnaires, 15 questionnaires were incomplete, hence, making 
a final sample of 105 respondents.  
4.14 Questionnaire Survey  
The study used the questionnaire survey to collect the primary data from respondents. Collis 
and Hussey (2013) documented that a questionnaire is a list of carefully chosen structured 
questions that are executed after considerable testing to elicit responses from respondents. In a 
similar vein, Sekaran (2003) argued that a questionnaire is a written set of questions to record 
respondents’ answers. In addition, Zikmund et al. (2013) documented that the questionnaire 
method is very helpful in getting information from respondents related to the research problem 
and helps decision makers to address the problem. Existing literature also provides the evidence 
that a survey questionnaire is commonly used in the area of social sciences and all respondents 
were asked to answer the same questions in same circumstances (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & 
Jackson, 2012).  
In line with the views of Oppenheim (1992) and  Foddy and Foddy (1994), this study used a 
survey questionnaire for several reasons. It is the most commonly used method for data 
collection and ensures the anonymity of respondents; consequently, respondents respond in a 
more free and convenient manner. Hence, the credibility of data and research is increased. It is 
appropriate for individual researchers who have shorter time span and limited resources. 
Survey questionnaire can easily disseminate to a larger sample which increases the credibility 
of data and generalizability of results. In addition, researchers also documented that a survey 
questionnaire is the best method of gathering data because CG studies are descriptive in nature 
                                                          
14 In Pakistan, some companies have their year ending in June while some have December.  
15 There is a total of 579 PSX listed firms in Pakistan, however, only 365 firms fulfilled the set criteria. Out of 
365 companies, 15 companies were further excluded and were used in the pilot study (see section 4.16).  
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(Alleyne, Howard, & Greenidge, 2006; Denscombe, 2014; Jones, Baxter, & Khanduja, 2013; 
Paape, Scheffe, & Snoep, 2003). There are two types of questionnaires as documented by  
Oppenheim (1992) and Bryman and Bell (2015). First is the self-administered questionnaire 
which can be conducted into three ways i.e. postal, internet mediated and hand delivered and 
collected (Jones et al., 2013). Second type is interviewer administered questionnaire which is 
classified into two types i.e. the structured interview and telephone questionnaire (Jones et al., 
2013). Additionally, researchers also documented that the choice of questionnaire depends on 
many factors including sample size, respondents’ characteristics, purpose of data gathering and 
number of questions (Saunders, 2011).  
Keeping in view the objectives of the study, the self-administrated questionnaire was suitable 
and employed for several reasons. It was more appropriate in the Pakistani context due to 
authenticity16, time savings, being easy to distribute, cheaper and kept anonymity that 
encouraged respondents and increased the response rate. In addition, existing studies on CG 
have already utilized this method (Goodwin & Seow, 2002; Hussain & Mallin, 2003; Solomon, 
Lin, Norton, & Solomon, 2003). Though the self-administrated questionnaire can be distributed 
through the post, internet and hand delivery, researchers argued that hand delivery method is 
the most appropriate for several reasons (Jones et al., 2013; Sekaran, 2003). It provides an 
opportunity to the researcher to motivate respondents to answer truly through providing a brief 
introduction about the research topic. Moreover, the researcher can collect responses in a 
shorter time and can clarify any ambiguity of respondents about questions. In addition, the 
questionnaire can be distributed to a large sample in a less expensive way as compared to 
interview and requires less skills. The researcher hired two research assistants to distribute the 
questionnaire to respondents to save time and cost17. The distribution and collection of 
questionnaires took two months.   
4.15 Questionnaire Design 
Researchers have argued that the questionnaire design is a very complex process and guidelines 
need to be followed (Collis & Hussey, 2013). The questionnaire needs to be in simple and 
concise language to ensure the respondents understand the meaning of questions in the same 
                                                          
16 Due to many fraudulent emails and links, respondents are not comfortable with filling the questionnaires online 
which may reduce response rate. In addition, sometimes, emails go to a spam folder to protect from fraudulent 
activities. 
17 The researcher was based in New Zealand and it was not possible for the researcher to go back to Pakistan to 
collect survey data due to time and huge travelling costs. Therefore, two research assistants were hired who have 
relevant qualifications and experience to save time and cost. In addition, a pilot study was conducted which helped 
in training the research assistant see (Connelly, 2008). The survey was completed in six weeks. 
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way. Moreover, questions need to be specific so that respondents do not give several answers. 
The questionnaire was formulated from multiple sources18 to ensure validity (Brace, 2018; Jann 
& Hinz, 2016; Perkins & Peterson, 2005). The survey questionnaire employed several kinds of 
questions such as Likert scale and multiple-choice questions. As seen in Annexure D, the 
questionnaire consists of four parts including demographic information to increase 
participants’ confidence (Kelley, Clark, Brown, & Sitzia, 2003). The first part comprises the 
questions linked to the level of CG compliance, measured through a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. The first part consisted of 48 CCG 
2012 provisions, divided into seven sub sections i.e. Auditing, BoDs, Charters/laws, Directors’ 
Education, Executive Director Compensation, Ownership and Progressive Practice. This 
section represents the independent variable of the study and is used to compute the CG index 
(CGI) score.  
The second and third parts comprise barriers and drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan, 
respectively, which are also measured through a five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) 
strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. The part two (barriers) consists of seventeen items; (1) 
Lack of Auditors’ Independence, (2) Board Ineffectiveness, (3) Institutional Culture of 
Pakistan, (4) Political and Governmental Interference in Business Activities, (5) Weak Legal 
Control and Enforcement, (6) Lack of Shareholders’ Awareness, (7) Lack of Resources for CG 
Compliance, (8) Lack of Shareholders’ Rights Protection especially Minority Shareholders, (9) 
Lack of Protection for Whistle Blowers, (10) Lack of Professional Education and Training 
among Stakeholders, (11) Fewer Voting Rights, (12) Low AGM Participation, (13) High Level 
of Corruption, (14) Nepotism or Kinship Culture, (15) Wobbly/unstable Economy of Pakistan, 
(16) Strong Social Ties among Different Stakeholders, and (17) Interpersonal Connections 
among BoDs while part three (drivers) consists of twelve items;  (1) Auditors Independence, 
(2) Internal Control and Risk Management, (3) Provide Protection to Whistle Blowers, (4) 
Enhancing and Empowering Professional Regulatory Bodies, (5) Board Heterogeneity, (6) 
Board Independence, (7) Encouraging Participation in Events and Conferences related to 
Corporate Governance) , (8) Enhancing Partnership with International Regulatory Bodies i.e. 
OECD, IFC to Promote CG in Pakistan, (9) Provide Accounting and Auditing Education to 
Internal Stakeholders, (10) Initiation of Training Programs for Directors, raise Awareness and 
Education for CEOs, Directors, Shareholders and Board Members, (11) Establish Corporate 
                                                          
18 The questionnaire is developed based on provisions of CCG 2012 and findings of the qualitative study (see 
chapter five).  
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Governance Education Programs at Universities, and (12) Promote CG Research in Pakistan. 
Finally, part four comprises respondents’ demographic information including age, position 
within organization, qualification, specialization and experience within job.  
4.16 Pilot Study 
A pilot study is widely used by researchers to reduce errors at very minimal costs. After 
designing the questionnaire, a pilot test was conducted to ensure validity and reliability of the 
instruments and procedure for data collection. The purpose of conducting a pilot study is 
manifold. It helps in developing and testing the adequacy of the research instrument, designing 
and testing protocols for study, collecting preliminary data and training of research assistants 
(Connelly, 2008). In addition, the participants in a pilot study are not included in the final 
sample to avoid response bias. Connelly (2008) stresses that a pilot study sample should be at 
least 10% of the total sample size of the study. Hence, this research conducted a pilot study 
from 15 respondents to fulfil the aforementioned objectives.  
4.17 Validity and Reliability 
The instruments were pre-tested to ensure the content and face validity by analyzing 
consistency and interpretation. For this purpose, the questionnaire was sent to experts in the 
field of CG to eliminate ambiguity and inadequacy. Simple words and language were used to 
ensure validity. Moreover, redundant and complicated terminologies were eliminated. The 
items were tested for their reliability through Cronbach Alpha with the help of Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 24. The Cronbach alpha indicates how well items in a set 
are positively correlated to each other and Cronbach alpha is determined for the items. The 
results of Cronbach Alpha are presented below (Table 5): 
Table 5 Cronbach Alpha Value of Instrument  




1 Level of Corporate Governance Compliance 48 0.892 
2 Barriers to Good Governance Practices 17 0.854 




As seen in Table 5, the Cronbach Alphas for all three parts were above 0.70. The coefficient 
of Cronbach Alpha ranges between zero to one and above 0.7 are considered as highly reliable 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2016).  
4.18 Data Collection  
In addition to primary data, this research also used secondary data for analysis. The primary 
data is gathered via a survey questionnaire as discussed in the section 4.15. Secondary data has 
some advantages over primary data due to its time and cost effectiveness (Saunders, 2011; 
Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). Similarly, Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005) documented that it is 
desirable to use secondary data over primary data to answer the research questions if it is 
available. Consequently, this study also used secondary data to measure firm performance such 
as return of assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) which is collected from recent annual reports 
of sampled firms19. 
4.19 Data Analysis and Presentation 
A research study produces massive raw data and it is necessary to organize and score data 
systematically for data analysis (Collins, 2003). In this research, the data is gathered from PSX 
listed firms through self-administrated questionnaires. The data analysis is fascinating, creative 
and time consuming process (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). This research used descriptive 
statistics, exploratory factor analysis (EFA), correlation and regression analysis to achieve the 
research objectives and SPSS 24 was used as a tool for data analysis. First, this research 
employed explanatory factor analysis (EFA) which is an interdependence method for 
classifying the most influential barriers and drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan. The 
factor analysis investigates the inter-correlations between the items and reduces them into small 
groups. The factors within a group are quite similar in meaning and represent the same 
meaning. This technique allows the researcher to determine underlying factors or dimensions 
that exist in a given data set. This technique is useful in academic and managerial research in 
reducing the items into discrete dimensions that can be further aggregated. Second this research 
estimated a hierarchical multiple linear regression model for the study which is mentioned 
below: 
Firm Performance: β0+ β1Demographic variables + β2 CGI Score2 + ε 
Where 
                                                          
19 Data is collected only for those firms, who filled in the survey questionnaire.  
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β0 = Constant 
Demographic variables: Age, Qualification, Specialization, Experience which is collected from 
the survey questionnaire  
Firm Performance: ROA and ROE from annual reports 
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets  
ROE = Net Income / Total Shareholders’ Equity 
CGI Score: Corporate Governance index (CGI) Score which is calculated from the survey 
questionnaire 
ε: Error term 
4.20 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the methodology used in this study to explore key institutional 
determinants of CG practices in Pakistan. First, the chapter discussed the research paradigm 
(interpretivism and positivism) used in this study. The appropriateness of these research 
paradigms and their use in the study are also discussed in this chapter. The use of inductive and 
deductive approaches and their application in the context of study are also discussed. Second, 
the chapter presents a mixed methods research design and an explanation for choosing this 
design in the study. The chapter also highlights the strengths of a mixed methods research 
design and also discusses the nexus between the research objectives and questions with a mixed 
methods research design. The chapter provides justification for using qualitative and 
quantitative research related to each research question. Third, the chapter presents the benefits 
of triangulation in mixed methods studies. In phase I, a qualitative research design is employed. 
Semi-structured focus group interviews were conducted with professionals and regulators to 
explore the key institutional determinants of good CG practices in Pakistan. In addition, an 
interview guide is used to conduct the interviews which were recorded, and notes were taken. 
The qualitative data is transcribed into verbatim words and NVivo software is used as a tool to 
analyze the qualitative data. Eight themes (presented in Table 4) were explored i.e. (1) 
Auditing, (2) Political, (3) Legal, (4) Board, (5) Shareholders’ awareness, (6) Voting, (7) 
Culture and (8) Values which are discussed in detail in chapter five.  
In phase II, the quantitative research design is employed. The quantitative data is collected 
from 105 PSX listed firms using a purposive sampling technique through five-point Likert 
scale survey questionnaires. The survey questionnaire consists of four parts. The first part 
presents the CG compliance and consists of forty-eight provisions from SECP CCG 2012. The 
second part is consisting of potential barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan and consists of 
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seventeen items. The barriers are identified from qualitative data analysis. Furthermore, the 
third part consists of drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan and consists of twelve items. 
These items are also extracted from qualitative analysis. Regarding firm performance, the 
secondary data is collected from annual reports of sampled firms. Descriptive statistics and 
correlation analysis are conducted in phase II. In addition, EFA is employed to identify the 
most influential barriers of good CG practices in Pakistan which prevent the best CG practices 
in Pakistan. Moreover, the most important drivers are also identified which can promote good 
CG practice in Pakistan by employing EFA. Finally, the multiple hierarchical regression 
analyses were conducted to investigate the nexus between CG compliance score and firm 





FINDINGS OF THE QUALITATIVE PHASE 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of the focus group. The chapter expounds the themes which 
are identified by focus group interviews. Eight themes emerged as the result of the focus group 
interviews. These themes are; (1) Auditing, (2) Political, (3) Legal, (4) Board, (5) Shareholders’ 
awareness, (6) Voting, (7) Culture and (8) Values and they were discussed by the participants 
of the focus group. These themes are key institutional determinants of good CG practices in 
Pakistan and fulfill the first objective. A chapter summary is presented at the end.  
5.2 Auditing 
Auditing is a self-regulatory element of CG and creates appropriate links of information, 
governance and incentives between investors and managers. It encompasses a broad group of 
intermediaries i.e. financial analysts, investors, ratings agencies, corporate boards (internal 
governance agents), and auditors (internal and external) (Healy & Palepu, 2003). Researchers 
have documented the importance of auditing for improving CG practices. Preston, Cooper, 
Scarbrough, and Chilton (1995) argued that the audit process is profoundly convoluted in the 
development of professional codes of ethics and rules on independence through formal 
procedural knowledge. In addition, Grabosky (1995) documented that reputational 
intermediaries work as gatekeepers by ensuring quality information and compliance with 
regulations. However, these intermediaries may have their own set of incentives and problems, 
thus, they are regulated by different state agencies and certified professional bodies. As 
compared to board structure and shareholder activism, auditing issues have received less 
attention in CG debate because these are considered straightforward and technical in nature.  
In Pakistan, the auditing process is not effective and auditors lack independence (Samza, 2016). 
The focus group analysis reveals that auditors have links with management and owners of firms 
and sign off practice is quite common. However, researchers argued that the purpose of audits 
is to identify fraud, and auditors provide a judgement on the financial statements with reference 
to the concept of fairness or a ‘true and fair’ view (Humphrey & Moizer, 1990; Humphrey, 
Moizer, & Turley, 1992). In Pakistan, the situation is contradictory and lacks transparency and 
fairness because auditors are not independent and audit committees are mostly comprised of 
family members or relatives who are serving as independent directors (Khan, 2014). The 
following sections expound evidence on three categories (1) auditor independence, (2) audit 
committee and (3) risk management that are classified together as auditing. 
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5.2.1 Auditor Independence 
Auditor’s effectiveness depends on the capability to perform independently as a gatekeeper. 
The auditor independence is pivotal for ensuring transparency and disclosure. However, focus 
group analysis reveals that an auditor’s independence is compromised in the PSX listed firms. 
Similarly, DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002) argued that auditors behave with 
relatively greater independence towards those clients who pay higher audit fees. Additionally, 
Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003) found no relationship between discretionary accruals 
and audit fees after controlling for firm performance. These findings support the argument that 
market based incentives such as litigation cost and reputational loss (Coffee Jr, 2003) override 
the benefits received by auditors due to compromising their independence (Reynolds & 
Francis, 2000). A focus group participant informed that auditors do not verify the statements 
and there is sign off practice. This practice can be due to lack of expertise or high compensation. 
The focus group participant commented that: 
 “One is a general statement of compliance which gets put with the audited accounts and that 
the external auditor has to sign off. Having said that I have questioned many times on various 
boards whether the external auditor actually verifies the statement of compliance and they do 
not (participant – II)” 
In addition, Ascioglu, Hegde, and McDermott (2005) maintained the argument that auditor 
compensation lowers market liquidity and disclosure quality of the firm. In a similar vein, 
Johnson, Nelson, and Frankel (2002) documented that large audit and consulting fees influence 
the auditor’s independence. Dee, Lulseged, and Nowlin (2002) also support these findings and 
document that auditors are less conscientious in restraining earning management for those 
client firms which gave them a high proportion of non-audit fees. It is evident that auditor 
independence is very pivotal for good CG practices, transparency and fairness in Pakistan; 
however, the current practices are different. A focus group participant also mentioned that 
efficacy of the internal auditing function depends on the independence of the auditor. The focus 
group participant highlighted that: 
“Having his own internal systems of control and that is where the internal auditor… internal 
auditing function is important and depending very much on how efficient, effective, 
independent the internal auditor function is within the company. The compliance can vary from 
company to company so… (participant – II)” 
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Hence, it can be interpreted that the nexus between auditor independence and their fees may 
depend on the CG context of the client firms themselves. Larcker and Richardson (2003) 
documented that the provision of non-audit services is possibly problematic for some firms that 
are controlled by management. In addition, Causey (2008) debated that there should be strong 
internal control and audit function to implement good CG practices. The firms lack 
transparency, fairness and disclosure due to lack of auditors’ independence in Pakistan. The 
auditors are not fulfilling their duties in the true spirit and the quality of information is 
compromised. Moreover, the family dominated firms may have close links with auditing firms 
and pay them higher fees that lead towards poor disclosure quality.  
5.2.2 Audit Committee  
Most of the listed firms around the globe have pursued tackling the problem of auditor 
independence mostly by having active audit committees within the BoDs and supervision of 
external auditors. Audit committee is responsible to ensure the independence of external 
auditors from CEO and firm, in general, and close supervision by independent outside 
directors. In addition, researchers and governmental bodies have aired distrust about the 
effectiveness of audit committees and frauds such as at Enron have vindicated those doubts. A 
UK based qualitative study in which interviews were conducted from audit committees 
documented that the ceremonial function of audit committees is to give shared declaration and 
relaxation to outsiders, rather than intervention in and verification of company information 
(Spira, 1999a; Spira, 1999b). 
The analysis of the focus group reveals that the existence of an auditing committee is necessary 
to protect shareholders’ interests especially minority shareholders. Moreover, the focus group 
analysis also highlighted that audit committees should be comprised of independent directors. 
A focus group participant highlighted the importance of audit committees in the listed firms of 
Pakistan: 
“at a minimum the board audit committee is essential and that should primarily be composed 
of independent directors, if there is one or two at least it should be chaired by an independent 
director so that there is some level of independent discourse vis a vis the financials 
(Participant-II)” 
Cohen et al. (2002) argued that audit committee members may lack expertise, knowledge and 
independence in supervision. Similarly, Felo, Krishnamurthy, and Solieri (2003) found that a 
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positive association between financial reporting and the percentage of audit committee 
members having a financial background. Serious issues emerged at Enron about the 
independence of committee members despite the presence of the audit committee. Gillan and 
Martin (2002) found strong financial ties among directors at Enron, consequently, directors 
took individual benefits in the form of consultancy fees, group donations and transactions with 
entities in which directors played a key role. In addition, researchers documented that the level 
of interaction between the audit committee and auditors is highly variable (DeZoort, 1998), 
hence, it is pivotal to know how audit committees operate and fulfill their responsibilities 
(Kalbers & Fogarty, 1998). Reinstein and Weirich (1996) found that selection and retention of 
audit companies were influenced by relationships between the audit firms and the companies 
of the committee members. A similar type of situation exists in Pakistan. The analysis of the 
focus group reveals that audit committees are usually comprised of non-independent directors 
or family members and decisions are made in best interests of the controlling family. A focus 
group participant highlighted that: 
the board so that what happens sometimes in family dominated companies is that they staff 
these sub committees with people whom they are comfortable with including primarily the audit 
committee with non-executive or family members and most of their decisions vis a vis the 
budget, vis a vis other issues (Participant-II)” 
The audit committee does not have the expertise and power to confront management in the 
listed firms of Pakistan and does not play an effective role in improving the quality of financial 
reports. It is important to have an audit committee with independent directors with relevant 
experience and literacy.  
5.2.3 Risk Management  
Researchers documented that BoDs are responsible for managing internal control and risks.  
(Turnbull, 1999). Despite the increasing interest in studying risk management and internal 
control, limited evidence is found to expound the nexus between internal control and good CG 
practices (Solomon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph, 2000). BoDs must ensure that all types of 
risks are considered and fully entrenched in the firm’s culture. The analysis of the focus group 
reveals that risk should be managed by BoDs in the PSX listed firms that will help in improving 
CG practices. The risk is not limited to financial and regulatory/legal compliance risks, but also 
strategic, ethical and operational risk (Waite, 2001). Ethical risks include failure to have ethical 
standards in doing business and contracts are obtained through personal relations and unethical 
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means (Cooke, 1991). Consequently, this could also cross over into financial risks through 
accounting irregularities and vulnerability to fraud. Cannella Jr, Fraser, and Lee (1995) 
mentioned that there is particular reputation risk among BoDs if performance is poor. A focus 
group participant also mentioned that BoDs should emphasize internal control and risk 
management: 
“at least a good number of independent directors, sufficient independence, diversity of skills 
because for me corporate governance board’s role is really the center piece of corporate 
governance and then of course better oversight in terms of having internal controls and risk 
management under the board’s oversight I think that can contribute tremendously towards 
improving the overall corporate governance framework in companies in Pakistan (Participant 
– III)” 
It is concluded that auditing function is not reliable in Pakistan and auditors’ independence is 
questioned. However, as per agency theory, principals hire independent external experts 
(auditors) due to lack of trust in agents and reliability of information. Agents (directors or 
auditors) may be trustworthy and there is no need to increase the regulatory mechanism, 
however, a simple agency model suggests that agents are untrustworthy. The independence of 
auditors has great importance in delivering high-quality disclosure; however, auditors work 
closely with BoDs of firms that may question the independence of auditors and demand strict 
regulations and control.      
5.3 Political  
Researchers have argued that the institutional environment of developing countries not only 
differs from developed countries but each developing country has its own institutional 
conditions that vary from other developing countries (Singh & Newberry, 2008). However, 
some scholars have also emphasized the similarities between developing countries in terms of 
political corruption, ownership structure, legal origin, size of capital markets and investor 
protection. Consequently, the politics can influence the culture, profitability, ownership, 
operations and firm size (Roe, 2003). The same situation is prevailing in the listed firms of 
Pakistan. Being a developing country, Pakistan has a high level of political risk and political 
interference is common in daily business life. Moreover, the political situation is unstable in 
the country and corruption is high. The capital markets of developing countries lack necessary 
resources to support entrepreneurs (Domadenik, Prašnikar, & Svejnar, 2014) and after 
following strict regulations (Desai & Olofsgård, 2011), business owners still face difficulties 
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in getting access to resources such as land, services and bank finance. Consequently, politicians 
take advantage of this and show interest in corporate organizations to take bribes and benefits 
(Wu, 2005). 
The focus group analysis reveals that firms use political contacts to take advantage and expedite 
the process of acquiring resources in Pakistan. Moreover, the appointments are made on 
political connections rather than merit, consequently, sometimes people in higher positions 
lack expertise and relevant knowledge. The following sections expound evidence on three 
categories (1) political system, (2) political influence and (3) corruption that are classified 
together as political.    
5.3.1 Political System 
Existing studies reveal that the political system of a country can have pivotal significance  for 
the political system and ultimately corporate governance (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007). In 
a similar vein, researchers documented that the political system of a country is reflected in the 
corporate governance (Adegbite et al., 2013) and political influence can be manifest in the 
business environment (Adegbite, 2012). The analysis of the focus group reveals that corporate 
standards and performance are dependent on the economy and the economy is dependent on 
political stability.  If the political situation is unstable, it will have negative consequences on 
the economic condition of the country and the firm level as well. A focus group participant 
asserted that: 
“On top of the issues I will say economic stability and political stability, these are the macro 
level issues. If they are persistent overall the performance of the company and the financial 
performance of the company as well as the corporate standards will definitely rise to a 
significant level. Uncertainty of politics and economics these are the barriers…. The market is 
dependent on the economy and the economy is dependent on political stability so that’s why 
we are on a downward spiral (Participant – IV)” 
Nahavandi (2006) also documented that leaders can influence their followers and their actions 
may be inconsistent with an organization’s objectives. Hence, this power inequality 
emasculates the ability of existing corporate mechanisms to meritoriously monitor behavior 
(Lessing, 2009). In Pakistan, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has a poor CG system, 
consequently, the financial sector is abused by politically influential elites (Khan & Bhatti, 
2008). In a similar vein, Saeed (2013) conducted a study in Pakistan to examine the effect of 
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political connectedness on firm leverage and performance. He found positive effect of political 
connectedness on a firm's leverage while a negative effect on firm performance. He also 
documented that politically connected firms enjoy the benefits of preferential lending as 
compared to non-politically connected firms. It is evident from the focus group that political 
issues are a major concern in the implementation of CG practices in Pakistan. Ali, Tao, Shaikh, 
and Sajid (2017) also documented that politics and leadership have an impact on corporate 
governance practices in Pakistan. 
5.3.2 Political Influence 
Political influence includes the connections of different stakeholders (Aplin & Hegarty, 
1980)having restricted control over the rewards of political actors. Bushman et al. (2004) claim 
that private mechanisms for the enforcement of contracts and relationship-based arrangements 
emerge in countries with weak law enforcement. The parties of contracts develop informal ties 
with each other due to weak enforcement mechanisms and these informal ties perform as an 
auxiliary for the strong enforcement of contracts. They further argued that, in return for bribes, 
political support and nepotism, politically powerful elites favor their acquaintances. The 
analysis of the focus group also portrays a similar situation among listed firms of Pakistan. The 
analysis reveals that political appointments are made in listed firms of Pakistan which lead 
towards low transparency and disclosure. The analysis also reveals that SECP “that works as 
regulatory body of CG practices” is also under the influence of politics and unable to perform 
well. A focus group participant also mentioned the political appointments on the board at State 
Owned Enterprises (SEOs). 
“Because of that which I have told you the chronic illness of state-owned enterprises in 
Pakistan, which is they appoint, they have political appointees on their board (Participant -I)” 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) also argued that economic transactions are made on the basis 
of political and personal ties in weak law enforcement countries, hence, the political influence 
has an important role in shaping CG systems in those countries. Similarly, BoDs have political 
connections and CG practices do not exist in the true spirit among the listed firms of Pakistan. 
A focus group participant also highlighted that: 
“But sometimes SECP autonomy is compromised due to political interference and government 
line industries as you know. And because of this political interference SECP has been very 
bleak in ensuring corporate governance, enforcements in listed companies lease and because 
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SECP is the main body which is responsible for ensuring corporate governance in public sector 
companies…… they [SECP] are monitoring the progress of the companies but their hands are 
tied, they cannot basically, they till the implication which additional directors and associate 
directors can’t do in the true spirit because of political influences through the commissioner 
and through the chair  (Participant -I)” 
Similarly, researchers have argued that it is easy to maintain political relationships in family 
firms through networking and kinship (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006) especially in developing 
countries, consequently, these politically influential people can affect the development and 
implementation of regulations and laws in developing countries (Berglöf & Von Thadden, 
1999). Focus group analysis reveals that almost all firms have political influence and it has 
disastrous effects on company performance and CG practices. The focus group participant 
stressed that politics should be separate from business to improve company governance. The 
focus group participant informed that:  
“Politics should be separated from the company’s business, from the company’s governance…. 
they are basically politically proof. They are prudent and politically proof and their corporate 
governance practices have never been the government stake.... This is the main chronic factor 
which is basically hurting the Pakistan economy and hurting the performance of the company 
in Pakistan…. But the reality is the political interference is so much.  (Participant -I)” 
In sum, PSX listed firms have great political influence that is affecting their day to day 
operations and CG practices. The regulatory authorities are unable to enforce the regulations 
due to political influence and political connectedness. Politics should be separated from firm’s 
operations in order to promote CG practices.  
5.3.3 Corruption 
Corruption is the biggest challenge for many developing countries including Pakistan20. 
Political connectedness is also linked to the corruption level within the country (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2006; Faccio, 2006; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2008). Similarly, political 
connectedness is more dominant in countries with weak legal systems and high levels of 
corruption (Faccio & Parsley, 2009). Fisman (2001) documented that high levels of corruption 
                                                          
20 Pakistan ranked 117 out of 180 most corrupted countries. The higher number indicates a high corruption 




might imply the existence of political connectedness and high political corruption in 
developing countries such as Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and China. In addition, Faccio (2006) 
and Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2008) documented that the political connectedness of firms 
is prevalent in countries with lower judicial independence. The analysis of the focus group 
reveals that corruption is high in Pakistan especially in the corporate sector. The participant (s) 
stressed the introduction of anti-corruption reforms. They mentioned that firms hide 
information due to corruption and wrong doing. A focus group participant informed that: 
“also another factor which is corruption, corruption is the cause of concern, the corruption is 
basically, anti-corruption movements are basically not implemented through in Pakistan… 
anti-corruption reforms should be retrospect, they should be implemented in all corporate 
governance and also stake holders and those which are involved in for example the State Bank 
of Pakistan, SECP… if you are hiding your reports (disclosure statement) that means there is 
corruption involved in it. (Participant -I)” 
It is becoming increasingly acknowledged that politics shape corporate governance (Roe, 
1991), particularly taking more complex dimensions in developing countries like Pakistan. 
Similarly, Roe (2003) argued that politics interferes with firms’ ownership structures and 
boardrooms’ behavior. Moreover, politics influences the firm in several ways, given that it 
defines who owns it determines firm’s capacity to acquire external financing. In addition,  it 
defines its growth and profitability potentials and ultimately reveals the dissemination of 
authority and power within the firm (Roe, 2003). In Pakistan, it is found that politicians hold 
major stakes either directly or indirectly in many firms, which provides them the opportunity 
to hire their favorite BoDs and management.  Consequently, these politicians use their 
influence to control the firm for their personal interests and benefits. One the other side, 
multinationals compromise their ethical standard to get more business in such political and 
corrupt environment. Consequently, the need arises to comprehend relationship between 
institutions and CG system in such endemic corruption.  
5.4 Legal 
The legal and regulatory systems of a country instigated the CG provisions. In Pakistan, the 
SECP have been taken enormous steps in issuing and resolving CG issues in Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, different issues have constrained the efficacy of CG regulations despite the 
government and regulatory bodies’ intervention. The critical factors underlying this challenge 
remain the economic, legal and corporate environment of the country (Siddique, 2013). 
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Similarly, it is considerably essential that an appropriate, efficient and reliable regulatory, legal 
and institutional framework should be established in order to ascertain best CG practices 
(OECD, 2004). The business community has identified different key barriers; (1) lack of 
resources (i.e. qualified workforce), (2) insufficient benefits of CG compliance; and (3) 
problems regarding disclosure of proprietary information to competitors (International Finance 
Corporation, 2007) in effective implementation of CG in Pakistan. The analysis of the focus 
group reveals that firms are not complying with CG practice in the true spirit rather they are 
doing tick box practice. One reason for this may be lack of resources. Moreover, the analysis 
shows that enforcement lags behind due to the weak and long process of the judicial system. 
The analysis of the focus group also reveals that regulators are not competent enough and do 
not have enough power to exercise to enhance CG practices. Following sections expound the 
evidence on three categories (1) compliance, (2) enforcement and (3) regulators that are 
classified together as legal.    
5.4.1 Compliance   
Compliance is very important in achieving the CG objectives and many countries have adopted 
legal mechanisms to establish CG systems in particular context (La Porta et al., 2002), 
however, poor compliance has disastrous effects on good CG systems especially in emerging 
countries (Berglöf & Claessens, 2006; Okpara, 2011) . Evidence reveals that  CG codes do not 
take into account the local specificities (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Judge et al., 2008), 
consequently,  impair the desire and motivation to comply with the CG codes (Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2012). Similarly, the analysis reveals that compliance is lacking among the listed 
firms of Pakistan due to fewer resources or lack of motivation. One focus group participant 
informed that: 
“I think compliance is what lacks behind and that is the difference between complying in the 
letter and complying in spirit. You can have a statement of compliance saying and do a box 
ticking exercise that we are in compliance with all the provisions but it’s really not in spirit…. 
so I think compliance is far behind the written rules and regulations (participant – II)” 
In a similar vein, Hamid and Kozhich (2007) highlighted that, after the introduction of CG 
code in 2002, many firms delisted from the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) due to increased 
cost to fulfill the requirements of the CG code. Many firms perceive that appointment of 
qualified CG experts, publishing and printing of financial statements and CG disclosure are 
extra financial burdens on them. Another focus group participant highlighted that: 
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“You don’t have enough resources to implement, to comply with the corporate governance 
practices. Maybe we think that it will create, it will increase your cost (Participant – I)” 
In Pakistan, ownership concentration is high and most of firms are owned and controlled by 
family members, hence, firms prefer not to comply with strict regulation intended at protecting 
the rights of minority shareholders (Khan, 2014). In a similar vein, Adu-Amoah et al. (2008) 
documented that this raises the concerns regarding the application of corporate governance 
codes, in emerging countries, developed by the Western world. For instance, in developed 
countries, CG compliance is effective due to the robustness of their institutional frameworks 
and replication of akin strategies in developing economies, i.e. Pakistan might not generate the 
same results due to weak institutional environment.  
5.4.2 Enforcement   
Researchers documented that enforcement is pivotal in creating good governance practices and 
an effective business environment, especially in a developing country like Pakistan (Ashraf & 
Ghani, 2005; Berglöf & Claessens, 2006). Anwar (2006) argued that enforcement is the main 
impediment to good corporate governance practices in Pakistan due to high levels of political 
corruption (Easterly, 2001). Similarly, researchers found that relationship -based arrangements 
emerge for enforcement in countries with weak law enforcement (Bushman et al., 2004). On 
the other hand,  Inyang (2009) debated that enforcement is crucial to attain a good corporate 
governance system. Pakistan has a small concentrated capital market, characterized by weak 
law enforcement, and mostly, firms rely on banks for financing rather than equity financing 
(Ashraf & Ghani, 2005). Therefore, the Pakistan stock market is volatile and highly 
concentrated (Iqbal, 2012; Nawazish & Sara, 2012). In a similar vein, Siddiqui (2010) 
expounded that developing countries have less developed and more highly concentrated stock 
markets than the developed countries and the Anglo-Saxon model is more suitable for countries 
with low concentration and developed markets. Despite this fact, many developing countries 
including Pakistan have adopted this model due to the sway and guidance of international 
financial agencies. Pakistan also receives guidance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and the World Bank (WB) for effective enforcement of the CG system and development and 
training of staff (Javid & Iqbal, 2010). Another reason regarding regulations is related to the 
failure of courts to address legal disagreements economically, in a timely manner and fairly 




“We have very good laws everything is on paper I mean if you go through any legal penal 
structure, it is all there. Where we lack is implementation and here the judicial system… the 
role of the judicial system also comes into play because as you know if something goes to court 
in Pakistan you can just forget about it, it takes years and years for it to reach a conclusion if 
at all, so the many loopholes that exist in the implementation of the laws is what has held us 
behind (Participant -II)” 
This highlights the weak judicial system and powerful political class. Additionally, prevalent 
corrupt practices have infiltrated and boosted this problem. Recently in Pakistan, corporate 
executives, public office holders and politicians have been sentenced for governance-related 
infringements, nonetheless these sentences have been believed to be very compassionate. 
Additional reason is the length of proceedings in courts and expenses. Another focus group 
participant highlighted that: 
“So that was first hurdle but then the process itself, it was the court sanction process, so you 
had to petition the high court of the province. I have looked at different rulings that were issued 
under those provisions and in most cases I would say because of the process… the nature of 
the process being very contentious and laborious…. because courts are sometimes not as 
proficient or as efficient (participant – III)” 
Participants also discussed the duplication of regulations and role of regulators in enforcement 
of and compliance with good governance practices in Pakistan.  In addition, complying with 
or explaining the nature of corporate governance regulations presents an additional challenge 
regarding enforcement21. Due to lack of enforcement, the objective of good CG practices is not 
fulfilled, and CG reforms become ineffective in Pakistan. 
5.4.3 Regulators  
It is noted that regulations are pivotal for the entrenchment of a sound CG system, but 
regulators are also most important because their responsibility is to ensure compliance with 
regulations. In Pakistan, it is advised that poor compliance and weak enforcement are affected 
by unprofessional CG regulators. SECP is the principal regulatory body for corporate sector 
regulations in Pakistan. Researchers have argued that good corporate governance practices 
cannot be achieved in Pakistan as regulators lack the required authorization to force compliance 
                                                          
21  SECP introduced the CG code in 2002 with comply or explain and made it mandatory to comply with most 
of the CG code provisions in the 2012 reform, however, there are still voluntary provisions.  
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(Khan, 2017). The analysis of the focus group reveals that regulators lack resources to ensure 
implementation of CG practices. The analysis also reveals that regulators do not have enough 
power to exercise it. A focus group participant also informed that: 
“If we talk about SECP they have the limited resources they can't go beyond that. So the true 
letter cannot be implemented but in the background of those limited resources there is political 
influence. So, they can’t go there, this is an implication with the regulator. If the regulator is 
not performing at all fully then how can you, how can you basically say that company will do 
it…. As I told you, what the regulator is doing basically, the legal implication is there and 
SECP is an autonomous body, okay, but sometimes SECP autonomy is compromised due to 
political interference and government line industries as you know…. there is no serious 
corporate governance in public sector entities, even though the regulator is there, SECP is 
there, even though, even though the rules are there, even though ICAP is basically the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan are basically voicing and influencing, influencing and 
that these rules should be implemented into letter spirit but they are not basically implemented 
so far. (participant -I)” 
Another focus group participant informed that: 
“The regulators do not have enough power. Sometimes, they do not do their job and are active 
politically (Participant-VI)” 
Another focus group participant highlighted that: 
“So as far as regulations and laws are concerned I think it’s pretty good it’s the implementation 
which lacks and I think that’s what you need to focus on because despite the best of laws and 
best of regulations they are unable to get them to be implemented in the letter and spirit and 
that is what one (regulators) needs to investigate (participant -II)” 
A focus group participant informed that: 
“it means that there are limited like they [regulators] have limited resources, limited media 
regulatory system, like they can’t make anything according to them, they [regulators] are 
limited by their rules and regulations (Participant -I)” 
It is evident that regulators are unable to perform better due to limited resources and political 
and other pressures. Effective regulations demand adequate authority and power to exercise 
and compel compliance and enforcement of regulations. Moreover, the financial conditions 
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could also persuade regulators to be involved in dodgy CG activities.  Another issue is related 
to the power of regulators to abdicate their responsibilities. This lack of authority and power is  
erratic with assumptions of public interest theory (Den Hertog, 2010), that requires ample 
executive power and information to endorse public interest. Therefore, in developing countries 
like Pakistan, regulators not only suffer from lack of the required executive power but also 
have limited access to the information constrained by weak social and political institutions. 
Consequently, it restricts their ability to make informed decisions and quality is compromised.  
5.5 Board 
CG research that investigates the effect of board composition on critical decisions has primarily 
adopted an agency theory rationale. As per the SECP CCG 2012, BoDs are responsible for 
ensuring effective CG practices among PSX listed firms. An effective board not only develops 
and promotes a collective vision of a company’s purpose but also the values, behavior and 
culture to conduct business (Council, 2009). Thus, BoDs are responsible for adoption of control 
mechanisms (like selection, evaluation, monitoring) that align with the interests of managers 
and owners. BoDs are described as the apex of the internal control system (Jensen, 1993) and 
their monitoring has become pivotal in corporate governance research.  According to SECP 
CCG, BoDs are required to take training to improve their effectiveness (SECP CCG, 2012). 
Researchers also documented that BoDs help organizations in establishing the nexus with the 
external environment.  As per resource dependent theory, organizations are dependent upon 
resources in the external environment for their survival (Pfeffer, 1972) and BoDs act as the 
instrument to deal with external dependencies (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In addition, BoDs 
help to secure valuable resources and information and offer access to crucial constituents 
(Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000).  Similarly, Patel and Xavier (2005) debated that in 
developing countries, it is essential to have an effective system of checks and balances on 
managerial and board behavior in order to achieve a good corporate governance system. The 
analysis of the focus group reveals that BoDs should be independent to protect minority 
shareholders and make independent decisions. However, the analysis also reveals that BoDs 
lack independence among listed firms of Pakistan. Moreover, there is a lack of board 
heterogeneity and nepotism/kinship exists due to high ownership concentration. The family 
members are appointed as BoDs and in some cases, the entire board is composed of family 
members that ultimately leads towards expropriation of minority shareholders. The following 
sections expound evidence on three categories (1) board independence, (2) board heterogeneity 
and (3) nepotism/kinship that are classified together as board.    
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5.5.1 Board independence 
The board’s independence is supported in agency theory which adopts inadequacies that arise 
from separation of ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
According to agency theory, BoDs are responsible for monitoring, rectifying and evaluating 
managers’ performance on behalf of shareholders (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). 
Moreover, BoDs also assign rewards and penalties to management on the basis of criteria that 
emulate shareholders’ interests. The independent BoDs provide effective oversight of the 
firm’s executive directors and CEO. Researchers documented that independent directors are 
usually assumed to be more effective in protecting shareholders’ interests (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985), resulting in higher firm performance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). A focus group 
participant also highlighted that: 
“Definitely board independence not only helps ensure management of conflict of interest but 
also ensures that the minority shareholders are also protected in terms of their rights and their 
assets and their investment so the agenda that are taken by the board are mainly focused 
towards the minority shareholders… the protection of minority shareholders (Participant -
IV)” 
An extensive literature has investigated the nexus between the composition of the BoDs and 
diverse proxies for corporate performance. Researchers pointed out that independent BoDs are 
very often executive directors in other firms (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Kaplan & Reishus, 1990). 
In addition, managers preferred independent directors because they better monitor the 
managerial discretion. Rhoades, Rechner, and Sundaramurthy (2000) found a positive impact 
of board independence on firm performance. Researchers documented that board independence 
has a positive effect on the corporate governance rating (del Carmen Briano-Turrent & 
Rodríguez-Ariza, 2016). In a similar vein, Ortas, Álvarez, and Zubeltzu (2017) found that the 
independence of a company’s board positively influences corporate social performance. 
Ensuring board independence empowers BoDs to contribute substantially to the decision-
making processes. However, the focus group pointed out that selection and appointments of 
board members are extensively based on personal relations and political gains. Such situations 
may undermine the boards’ independence and their ability to question or challenge the 
authority of the managing director or CEO. A focus group participant pointed that: 
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“A board should be independent…. independence of the board is very important, if the board 
is not independent, they will not make independent decisions. They will, they will not do 
anything which is right for the company (participant -I) 
Another focus group participant mentioned that: 
“There is no level of complete independence from each other so when somebody comes on to 
your board the high likelihood is even if they are an independent director there is a high 
likelihood that there is some connection to degrees of separation with other board members or 
management or somebody (Participant – II) 
A focus group participant also stressed on having an independent board to increase 
effectiveness of corporate boards: 
“I think one thing that has really made corporate boards more effective in listed companies is 
the idea of having board independence and board independent directors (Participant -III)” 
Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) debated that independent directors can arbitrate to protect 
the interests of all shareholders in case of disagreement of interests among controlling and 
outsider shareholders (Anderson et al., 2003). Nonetheless, it is divergent in PSX listed firms 
and firms lack independent directors in the true sense22. Due to lack of independence, the 
interests and rights of minority shareholders are not protected.  
5.5.2 Board Heterogeneity 
Board heterogeneity is referred to as variation among board members in terms of gender, age, 
education, experience, managerial background, learning styles, cultural diversity and values 
(Coffey & Wang, 1998). Researchers argued that larger tenure of BoDs is linked with increased 
commitment to established procedures and practices (Pfeffer, 1972), better stringency (Boeker, 
1992) and increased insulation towards new ideas (Hambrick, 1996). In a similar vein, 
Filatotchev, Jackson, Gospel, and Allcock (2007) argued that good CG is linked with high 
degrees of board diversity including social and human capital. Boards that are comprised of 
more diverse personals such as public affairs specialists, top management, financial 
representatives and lawyers, may be more effective in terms of bringing imperative experience, 
                                                          




skills and expertise to provide advice and counsel. Board diversity, thus, benefits corporations 
for the following reasons: it allows a better understanding of the market, especially in a diverse 
market place; diversity is also linked with innovation and creativity; it enhances the 
effectiveness of corporate leadership; promotes more effective global networking and 
relationships; and enables more effective problem-solving (Nguyen & Faff, 2007). In addition, 
Odle (2007) argued that better governance structures can be achieved through encouraging 
greater board diversity.  A focus group participant also informed that: 
 “I am a big advocate for diversity at the board level, I have always spoken about age diversity 
I think gender diversity is also important…..When you have a greater diversity you bring in 
people from different socio economic backgrounds from different genders from different age 
structures you bring in people into a group who don’t necessarily have that same level of 
comfort with each other and that is important for them to start voicing their differences of 
opinion because when there is difference of opinion there is a greater chance of a better 
discussion taking place and better decision making taking place (participant – II)” 
The analysis of the focus group reveals that diversity is very important in improving the CG 
practices in Pakistan because it helps in the creation of some voicing and difference of opinions. 
Moreover, different types of diversity also help in improving the CG practices, however, the 
level of board diversity is unknown among the listed firms of Pakistan23.  
5.5.3 Nepotism/Kinship 
Pakistan remains dominated by a value system based on family, kinship, lineage group, and 
occupational group. Kinship connections are fundamental in reinforcing and negotiating 
bureaucratic hurdles and play an imperative part in political, social and administrative 
organizations (Jalal, 1995). The analysis of the focus group reveals that most businesses are 
family owned in Pakistan and ownership concentration is high. Moreover, the entire board is 
composed of family members due to high ownership concentration. This kinship creates a big 
problem in family owned businesses in Pakistan and family members believe that directorship 
of the firm is their inherited right. One focus group participant informed that: 
“I think predominantly there is a lot of family ownership as you know it is dominated by large 
families, but this has historically been the trend (Participant-II)” 
                                                          
23 Diversity can be related to age, gender, experience, nationality and education etc.  
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Similarly, another focus group participant mentioned high ownership concentration: 
“So I think the level of ownership concentration is something that’s a challenge dealing with 
it, making sure that despite having a majority eighty ninety sometimes more or ninety-five, 
ninety percent shareholder owner (participant – III) 
He also highlighted that: 
“In Pakistan you have one big share owner who also has board representation, almost the 
entire board is composed of his family members and then they are also managing the 
business…..In Pakistan we have this high ownership concentration which means that I mean 
even among listed companies we have majority shareholders a family owner who owns 
sometimes as high as eighty or ninety percent of shareholding (Participant – III)” 
In some firms, family members are hired at board and management level, consequently, this 
kinship is a major problem in evaluating the board performance. In contrast, some firms hire 
individuals due to their competency, hence, the CG disclosure differs across firms. A focus 
group participant highlighted that: 
“some companies which have a very independent internal auditor function which reports 
directly to the chairman of the board, others it’s really a mouthpiece for the management and 
it’s very easy to gauge that sitting at the board from the level and comprehensive audit reports 
that come to the board, whether these audit reports are just mere formalities or there is actually 
something of substance in those internal reports or not. So again it tends to vary but where the 
board and the management are professional and the internal auditor function is independent, 
there are greater chances of better effectiveness and compliance with corporate governance 
(Participant-II)” 
It is evident that family businesses are perceived as creating barriers to good CG practices in 
Pakistan. This argument is also supported by literature. Morck and Yeung (2003) argued that 
family business may not alleviate agency conflicts, particularly, when family control the firms. 
They further documented that it can increase the agency problems because managers will work 
for controlling family and ignore the shareholders in general. Similarly, Bartholomeusz and 
Tanewski (2006) found that family control creates agency costs rather than negating them.  
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5.6 Shareholders’ Awareness 
Shareholder awareness is evolving, and it has been considered as one of the principles that 
affect CG practices. Researchers around the globe have agreed that CG is a benchmark of 
success for firms both in developed and developing economies. Nevertheless, effective 
implementation of CG is more needed in developing countries as compared to their developed 
counterparts. The awareness about CG in Pakistan is not very old and the initial CG code was 
implemented in 2002 and later revised in 2012 by the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan with the collaboration of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) 
and is a mandatory requirement for PSX listed firms. However, CG practices are in the 
developing phase due to the  immature capital markets of the country (Afza & Nazir, 2012). 
The focus group analysis also reveals that there is lack of awareness about CG practices in 
Pakistan. One focus group respondent highlighted that: 
“as far as awareness is concerned it could be that our annual reports require a much higher 
level of disclosure now than they used to a decade and a half ago so maybe the kind of 
information that the shareholders are looking for is already provided to them via the many 
disclosures that the companies now are obliged to make so the awareness might already be 
there but it’s not translating into their active voting (Participant – II)” 
Some of family owned companies considered it costly to implement CG practice and repel CG 
compliance due to wrong or negative or wrong perceptions towards CG. Hence, they argued 
that the lack of awareness and knowledge amongst different stakeholder are responsible for 
non-compliance of CG practices (Samza, 2016). Another focus group participant informed 
that: 
“If you were to work in Pakistan as to raise more awareness on the business case so if you 
make it clear to those family owners, majority shareholders that corporate governance is 
something that adds value to the bottom line of a company and it’s not something that’s there 
to dilute their control etc. (participant -III)” 
The analysis of the focus group reveals a lack of awareness and knowledge among different 
stakeholders especially shareholders among listed firms of Pakistan. For this reason, the CG 
compliance is lagging behind. Firms are not well aware of the benefits of implementing CG 
practices, hence, they are reluctant to adopt it in true spirit. The shareholders’ rights are 
protected in the books of law but not in reality. There is a need to introduce educational and 
training reforms to increase levels of awareness among stakeholders. The following sections 
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expound evidence on two categories (1) shareholders’ rights protection and (2) education and 
training that are classified together as shareholders’ awareness.    
5.6.1 Shareholders’ Rights Protection 
Shareholders’ rights reveal the balance of power between managers and shareholders and 
provides ability for voting stockholders to exercise control over firm assets, affect ownership 
changes to increase shareholder value and remove opportunistic or ineffective managers. As 
per the perspective of traditional theory, lower shareholder rights (weak external governance) 
create information asymmetry among managers and shareholders that provides opportunity and 
excessive incentives to the managers to reduce transparency and manage earnings to increase 
their bonuses. According to traditional theory, lower shareholder rights generate information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders that leads to reduce transparency and increases 
managerial incentives in one hand (Jiang & Anandarajan, 2009). Greater shareholder rights, on 
the other hand, empowers shareholders to implement CG mechanisms to monitor managers 
more fastidiously. Researchers found that greater shareholder rights are linked with reduced 
agency risks  and improves firm performance (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). Hence, 
shareholders’ rights and protection are pivotal to increase transparency and firm value. 
However, shareholders especially minority shareholders are not aware of their rights in 
Pakistan. Due to lack of awareness and knowledge, their rights are diminished by majority 
shareholders. The focus group analysis reveals that the minority shareholders’ rights are 
protected in books of law but not in practice. Similarly, Javid and Iqbal (2010) documented 
that family dominated boards are less able to protect minority shareholders’ rights in Pakistan. 
One focus group participant also informed that: 
“…the implementation lacks behind again and there it is more to do with the minority 
shareholders perhaps not having the wherewithal to understand all their rights and be able to 
understand how they can process getting their due share too, but I mean as you know most of 
the companies are family owned and as such the majority shareholders’ interests are 
sometimes paramount but the role of the independent directors is really to ensure that the 
decisions are made in line with the interests of all stakeholders but there is not much minority 




According to the Companies Ordinance, 198424, the minimum threshold for seeking a remedy 
from the Court against oppression and mismanagement requires that 20% of the shareholders 
initiate a complaint. In addition, shareholders have the opportunity to employ an independent 
inspector through SECP to inspect firm’s affairs opportunity if they hold at least 10% but less 
than 20% of shares25. This threshold effectively is in the favor of companies with high 
ownership concentration. One focus group participant also informed that: 
“I refer to the company’s ordinance 1984 which was before the companies act of 2017, we had 
some provisions around minority shareholders and abuse of minority… protection against 
abuse of minority shareholders but one of the consistent issues has been that to invoke those 
redressal mechanisms first it required having at least twenty percent ownership or 
shareholding to actually go to a court and seek redress there. There is an allegation of abuse 
by the majority so that was a big hurdle and that actually meant that you effectively 
disenfranchise the minority shareholders because if you look at the ownership structure, I mean 
20 percent was a long shot for I mean there was no way minority shareholders whether total 
minority shareholders are five percent or ten percent actually have that majority to go. So that 
was the first hurdle but then the process itself it was a court sanctioned process, so you had to 
petition to the high court of the province (Participant-III)” 
Moreover, no analogous provision exists for minority shareholders who represent less than 
10% who do not have the standing to file a petition to the court or SECP for mismanagement 
and minority oppression26. Minority shareholders can enforce their claims in civil cases by 
suing for tortious loss in accordance with general laws, however, those cases take a long time 
and hinder a company’s business27.  
5.6.2 Education and Training 
Educational background can be a pivotal determinant of corporate governance practices 
because better educated mangers are likely to accept ambiguity and adopt innovative activities 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Similarly, Nevertheless, Gray (1988) acknowledged education as 
an institutional consequence affecting disclosure practices and accounting values while Grace, 
                                                          
24 Companies Ordinance, 1984 (XLVII of 1984) 
25 Section 290, Companies Ordinance, 1984 (XLVII of 1984) 
 
26 In addition, section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, maintains that minority shareholders who represent 
less than ten percent do not have the standing to file a petition to the court for mismanagement and minority 
oppression. 




Ireland, and Dunstan (1995) argued that education level should be examined as a measure for 
professional status. Researchers also argued that a high level of education may increase the 
demand for corporate accountability and political awareness (Wallace & Cooke, 1990). In 
Pakistan, the education and training are considered as important determinants of CG practices. 
One focus group participant highlighted that: 
“I think the most positive influence is professionalism at the board and professionalism at the 
management and along with that of course is the director’s training so that people are aware 
of their role as directors and what they are supposed to be doing at the board level….the main 
thing director education and awareness is very important as I mentioned the case before I 
mean the directors didn’t even know that they were being made directors of a company I mean 
there is a sea change since those days but there is a greater need to make directors aware that 
they are there as professionals and not as a badge of honor (Participant-II)” 
Since the responsibility for preparing annual reports rests mostly with the principal officer of 
the company, the educational background of the financial controller is as important as that of 
other directors  (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994).  In addition, if BoDs have accounting and business 
educational backgrounds, they may disclose more information to show accountability, increase 
the creditability of the team and improve the corporate image. Moreover, the high education of 
regulators also helps in increasing the compliance of CG. However, in Pakistan, most of the 
regulators lack knowledge and expertise. One focus group participant informed that:  
“There has been a challenge in Pakistan under the 2012 code and before that the first line 
regulator was stock exchanges and stock exchanges have had I would say a weak capacity in 
terms of enforcing corporate governance first because of not having staff who have expertise 
and knowledge in that area but then also sometimes there were other considerations where I 
mean people also raised questions about having the stock exchanges being independent enough 
or the department within them being assertive enough to actually hold companies accountable 
because one of the sanctions that could have been invoked under the 2002 and 2012 code 
against a company that was not complying with the CG code had been delisting, but then given 
that there are I mean stock exchanges wanted always to have more listing (Participant-III)” 
It is perceived that foreign qualified individuals receive more robust exposure and professional 
training compared to their locally qualified counterparts and might be expected to disclose 
more information (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994). The focus group participant also informed that: 
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“In terms of societal factors… social factors I would maybe point out as I said earlier for 
family firms you are seeing the second and the third generation they are more open minded for 
the simple reason that these owners have a been a bit more exposed to these ideas because of 
sometimes having more opportunities to get themselves educated in different countries and 
different areas. I think they have been a positive influence so things a founder would not have 
imagined I think the second and the third generation, they are more courageous to actually try 
to implement those in their companies…..Of course, as I said, there’s a lot to be done but I 
have even met and known some family firms where you see the second and the third generation 
thinking more in terms of… simply because of their education their exposure to the world so 
that is probably one example I can give of how from one generation to another generation the 
attitudes towards accountability, towards corporate performance, and corporate governance 
have changed (Participant -III)” 
It is argued that qualifications and training alone are not solutions to the problems faced in 
developing countries (Abayo & Roberts, 1993) and firms are unlikely to provide high-quality 
information in the absence of demand and enforcement function. This is particularly the case 
in Pakistani firms with substantial family shareholdings 
5.7 Voting  
Shareholder voting lies on the basis of a broad range of corporate governance protections. The 
shareholders’ rights to choose BoDs give them fundamental power over essential corporate 
decisions. In contrast, if management holds more voting power, it tends to negate the discipline 
of CG and the market for corporate control, especially in the case of pyramidal business groups 
and multiple classes of common stock. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) found evidence 
that firm value declines as the voting control of insiders rises. Moreover, they found that firm 
value increases if controlled by an independent person. Similarly, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2009)  found that firm value increases as cash flow rights of insiders increase while firm value 
decreases if voting rights of insiders increase. In addition, researchers argued that if CEOs are 
involved in the nomination process of BoDs, lower quality nominees emerge and CEOs tends 
to hire less independent outsiders and more gray outsiders with conflicts of interest (Shivdasani 
& Yermack, 1999). Other research has studied the general effects of voting restrictions on firm 
value and performance, often finding that firms perform worse in the presence of voting 
restrictions (Gompers et al., 2003), staggered boards (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007) 
and dual class voting structures (Gompers et al., 2009).  
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The analysis of the focus group reveals that mostly shareholders do not have voting rights 
among the listed firms of Pakistan especially family ownership firms. The rights are assigned 
to majority shareholders and minority shareholders do not have the right to vote. Moreover, 
there is a lack of shareholders’ participation at AGMs that leads towards power quality 
reporting. The following section expounds evidence on one category (1) AGM participation 
that is classified as voting.    
5.7.1 AGM Participation 
AGMs are considered as an instrument of corporate governance that provides shareholders, 
especially minority shareholders, access to the board, puts pressure on mangers and limits the 
possibility of their wealth expropriation (Strätling, 2003). Similarly, Cutajar (2015) argued that 
the AGM is a pivotal element of CG practices and it can be enhanced by shareholders’ 
participation and proper education about laws and regulations. In addition, AGM proceedings 
should be carried out in more effective, managed, interactive and engaged ways (Cutajar, 
2015). However, his study reveals that most shareholders lack relevant education and 
shareholder activism (Cutajar, 2015). Proxy voting is often seen as an opportunity for directors 
to strengthen their hold over the general meeting (Monks & Minow, 2001) and also influence 
the agenda, timetable and conduct of AGMs (Turnbull, 2000) at the company’s expense. A 
similar situation exists among the listed firms of Pakistan. Most of the shareholders especially 
minority shareholders do not participate in AGMs and those who participate do not have any 
relevant knowledge and education. One focus group participant highlighted that: 
“See there are two ways one can gauge that one is of course voting by their phase which is 
buying or selling shares regarding… in line with their level of comfort or discomfort with how 
the companies manage and the second is how vocal they are at the annual general meetings. 
Now the little bit of experience I have attending AGMs of various companies… listed 
companies there is not much number one attendance and if the attendance is there really, the 
freebies that are distributed at the AGMs nobody is really interested in questioning the 
presentations or perhaps they don’t know enough to question the presentations that are made 
by the management so there is not much vocal presence of shareholders at the AGMs. 
Regarding the buying and selling of shares again what I have seen with the way the prices have 
fared or the Pakistan Stock Exchange prior to that to the various Karachi Lahore stock 
exchanges is that the price changes don’t seem to be based too much on fundamentals of course 
when the company is doing well I mean the price increases there but it seems to have increased 
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over a period of time despite the variations… the slight variations in the company performance. 
So as I said I often say that the price variations of the stock exchange have little to do with the 
fundamentals of the company. So if we gauge shareholder awareness by these two measures 
i.e. whether they are actually going in and out of shares actively no they are not and two 
whether they are playing a vocal part at the AGMs from my experience no they are not so there 
is not much shareholder participation which can act as a gauge for their awareness” 
(Participant -II)” 
Iwatani and Taki (2009) argued that the opening of AGMs to regular shareholders increases 
attendance, participation and questions specifically from individual investors, and annual 
meetings are now longer. Similarly, Dimitrov and Jain (2011) argued that these meetings 
provide an opportunity for shareholders to show their apprehensions with corporate 
performance, pressurizing managers to exhibit good results. One focus group participant also 
informed that: 
“…they must conduct AGMs and everything must be described in the report what you have 
done in corporate governance, who is the director, who is the financial director for CFO, who 
is an audit committee member, who is your auditor they need to say everything, they must get 
certified they must have the awareness section they must acknowledge and they must sign 
regarding the board of governors (Participant -V)” 
Moreover, managers respond positively to questions and concerns of shareholders and try to 
influence them by positive news before AGMs. These meetings are very important for 
shareholders especially minority shareholders to exercise their rights and increase value to the 
firm. 
5.8 Culture 
Douglass (1990) documented that institutions are formed by formal constraints and informal 
constraints. As per his theory, formal rules are created by polity whereas informal norms refer 
to heritage or culture. A researcher documented that cultural factors are related to the corporate 
governance system  (Semenov, 2000) and companies need to understand it. Similarly, Evans 
(n.d) documented organizational culture as a significant determinant of companies’ governance 
structures. Pakistan is considered a short-term culture country which focuses on the present 
rather than the future. Short-term cultures value diligence, ordering relationships by status, 
shame and thrift. Similarly, it is uncommon to plan for the distant future and people often come 
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late for meetings and appointments28. In addition, meetings may be cancelled on the spur of 
the moment. Like many other developing countries, Pakistani culture can be categorized as 
collectivist (Kochanek, 1983), high power distance (Newberg, 2002), high uncertainty 
avoidance and moderately high masculinity. However, most of the Anglo-Saxon and 
Scandinavian countries are located toward the lower end of the power distance. Therefore, the 
implication of corporate governance may be different in Pakistan from Anglo-Saxon countries. 
It is important for researchers to continue to investigate the development of CG practices from 
the cultural perspective (Chan & Cheung, 2012). The analysis of the focus group reveals that 
culture has a great influence in the corporate sector of Pakistan and daily life of people. Hence, 
it has an effect on CG practices and behaviors of people. Firms are still in a private ownership 
mindset and they are not willing to come out of this. Moreover, people are afraid to speak about 
any wrong doing due to personal contacts or lack of protection. The following sections expound 
evidence on two categories (1) culture and (2) whistleblowers that are classified together as 
institutional culture. 
5.8.1 Institutional Culture 
In the extended literature, researchers found that CG disclosure has been influenced by the 
dominant culture (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) especially in developing countries (Licht, 
Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2005). Similarly, Oghojafor, George, and Owoyemi (2012)  
conducted a study in Nigeria and found that national culture plays a pivotal part in the 
effectiveness of CG system. The focus group analysis also reveals that culture has an impact 
on corporate governance practices in Pakistan. One focus group participant informed that: 
“Number three is cultural aspects, some of the companies are still in a private mindset, 
ownership mindset, they are not willing to come out of it so some cultural issues... (participant 
-IV)” 
Similarly, researchers argued that culture has substantial significance on CG practices 
especially in developing countries (Amaeshi, Ogbechie, Adi, & Amao, 2006). In addition, 
Licht et al. (2005)  documented that culture has varied impact on CG practice across  countries 
and is dependent upon different factors. Another focus group participant also commented that: 
“There are some social factors which can have an impact on corporate governance compliance 
like maybe culture, religion or maybe the lack of experience or relevant education or these 
                                                          
28  Centre for Intercultural Training, Working with a Pakistani Partner (Ottawa/Islamabad: CIDA, 1995), p. 12. 
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types of things can have some impact on the corporate governance compliance (participant-
V)” 
Similarly, Pakistan has a  national culture due to the historical relations and spiritual attachment 
(Mughal, 2008) that has impacted on the institutional culture and obstructed the adoption of 
CG. 
5.8.2 Organizational Whistle-blowers 
Whistleblowing is seen as the process where employees are able to report any unethical 
incident or practice (Lewis, 2001). However, whistleblowing does not exist in most of the 
organizations and employees may experience retaliation in the form of a job loss and 
department demotion for doing so (Martin, 1999). In contrast, Dehn and Borrie (2001) 
documented that organizations should protect whistle-blowers. Sternberg (1996) also 
documented that whistleblowing policies were a proactive way to detect problems at an early 
stage and helps organizations in maximizing long term values for owners from an ethical 
perspective. The focus group participant informed that: 
“if I can just cite you an example of when I was working at [SECP] fifteen years ago the first 
show cause notice I issued to a company the directors who came in turned out to be the peons 
and the chauffeurs of the company whose names had been affixed to the names of the directors 
and their signatures taken without them even knowing that they were liable for the actions of 
the company. Of course the real shareholders had absconded but these poor directors who had 
done nothing but affixed their names had been left behind to face the consequences (Participant 
-II)” 
Recently, the Public Interest Disclosures Act (2017) was passed in Pakistan to protect 
whistleblowers and encourage employees to raise their voices about corruption and 
wrongdoing within departments and organizations. The BoDs should ensure procedures to 
track down any whistleblowing and take necessary actions to protect whistleblowers. 
5.9 Values 
Corporate values comprise an internal institutional force which monitors corporate behavior 
and a robust determinant of its CG and leadership. Wieland (2005) argued that practical 
implementation of corporate governance codes of conduct cannot be realized alone without 
moral values of the company culture. In a similar vein, Hart and Holmstrom (2002) argued that 
corporate values may be part of a vision of the company's future that includes future ownership 
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and stakeholders. In addition, good governance comprises other different values including 
responsibility, integrity, fairness, honesty, accountability and transparency. In sum, the 
corporate governance problem is a moral challenge and can be resolved with ethical behavior 
of all corporate actors including managers, directors, auditors and regulators.  
The analysis of the focus group reveals that social values are high in Pakistan and people give 
preference to social norms and personal relationships. Family members are appointed as BoDs 
and to managerial positions due to the existence of family systems. Moreover, the BoDs serve 
on each other’s firms due to interpersonal connections. Consequently, the quality of reporting 
is compromised. The analysis also reveals that education and training are helping in changing 
the mindsets of people and improving CG practice. The following sections expound evidence 
on two categories (1) family systems and (2) interpersonal connections that are classified 
together as values.    
5.9.1 Family Systems 
In most developing countries, family systems provide a set of interrelationships and social 
arrangements that allow people to live in harmony and pursue a social life (Klomegah, 1997). 
Pakistan has an extended family system in which the family is responsible for the care and 
nurture of all children. Moreover, the family is considered as a strong bond and primary source 
of identity, responsibility and loyalty. Similarly, Kimani (2010) debated that the family defines 
moral and social norms and safeguards spiritual and material traditions and customs. 
Researchers documented that family core values influence the family business (Hendrick, 
2000) and determine the behavior of family enterprises (Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005). 
The analysis of the focus group reveals that family values are high in Pakistan and the whole 
family owns and controls the business. One focus group participant highlighted that: 
“but I think it’s something that really needs a change of mindset on the part of majority 
shareholders and I think the more that I have seen over the years is that most of these family 
firms they go into second and third generations (Participant-III)” 
 Family systems form the core values and fundamental principles which help in setting vision, 
missions and goals of family enterprises. Researchers found that family businesses differ in 
terms of family involvement in management (Sharma, 2004) and ownership (Astrachan, Klein, 
& Smyrnios, 2002). The focus group analysis also presented similar findings. One focus group 
participant informed that: 
105 
 
“Family owners often perceive corporate governance as equivalent to losing control, as 
something that’s essentially to do with complying with certain regulations and sometimes they 
don’t perceive it as something that’s really contributing to their overall decision making 
(Participant – III)” 
Another focus group participant highlighted that: 
“I am not going to say that just because companies are more family owned there is less 
corporate governance, there are some family owned businesses which are actually very 
conscious about compliance and good corporate governance practices. It just depends on how 
well educated they are (Participant -II)” 
In addition, it is argued that family ownership can lead towards competitive advantage by 
reducing agency conflicts and maximizing the value of a firm because family wealth is directly 
related to the company. Therefore, it offers robust spurs to monitor managers and reduce the 
intrinsic problem of free-ride shareholder dispersion. Similarly, Anderson et al. (2003) argued 
that strong control mechanisms can increase the level of communication among stakeholders 
including family members and creditors that ultimately increases the quality of financial 
reporting and reduces the cost of debt. It is also imperative to cite that the family and the 
business are so entwined that sentiments are inevitable in a family business. Consequently, 
family firms are often counselled to hire outside board members for family businesses 
(Brockhaus, 2004) and to reduce resistance (Handler & Kram, 1988). One focus group 
participant informed that: 
“I have had the chance in my professional life to actually interview some of the family owners 
and in some cases I think I remember this family from a big family business in Karachi and the 
founder told me that he was skeptical at the start about having an independent director because 
it was a very closely held company with a family only board but now that person has been on 
board for one year they see value that that person brings, so that I think is most influential 
(Participant-III)” 
The sustainability and adoption of good corporate governance practices are as important as the 
public company. Besides this, personal relationships toward the family agents may 
compromise the principal ‘s ability to persuasively evaluate and monitor their performance.  
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5.9.2 Interpersonal Connections 
The interpersonal connections are very common in the corporate sector of developing countries 
especially Pakistan. In addition, directors (regardless of executive or non-executive) may sit 
on more than one board, called cross directorships. This practice is also common in both 
developed and developing countries (Roudaki & Bhuiyan, 2015). Some researchers argued that 
cross directorships are good for firms as directors can made comparisons based on knowledge 
of other organizations (Dahya, Lonie, & Power, 1996) while some researchers argued that cross 
directorship leads towards less independence and directors can make sympathetic decisions 
(Davis, 1993). Researchers also found a negative effect of interlocking on firm performance 
(Roudaki & Bhuiyan, 2015). These arguments are based on resource dependence theory. 
Similarly, people know each other especially in the business environment of Pakistan and the 
independence of directors is compromised. One focus group participant highlighted that: 
“but I think we tend to take much more for granted in Pakistan given that even within the 
corporate sector you find everybody knows everybody right, there is a certain comradery 
within the financial sector, within the banking sector, within the corporate sector because there 
is a certain class of participants who have been in the market for a long time and they are 
known to each other and hence there is no level of complete independence from each other. So 
when somebody comes on to your board the high likelihood is even if they are an independent 
director there is a high likelihood that there is some connection to degrees of separation with 
other board members or management or somebody. So that level of complete independence is 
not there I think more because of the social environment in which we operate compared to 
maybe some other countries where there is a certain level of… there is more distance between 
people serving in the same companies or serving on the same boards so I think that level does 
influence how people relate to each other, how the decision making function works in practice 
there is more give and take because it’s the norm I mean more cross directorships. I mean 
somebody asks you to serve on their board there is a high likelihood that you will be asking 
them to serve on your board so there is a little bit of give and take in these situations. So what 
I am saying is that social norms perhaps bring a level of informality into our board structures 
which influences the implementation of corporate governance at some levels. (Participant -
II)” 
Lorsch and Young (1990) emphasized that interlocking of CEOs is desirable because of their 
credibility and experience as peers. Additionally, it provides an opportunity to see how 
someone is doing the same thing you are doing. CEOs join other boards and thus form 
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interlocking relationships specially to ‘embed’ what they are doing (Davis, 1996). The focus 
group participant also informed that: 
“As we discussed earlier in the conversation one of the socio-economic factors at play in 
Pakistan is the fewer degrees of separation between board members. What ends up happening 
is that they start operating as small country club boards where everybody knows everybody, 
they all pat each other on the back, and nobody really wants to take a stand against each other 
because they meet each other socially at the clubs or elsewhere (Participant-II)” 
Several studies have documented that interlocking relationships and control structures are 
related to independence of directors and have pivotal implications of governance function. 
While some researchers argued that interlocking directors can offer insights based on personal 
experience and practical knowledge of other organizations, hence, this experience and 
knowledge can serve as raw material for other organizations (Dahya et al., 1996). In sum, cross-
directorships held by BoDs have significant insinuations for CG disclosure practice. In 
Pakistan, the cross directorship is common practice among BoDs, and they do not want to take 
strict action against each other, hence, transparency and fairness are comprised. In addition, 
this gives opportunity to wrong doing and ill practices. The following Figure 5 presents the 
institutional determinants of good governance practices in Pakistan.  
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 Figure 5 Institutional Determinants of Good CG Practices in Pakistan 
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5.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the analysis of the focus group. Eights themes are explored; (1) Auditing, 
(2) Political, (3) Legal, (4) Board, (5) Shareholders’ awareness, (6) Voting, (7) Culture and (8) 
Values. Auditing has three sub themes; (1) Auditor independence, (2) Audit committee and (3) 
Risk management. Analysis reveals that the auditing process is not effective and there is a need 
to improve auditing practices in Pakistan to improve CG practice in the country. The auditors 
are not independent, and their performance is questioned. Moreover, audit committees are not 
composed of independent directors, consequently, the quality of audits is poor. Due to lack of 
independent directors, internal control and risk management functions are not effective. 
Political has three sub themes; (1) political systems, (2) political influence and (3) corruption. 
Analysis reveals that corruption is high in Pakistan and political interference is badly affecting 
CG practices in Pakistan. Merit is compromised due to political influence that ultimately leads 
towards lower quality reporting. The appointments are made on political connections and 
firms’ operations are influenced by the political system of the country.  
Legal has three sub themes; (1) compliance, (2) enforcement, and (3) regulators. The analysis 
reveals that legal and regulatory systems fail to implement and enforce CG practice in the 
country. Moreover, regulators lack power and skills to enforce and ensure implementation of 
CG practices. Rules are in books but not in practice. Board has three sub themes; (1) board 
independence, (2) board heterogeneity and (3) nepotism/kinship. BoDs are not independent to 
protect shareholders’ rights especially minority shareholders. Moreover, boards lack 
heterogeneity and nepotism/kinship exist among PSX listed firms. Hence, the effectiveness of 
the board is compromised. Due to lack of board heterogeneity, voicing mechanisms are absent. 
Shareholders’ awareness has two sub themes; (1) shareholders’ rights protection and (2) 
education and training.  
The analysis of the semi-structured focused group revealed that shareholders are not fully 
aware of the benefits associated with good CG practices. In addition, shareholders lack 
adequate education and training. Hence, it is pivotal to increase the awareness among different 
stakeholders including shareholders. Voting has one sub theme i.e. AGM participation. 
Minority shareholders lack basic voting rights especially in highly concentrated family firms. 
Moreover, there is not much participation and vocal presence at AGMs. The freebies are 
attending the AGMs and do not have awareness. The social and cultural values are high and 
affect CG practices in the country. Culture has two sub themes; (1) institutional culture and (2) 
organizational whistle-blowers. Due to lack of protection for whistle-blowers, no one raises a 
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voice. Finally, values have two sub themes; (1) family systems and (2) interpersonal 
connections. Due to cultural and social values, people know each other and lack independence 




FINDINGS OF THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the quantitative data analysis of the study and aims to 
achieve three objectives of this study i.e. (1) to explore the most influential barriers to good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan, (2) to explore the most important drivers of good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan, and (3) to investigate the nexus between CG 
compliance and financial performance of PSX listed firms. Results are presented in seven 
sections as, section 6.2 presents the results of demographic information of respondents. This 
includes age, position, qualifications, specialization and experience of respondents. Section 6.3 
presents the results of descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of variables of the study. 
This section includes the variables such as Corporate Governance Index (CGI) score and firm 
performance indicators i.e. ROA and ROE. The results of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of 
barriers and drivers of good corporate governance practices in Pakistan are presented in 
sections 6.4 and 6.5, respectively. The results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis are 
presented in section 6.6. Section 6.7 presents the discussion while section 6.8 integrates the 
qualitative and quantitative findings. Finally, the chapter summary is presented at the end of 
this chapter.  
6.2 Demographic Results 
The results of the demographic information of respondents are presented in Table 6. There was 
a total of 105 respondents. The result reveals that most respondents (39%) were aged between 
31 and 40 years while only 3.8% respondents were above 60 years of age. Table 6 reveals that 
12.4% respondents were 30 years or less while 11.4 % respondents were aged 51 to 60 years 
of age. There were 33.3% respondents aged from 41 to 50 years. The respondents were 
predominantly middle-aged (39+33.3+11.4 = 83.7) which is considered a reliable source of 
providing information for this study.  
Regarding position, the results reveal that most of the respondents (42.9%) held the position of 
manager while 33.3% were in senior manager positions. There were only 8.6% respondents in 
the position of auditor while 15.2% of respondents were in the position of accountant. Coupling 




The results of the demographic information also reveal that 48.6% of respondents have a 
Master’s degree or equivalent qualification, while only 2.9% of respondents have other 
qualifications. It is highlighted that only 9.5% of respondents have PhDs or equivalent 
qualifications while Bachelors’ and Diploma holders were 31.4 % and 7.6% respectively.  
Table 6 Results of the Demographic Information 
The results also reveal that most of the respondents (34.3%) have specialization in accounting 
while only 1.9% respondents have other specializations. There were 10.5 % respondents who 
have specialization in management while both finance and economic specialization holders are 
each 26.7%. 
Regarding experience, results reveal that most of the respondents (41%) have 11 to 15 years of 
experience while 40% respondents have 6 to 10 years of experience. The 18.1% respondents 
Demographic Information of Respondents 
  Frequency Percent 
Age 
30 years or less 13 12.4 
31 to 40 years 41 39 
41 to 50 years 35 33.3 
51 to 60 years 12 11.4 
Above 60 years 4 3.8 
    
Position 
Senior Manager 35 33.3 
Manager 45 42.9 
Accountant 16 15.2 
Auditor 9 8.6 
    
Qualification 
PhD or equivalent 10 9.5 
Masters or equivalent 51 48.6 
Bachelors or equivalent 33 31.4 
Diploma or Professional 8 7.6 
Other 3 2.9 
    
Specialization 
Finance 28 26.7 
Accounting 36 34.3 
Economics 28 26.7 
Management 11 10.5 
Other 2 1.9 
    
Experience 
1 to 5 years 19 18.1 
6 to 10 years 42 40 
11 to 15 years 43 41 
16 to 20 years 1 1 
    
N= 105    
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who were in their early career have 1 to 5 years of experience, while only one respondent has 
16 to 20 years of experience. All in all, the respondents are mature experienced managers.  
6.3 Results of Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
The results of the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis are presented in Table 7. The 
results show the correlation between explanatory variables such as CGI score and dependent 
variables i.e. ROA and ROE while controlling for the effect of age, position, qualification, 
specialization and experience of respondents. Table 7 also presents the descriptive statistics of 
the CGI score, ROA and ROE. The CGI score has a mean value of 162.5619 with a standard 
deviation of 15.101531.  The ROA has a mean value of 0.06426 with a standard deviation of 
0.067981, while the ROE has a mean value of 0.11491 with a standard deviation of 0.179549. 
The results of the correlation analysis reveal that the CGI score has a significant positive (p 
<0.01) association with both ROA and ROE at the 0.01 level of significance. 
















CGI score 162.5619 15.101531 1   
ROA 0.06426 0.067981 0.610*** 
1 
  
ROE 0.11491 0.179549 0.431*** 0.839*** 1 
      
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Where the Total CGI score is the total score of CG 
compliance obtained from the survey questionnaire. ROA is return on assets while ROE is return on equity.  
Table 7 shows that there is a significant positive relationship (r = 0.610) between CGI score 
and return on assets at the 0.01 level of significance. Similarly, Table 7 reveals a significant 
positive correlation (r = 0.431) between CGI and return on equity at the 0.01 level of 
significance. The results of the correlation analyses are supported by prior studies (Javid & 
Iqbal, 2008b; Maranho & Leal, 2018; Ntim et al., 2014; Tariq & Abbas, 2013) that found 
significant positive relationships between the CGI score, ROA and ROE.  
6.4 Barriers to Good CG Practices in Pakistan 
This section presents the results of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) regarding barriers to good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan. The survey includes 17 items that were measured 
on the five-point Likert scale (see section 4.15). The results of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
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and Bartlett’s tests are presented in Table 8. KMO measure the sampling adequacy and should 
be greater than 0.5 for performing a satisfactory factor analysis. Kaiser (1974) and Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007) provided guidelines for interpreting these values29. Table 8 reveals that the 
KMO has a value of 0.702 which shows the adequacy of the sample for EFA. 
 
Table 8 KMO and Bartlett's Test for Barriers to good CG Practices 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.702 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1561.297 
 df 136 
 Sig. 0.000 
 
In addition to KMO, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity that estimates which inter-correlation 
matrix produced is an identity matrix. Generally, the value of P<0.05 on Bartlett’s test indicates 
that the inter-correlation matrix is not an identity matrix and factor analysis can be performed. 
In Table 8, Bartlett’s test is highly significant (P<0.05) that shows that EFA can be run for the 
extraction of factors by including all the items.  
In EFA, the next step is the extraction of factors. Researchers have argued that factors are 
extracted till the value of variance is maximized (Mvududu & Sink, 2013) and different 
methods can be employed to extract factors. This study employed the principal axis factoring 
(PAF) method to extract the factors. This method is a preferred approach in the presence of a 
multivariate normality problem and when the researcher aims to find latent factors in the study. 
In addition, the PAF extraction method generates reliable results despite the high or low values 
of communalities (Kahn, 2006).  
It is important for researchers to examine which evolving constructs could be retained for 
additional interpretation or analysis. The factor retention decision has important implications. 
First, it should have more effect on overall EFA results (Zwick & Velicer, 1986). Secondly, it 
is necessary to balance the need for frugality while effectively demonstrating fundamental 
correlations (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). Third, researchers argued that 
                                                          




under-extraction and over-extraction can alter the overall EFA and its interpretation (Ledesma 
& Valero-Mora, 2007).  
It is also noted that the number of factors retained varies across studies and different criteria 
have been used to make a decision. The following criteria (i.e. eigenvalue, scree test and 
variance explained) have been used in this study to make a decision about factor retention.  
Kaiser (1960) suggested that only those factors are retained for interpretation that have 
eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Eigenvalues represents the explained variable by a given factor. 
The benchmark of establishing eigenvalue 1.0 seems arbitrary, however, researchers 
documented that factors that have eigenvalues greater than one should be retained because 
these represent those factors which contribute to a higher percentage of communal variance 
than average (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  
In addition to eigenvalue, there is an alternative approach called the scree test to determine  
factors’ retention and involves developing a scree plot of extracted factors against the 
magnitude of their eigenvalues (Cattell, 1966; DeVellis, 2016). In this approach, the researcher 
needs to identify an elbow or break where larger eigenvalues end in steep slope rambling off 
of smaller eigenvalues begins. Cattell (1966) suggested that only left side factors of the elbow 
are retained while right side factors are dropped.  
Another common method about making a decision regarding factor retention is examining the 
cumulative variance accounted for by retained factors. Various sources recommended 
numerous levels from 50% onwards and there is no exact percentage of total variance 
explained. However, most statisticians and scholars recommended factors that are required to 
obtain a variance of 75% to 90% (see Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006; Peterson, 
2000; Pett, Lackey, & Sullivan, 2003).  
Based on the above criteria (i.e. Eigenvalue, Scree test and Total variance), this study only 
retained five factors that have eigenvalues of greater than one as shown in Table 9. The Scree 
test also reveals the elbow after five factors. In addition, Table 9 also reveals that these five 
factors explain the cumulative variance of 80.29% which is recommend by other researchers30. 
  
                                                          
30 (see Hair et al., 2006; Pett et al., 2003) 
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Table 9 Total Variance Explained for Barriers to Good CG Practices in Pakistan 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.861 34.476 34.476 5.661 33.299 33.299 3.671 21.595 21.595 
2 2.922 17.187 51.663 2.629 15.467 48.766 2.736 16.092 37.687 
3 2.279 13.408 65.072 2.05 12.06 60.826 2.541 14.947 52.635 
4 1.406 8.273 73.344 1.096 6.446 67.272 1.849 10.876 63.511 
5 1.182 6.954 80.298 0.928 5.457 72.728 1.567 9.217 72.728 
6 0.867 5.097 85.396       
7 0.563 3.314 88.71       
8 0.455 2.677 91.387       
9 0.388 2.285 93.672       
10 0.285 1.675 95.346       
11 0.197 1.156 96.503       
12 0.183 1.074 97.576       
13 0.152 0.895 98.471       
14 0.096 0.565 99.036       
15 0.084 0.496 99.532       
16 0.042 0.249 99.781       
17 0.037 0.219 100             
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring (PAF). 
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In Table 9, there are three main components, i.e. initial eigenvalues, extraction sums of squared 
loadings and rotation sums of squared loadings. The first factor has eigenvalues of 5.861 and 
these explain 34.476% of variance explained. Similarly, the second factor has an eigenvalue of 
2.922 and explains 17.187% of variance, making a cumulative variance of 51.663%. The third 
factor has an eigenvalue of 2.279 and explains 13.408% of variance, making a cumulative 
variance of 65.072%.  The fourth factor has an eigenvalue of 1.406 and explains 8.273% of 
variance and cumulative variances reach to 73.344%. Finally, the fifth factor has an eigenvalue 
of 1.182 and explains 6.954% of variance and cumulative variance reaches to 80.298% which 
is within the recommended range by the researchers31.  
Figure 6 Scree Plot of EFA for Barriers to Good CG Practices in Pakistan 
 
 
Figure 6 reveals the scree plot of EFA for barriers to good corporate governance practices in 
Pakistan. The scree plot graphically presents the eigenvalues in descending order. It can be 
seen that the first factor has an eigenvalue of 5.861 while second factor has an eigenvalue of 
2.922. Similarly, the third, fourth and fifth factors have eigenvalues of 2.279, 1.406 and 1.182 
respectively. In addition, an elbow can be seen after factor five. As suggested by Cattell (1966), 
only these five factors are retained in this study that were on left side of the elbow and the right 
side factors were dropped.  
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It is often difficult to interpret factors that are initially extracted and retained. Consequently, 
Dimitrov (2014) recommended that researchers need to rotate these factors to more suitable 
positions to create the simplest possible factor structure, maximize high loading and minimize 
low loadings. The idea of rotating factors stems from the work of researchers such as Thurstone 
(1947) and Cattell (1966) who saw it as a way of simplifying factor structures so they could be 
more reliably interpreted. In SPSS, researchers have to choose either orthogonal or oblique 
rotation strategies which have quite different fundamental assumptions but have same goal (i.e. 
seeking simple structure) (Hair et al., 2006; Pett et al., 2003). In orthogonal rotation, it is 
assumed that factors are independent of one another, consequently, they are kept in a fixed 
position and it is expected that newly rotated factors are uncorrelated. Varimax, quartimax and 
equamax are three common orthogonal rotation algorithms and varimax is the most widely 
used and easy to interpret (Dimitrov, 2014). This study selected varimax from the rotation 
menu and chose to suppress factors, having a coefficient score of less than 0.50 due to small 
sample size32. Table 10 presents the rotated results of principal axial factoring for barriers to 
good corporate governance practices in Pakistan. 
Factor loadings were considered in evaluating the factors retention that represent drivers of 
good corporate governance practices in Pakistan and only those factors were retained which 
had a minimum factor loading of 0.7 that is considered excellent (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Table 10 reveals that 17 items that were included into EFA were extracted and loaded 
into 5 factors. The factor 1 (three items) comprised lack of auditors’ independence, board 
ineffectiveness and lack of shareholders’ awareness. The factor 2 (three items) comprised 
political and governmental interference in business activities, weak legal control and 
enforcement and high levels of corruption. The factor 3 (two items) comprised strong social 
ties among different stakeholders and interpersonal connection among BoDs. The factor 4 (one 
item) comprised lack of professional education and training among stakeholders. At the end, 




                                                          




Table 10 Rotated Factor Matrix for Barriers to Good CG Practices in Pakistan 
  
Based on item loading and shared characteristics on each factor, the researcher assigned factor 
labels. The factor 1 is labeled as firm level barriers, factor 2 is labelled as external barriers, 
factor 3 is labelled as social barriers, and factor 4 is labelled as education and training 
barriers while factor 5 is labelled as legal barriers.  
6.5 Drivers of Good CG practice in Pakistan 
This section presents the results of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) regarding drivers of good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan. The survey includes 12 items that were measured 
on a five-point Likert scale (see section 4.15). The results of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and 
Bartlett’s tests are presented in Table 11. KMO measures the sampling adequacy and should 
Rotated Factor Matrixa 
 Factor     
  1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of Auditors’ independence 0.748     
Board ineffectiveness 0.866     
Lack of Shareholders’ awareness 0.822     
Political and Governmental interference in business 
activities  0.762    
Weak legal control and enforcement  0.752    
High levels of corruption  0.759    
Strong social ties among different stakeholders   0.722   
Interpersonal connections among BoDs   0.786   
Lack of professional education and training among 
stakeholders    0.845  
Fewer voting rights         0.718 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
A Rotation converged in 12 iterations. 
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be greater than 0.5 for performing a satisfactory factor analysis. Kaiser (1974) and Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007) provided guidelines for interpreting these values33. Table 11 reveals that 
KMO has a value of 0.735 which shows the adequacy of the sample for EFA. In addition to 
KMO, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity that estimates which inter-correlation matrix produced is 
an identity matrix. Generally, the value of P<0.05 on Bartlett’s test indicates that the inter-
correlation matrix is not an identity matrix and factor analysis can be performed. In Table 11, 
Bartlett’s test is highly significant (P<0.05) that shows that EFA can be run for extraction of 
factors by including all the items.  
Table 11 KMO and Bartlett's Test for Drivers of Good CG Practices in Pakistan 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
 
0.735 






Sig.   0.000 
 
Based on the criteria (i.e. Eigenvalue, Scree test and Total variance), this study only retained 
four factors that have eigenvalues of greater than one as shown in Table 12. The Scree test also 
reveals the elbow shape after the fourth factor. In addition, Table 12 also reveals that these four 
factors explain the cumulative variance of 77.728% which is recommend by other researchers 
(see Pett et al., 2003). In Table 12, there are three main components, i.e. initial eigenvalues, 
extraction sums of squared loadings and rotation sums of squared loadings. The first factor has 
eigenvalues of 5.504 and these explain 45.866% of variance explained. Similarly, the second 
factor has an eigenvalue of 1.545 and explains 12.872% of variance, making a cumulative 
variance of 58.738%. The third factor has an eigenvalue of 1.252 and explains 10.437% of 
variance, making a cumulative variance of 69.174%.  At the end, the fourth factor has an 
eigenvalue of 1.026 and explains 8.554% of the variance and cumulative variances reach 
77.728% which is within the range recommended by Pett et al. (2003) and Hair et al. (2006).
                                                          





Table 12 Total Variance Explained for Drivers of Good CG Practices in Pakistan 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 






Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.504 45.866 45.866 5.504 45.866 45.866 4.228 35.236 35.236 
2 1.545 12.872 58.738 1.545 12.872 58.738 2.404 20.037 55.273 
3 1.252 10.437 69.174 1.252 10.437 69.174 1.354 11.285 66.558 
4 1.026 8.554 77.728 1.026 8.554 77.728 1.34 11.17 77.728 
5 0.701 5.842 83.571       
6 0.667 5.554 89.125       
7 0.459 3.824 92.949       
8 0.307 2.556 95.505       
9 0.224 1.869 97.375       
10 0.155 1.289 98.663       
11 0.091 0.761 99.424       
12 0.069 0.576 100             




Figure 7 Scree Plot of EFA for Drivers of Good CG Practices in Pakistan 
 
Figure 7 reveals the scree plot of EFA for drivers of good corporate governance practices in 
Pakistan. The scree plot graphically presents the eigenvalues in descending order. It can be 
seen that the first factor has an eigenvalue of 5.504 while second factor has an eigenvalue of 
1.545. Similarly, the third and fourth factors have eigenvalues of 1.252 and 1.026 respectively. 
In addition, an elbow shape can be seen after the fourth factor. As suggested by Cattell (1966), 
only these four factors that were on left side of the elbow are retained in this study and the right 
side factors were dropped. Table 13 presents the rotated results of principal component analysis 
for drivers of good corporate governance practices in Pakistan. Factor loadings are considered 
in evaluating the factors retention that represent drivers of good corporate governance practices 
in Pakistan and only those factor were retained which had a minimum factor loading of 0.7 that 
is considered excellent (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Table 13 reveals that 12 items that 
were included into EFA are extracted and loaded into 4 factors. The factor 1 (four items) 
comprised auditors’ independence, board heterogeneity, board independence and initiate 
training programs for directors, raise awareness and education for CEOs, directors, 
shareholders and board members. The factor 2 (one item) comprised enhancing and 
empowering professional regulatory bodies. The factor 3 (one item) comprised encouraging 
participation in events and conferences related to corporate governance). Finally, factor 4 (one 
item) comprised enhance partnership with international regulatory bodies i.e. OECD, IFC to 
promote CG in Pakistan.  
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Table 13 Rotated Factor Matrix for Drivers of Good CG Practices in Pakistan 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
  1 2 3 4 
Auditors’ independence 0.867    
Board heterogeneity 0.792    
Board independence 0.804    
Initiate training programs for directors, raise awareness and education 
for CEOs, directors, shareholders and board members 0.915    
Enhancing and empowering professional regulatory bodies  0.88   
Encouraging participation in events and conferences related to 
corporate governance   0.869  
Enhance partnership with international regulatory bodies i.e. OECD, 
IFC to promote CG in Pakistan       0.824 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.     
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.    
a Rotation converged in 6 iterations.     
 
Looking at the item loading on each factor, the researcher identified factor labels based on the 
shared characteristics of each item. The factor 1 is labelled as internal drivers, factor 2 is 
labelled as regulatory drivers, and factor 3 is labelled as motivational drivers while factor 4 
is labelled as collaborative drivers.  
6.6 Nexus between CG compliance and Firm Performance 
This section presents the nexus between corporate governance index score and firm 
performance among PSX listed firms. The corporate governance compliance score is 
developed from the five-point Likert scale survey questionnaire. There was a total of 48 CG 
provisions that were divided into seven elements (Appendix D). The firm performance is 
measured through ROA and ROE, taken from annual reports of sampled firms. Only those 
firms are selected who filled the survey questionnaire.  
6.6.1 Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of ROA 
A multiple regression analysis is a type of test that analyses the amount of variance explained 
in a dependent variable by one or more independent variables, while hierarchical multiple 
regression adds another piece to it and allows researchers to determine the R2 change and 
change in F statistics.   
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The results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 14. There is a 
total of two models. In model 1, only the effect of demographic factors such as age, position, 
qualification, specialization and experience are measured on ROA. In addition to multiple 
hierarchical regression, the collinearity tests are also conducted. In model 1, it can be seen that 
all the demographic factors have a variance inflation factor (VIF) of greater than 1, it means 
there is no multi-collinearity among variables.  The model 1 shows the R2 value of 0.092, it 
means 9.2% variance in dependent variable (ROA) is explained by these demographic 
variables.  
In model 2, the CGI score is also added to investigate its impact on ROA.  The model 2 reveals 
that CGI score has a significant positive impact on ROA. It means those firms increase their 
financial performance which comply with the CG practices in true spirit. In model 2, the VIF 
also reveals the absence of multi-collinearity among variables. The VIF of CGI score is 1.161 
which rejects the existence of multi-collinearity.  In addition, the R2 has increased to 0.43, it 
means 43% variation in ROA is explained by these explanatory variables. The p and t -statistics 




Table 14  Results of Hierarchical Multiple Regression and Collinearity Stats for CGI Score and ROA 
  Model 1 Collinearity Stats   Model 2 Collinearity Stats 
Variables B Std. Error Beta t  Tolerance VIF   B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.041 0.036  1.127    -0.440 0.069  -6.338   
Age 0.015 0.011 0.223 1.404 0.364 2.751  0.005 0.009 0.074 0.575 0.355 2.817 
Position -0.004 0.007 -0.054 -0.534 0.903 1.108  0.004 0.006 0.057 0.700 0.874 1.144 
Qualification 0.005 0.008 0.068 0.660 0.857 1.166  0.004 0.006 0.047 0.567 0.856 1.168 
Specialization 0.014** 0.007 0.217 2.062 0.831 1.203  0.007 0.006 0.113 1.331 0.810 1.235 
Experience -0.024* 0.014 -0.266 -1.707 0.378 2.648  -0.001 0.012 -0.010 -0.080 0.352 2.842 
CGI Score        0.003*** 0.000 0.627 7.631 0.861 1.161 
            
  
            
  
            
  
            
  
R 0.303       0.6560      
R2 0.092       0.4300    
  
Adjusted R2 0.046       0.3960 
   
  
std. error of the 
estimate 
0.066392       0.052852    
  
F 2.008       12.3440      
Sum of square 
total 
0.481       0.4810    
  
Df  (5, 99)       (6, 98)      
                         
Dependent Variable: ROA 
*, **, *** Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed), 0.05 level (2-tailed) and 0.01 level (2-tailed), respectively.  
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6.6.2 Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis of ROE 
The results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 15. There is a 
total of two models. In model 1, only the effect of demographic factors such as age, position, 
qualification, specialization and experience are measured on ROE. In addition to multiple 
hierarchical regression, the collinearity tests are also conducted. In model 1, it can be seen that 
all the demographic factors have a variance inflation factor (VIF) of greater than 1 and means 
there is no multi-collinearity among variables.  The model 1 shows the R2 value of 0.065, it 
means 6.5% variance in the dependent variable (ROE) is explained by these demographic 
variables.  
In model 2, the CGI score is also added to investigate its impact on ROE.  The model 2 reveals 
that the CGI score has a significant positive impact on ROE. It means those firms perform 
better which comply with the CG practices in a true spirit. In model 2, the VIF also reveals the 
absence of multi-collinearity among variables. The VIF of CGI score is 1.161 which rejects 
the existence of multi-collinearity.  In addition, the R2 has increased to 0.225 which means a 
22.5% variation in ROE is explained by these explanatory variables. The p and t -statistics of 




Table 15 Results of Hierarchical Multiple Regression and Collinearity Statistics for CGI score and ROE
  Model 1 Collinearity Stats   Model 2 Collinearity Stats 
Variables B Std. Error Beta t  Tolerance VIF   B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.069 0.098   0.702    -0.803 0.214   -3.760   
Age 0.038 0.030 0.209 1.298 0.364 2.751  0.020 0.027 0.107 0.714 0.355 2.817 
Position -0.003 0.020 -0.017 -0.171 0.903 1.108  0.012 0.019 0.059 0.617 0.874 1.144 
Qualification 0.026 0.021 0.125 1.193 0.857 1.166  0.023 0.020 0.110 1.148 0.856 1.168 
Specialization 0.021 0.019 0.121 1.135 0.831 1.203  0.009 0.017 0.050 0.502 0.810 1.235 
Experience -0.069 0.038 -0.291 -1.842 0.378 2.648  -0.027 0.036 -0.116 -0.771 0.352 2.842 
CGI Score         0.005*** 0.001 0.431 4.493 0.861 1.161 
            
  
            
  
            
  
R 0.256       0.474      
R2 0.065       0.225    
  
Adjusted R2 0.018       0.178000 
   
  
std. error of the 
estimate 
0.177906       0.162824    
  
F 1.386       4.744      
Sum of square 
total 
3.353       3.535    
  
Df  (5, 99)       (6, 98)      
                            
Dependent Variable: ROE           
*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)       
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)        
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 




This chapter aims to achieve remaining three research objectives of this study. First, the study 
identifies the more influential barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan. To achieve this, the 
study used EFA on all 17 barriers and identified five major barriers i.e. firm level barriers 
(lack of auditor independence, board ineffectiveness, lack of shareholders’ awareness), 
external barriers (political and governmental interference in business activities, weak legal 
control and enforcement, high level of corruption), social barriers (strong social ties among 
different stakeholders, interpersonal connections among BoDs), education and training 
barriers (lack of professional education and training among stakeholders) and legal barriers 
(fewer voting rights). These five barriers are the most important barriers which are affecting 
the implementation of good CG practices in Pakistan. The results are well supported from the 
previous studies (Kaur & Mishra, 2010; Wanyama, Burton, & Helliar, 2009).   
Regarding the first factor (firm level barriers), the study finds that from the CG 
implementation view point, auditors’ independence is compromised in Pakistan. In addition, 
the BoDs have failed to be effective and shareholders’ awareness acts as a barrier to 
implementation of good corporate governance practices in Pakistan. These findings are well 
supported by Capaul (2003) who argued that auditing is a major area of weakness in corporate 
governance enforcement in most transition and developing countries which have also failed to 
enforce their laws, rules and regulation consistently. Auditors’ independence is compromised, 
and they have been giving unqualified opinions, certifying that the accounts audited provide a 
true and fair picture despite the many defects noted. 
Regarding the second factor (external barriers), the study finds political and governmental 
influence in firms and weak legal control and enforcement of regulatory bodies. In addition, 
the study also finds that the level of corruption is another major factor that hinders good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan. Doidge et al. (2007) argued that the political 
system of a country can has implications for corporate governance. The findings of the study 
reveal that weak legal control and enforcement are barriers to implement good CG practices in 
Pakistan, while researchers documented that enforcement is vital for  providing good CG 
system and an effective business environment in developing countries like Pakistan (Berglöf 
& Claessens, 2006). Similarly, Wilson (2007) and (Lin & Liu, 2009) documented that firms 
can be estranged from the corruption that prevails in the society if they are operating in a 
weakened corporate governance environment like Pakistan. Regarding the third factor (social 
barriers), the study finds that strong social ties and also interpersonal connections among 
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BoDs, also hinder good corporate governance practices in Pakistan. Similarly, Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) found that social factors such as culture affect the CG practices in emerging 
countries. Regarding the fourth factor (education and training barrier), the study finds that 
stakeholders lack professional education and training. In a similar vein, Okpara (2011) 
documented that lack of required education and training is a barrier which hampers the 
development and implementation of corporate governance practices in Pakistan. Regarding the 
fifth factor (legal barriers), this study finds that shareholders have fewer voting rights, 
consequently, this acts as a barrier in the implementation of CG practices in Pakistan. Due to 
limited voting rights, the protection of shareholders’ rights is also absent in Pakistan. In a 
similar vein, Okpara (2011) documented that shareholders’ rights are very crucial and vary 
from country to country. In addition, Jiraporn and Davidson (2009) argued that shareholders’ 
rights are an important part of corporate governance and play a pivotal role in controlling the 
behavior of BoDs. Kirkbride, Letza, and Smallman (2009) argued that there is a need to provide 
effective protection in law to disgruntled minority shareholders.  
To fulfill the second objective, the study identifies the most influential drivers of good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan. To achieve this, the study used EFA on all 12 
drivers and identified four major drivers i.e. internal drivers (auditors’ independence, board 
heterogeneity, board independence, initiation of training and educational programs to raise 
awareness), regulatory drivers (enhancing and empowering professional regulatory bodies), 
motivational drivers (encouraging participation in events and conferences related to corporate 
governance) and collaborative drivers (enhancing partnership with international bodies). 
These four drivers are the most important drivers to promote good corporate governance 
practices in Pakistan. 
Regarding the first factor (internal drivers), the study finds that auditor independence, board 
heterogeneity and independence and initiation of training and educational programs can 
promote good corporate governance practices in Pakistan. These findings are consistent with 
previous studies (Al‐Mudhaki & Joshi, 2004). Similarly, Turley and Zaman (2004) 
documented that auditor independence has the potential to alleviate weaknesses in existing 
corporate governance structures especially in emerging countries. In addition, the researchers 
also argued that board heterogeneity promotes relationships and networking (Cox & Blake, 
1991), enhances  corporate leadership and increases firm performance (Carter, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2003; Nguyen & Faff, 2007). Odle (2007) also argued that better corporate 
governance begins from board diversity. Researchers also documented that board 
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independence promotes corporate governance practices in firms (MacAvoy & Millstein, 2003). 
Regarding factor 2 (regulatory drivers), the study finds that empowering the regulatory and 
professional bodies can promote good corporate governance practices in Pakistan. Kajola 
(2008) argued that the corporate governance system will continue to experience challenges due 
to the absence of empowerment of regulators. Hence, it is pivotal to empower regulators to 
promote good corporate governance practices in Pakistan. Regarding factor 3 (motivational 
drivers), the study finds that there is a need to motivate stakeholders to participate in events 
related to corporate governance to raise awareness of and willingness to adopt practices in the 
true sense. In Pakistan, corporate governance compliance is not in a true sense (Khan, 2014) 
and it is necessary to conduct CG related events in order to promote CG practices (Samza, 
2016). Regarding factor 4 (collaborative drivers), the study finds that there is need to 
collaborate with international bodies such as IFC, OECD to promote CG practices in Pakistan. 
Khan (2014) and Samza (2016) also recommended collaboration with international bodies to 
promote CG practices in Pakistan. Third and the last, the study examines the nexus between 
CG practices (measure from CGI score) and firm performance (measure from ROA and ROE). 
To achieve this objective, the study used a five-point Likert scale questionnaire to measure the 
CGI score and employed multiple hierarchical regression analysis. The findings of multiple 
hierarchical regression analysis reveal that the CGI score has a significant positive relationship 
with both ROA and ROE. Hence, CG practices can increase the firm’s performance among 
listed firms of Pakistan. These findings are supported from existing empirical studies (Afza & 
Nazir, 2012; Javid & Iqbal, 2008b; Tariq & Abbas, 2013).  
6.8 Integration of Qualitative and Quantitative Findings 
This section integrates the qualitative and quantitative findings and presents the proposed 
model of good CG practices in Pakistan (Figure 8). Drawing on qualitative analysis, the study 
first explored the eight key institutional determinants of good CG practices in Pakistan such as 
auditing, political, legal, the board, shareholders’ awareness, voting, institutional culture and 
values and these were divided into formal and informal institutions. These are the key 
institutional determinants of good CG practices in Pakistan. Researchers have argued that 
certain prerequisite casual conditions need to be established and clarified for effective 
implementation and functioning of CG practices such as the role of government in the 
introduction of CG reforms and providing an enabling business environment (Goergen, 2012). 
In addition, it is fundamental to ascertain a suitable legal and institutional foundation to ensure 
an efficient corporate governance system (OECD, 2004). Based on these identified institutional 
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determinants, this study developed a survey questionnaire and found five most influential 
barriers to good CG practices in Pakistan. These barriers were firm level barriers (lack of 
auditor independence, board ineffectiveness, lack of shareholders’ awareness),  
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external barriers (political and governmental interference in business activities, weak legal 
control and enforcement, high levels of corruption), social barriers (strong social ties among 
different stakeholders, interpersonal connections among BoDs), education and training barriers 
(lack of professional education and training among stakeholders) and legal barriers (fewer 
voting rights). These barriers hinder good CG practices in Pakistan and influence the 
effectiveness of CG reforms and disturb the enabling business environment. Existing literature 
also provides evidence that ineffective BoDs (Okpara, 2011), a weak regulatory system and 
enforcement (Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003), corruption (Adegbite, 2012, 2015), political 
influence (Adegbite, Amaeshi, & Amao, 2012; Okpara, 2011) weak monitoring (Adegbite, 
2015), ineffective auditing practices (Kachelmeier, Rasmussen, & Schmidt, 2016), and 
interlocking relationships (McGee & Bose, 2009; Mensah, Aboagye, Addo, & Buatsi, 2003) 
are major challenges hindering effective implementation of CG practices in developing 
countries such as Pakistan. However, researchers’ marked the role of government in CG 
development through providing an enabling business environment and introducing CG reforms  
(Adelman, 2003; Goergen, 2012).  
Drawing on qualitative findings, the study also finds four major drivers of good CG practices 
in Pakistan through the survey questionnaire such as, i.e. internal drivers (auditors’ 
independence, board heterogeneity, board independence, initiation of training and educational 
programs to raise awareness), regulatory drivers (enhancing and empowering professional 
regulatory bodies), motivational drivers (encouraging participation in events and conferences 
related to corporate governance) and collaborative drivers (enhancing partnership with 
international bodies). These drivers can improve good CG practices in Pakistan. Enriques and 
Volpin (2007) also argued that some drivers can propel the CG practices in the presence of 
some fundamentals, to attain desired expectations such as shareholder activism  (Appel, 
Gormley, & Keim, 2016; Bourveau & Schoenfeld, 2017; Stathopoulos & Voulgaris, 2016), 
board independence (Adegbite et al., 2013; Terjesen, Couto, & Francisco, 2016), investor 
protection (La Porta et al., 2002), information disclosure (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012), 
auditor independence (Francis, 2004), shareholders’ engagement (Filatotchev et al., 2007) and 
collaboration with international regulatory bodies (OECD, 2004).  
Finally, the study examines the nexus between CG compliance and firm performance on a 
sample of PSX listed firms and found a significant positive relationship between CG practices, 
measured by a five-point Likert scale CG compliance index, and performance, measured by 
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ROA and ROE. These findings are also consistent with studies of (Afza & Nazir, 2012; Javid 
& Iqbal, 2008b; Tariq & Abbas, 2013).  
6.8.1 Proposed Model of Good CG Practices in Pakistan 
This study proposed a model for good CG practices in Pakistan (see Figure 8) which aims to 
promote the good CG practices in Pakistan. The study highlights and identifies the formal and 
informal key institutional determinants which shape the CG practices in Pakistan.  This study 
also emphasized on the role of government to do CG reforms and provide enabling business 
environment. However, there are different barriers such as firm level barriers (lack of auditor 
independence, board ineffectiveness, lack of shareholders awareness), external barriers 
(political and governmental interference in business activities, weak legal control and 
enforcement, high level of corruption), social barriers (strong social ties among different 
stakeholders, interpersonal connections among BoDs), education and training barriers (lack of 
professional education and training among stakeholders) and legal barriers (fewer voting 
rights) that restrain  the effectiveness of CG reforms and compliance in Pakistan. GOP and 
regulatory bodies (SECP, PICG) need to take appropriate measures to control these barriers in 
upcoming CG reforms and codes. The findings of study reveal that auditing process in not 
effective in Pakistan, hence, government needs to make strict criterion regarding appointment 
of internal and external auditors. In Pakistan, CCG 2012 required at least one independent 
director while it is increased to two independent directors in new CCG 2017. The problem is 
not about numbers, it is about true and fair compliance of CG code. It is proposed that SECP 
and PICG need to set a strict criterion regarding appointment of independent directors and it 
should be mandatory for firms to take approval from SECP before appointment of independent 
directors. It is proposed that SECP and PICG should launch awareness programs and highlight 
potential benefits of CG compliance. Political interference is quite common among business 
organizations in Pakistan; hence, politics should be separated from business and this can only 
be done through enforcement. Corruption is another severe problem that exist in Pakistan. 
Government needs to take reforms to tackle corruption in the country and strict action is 
proposed against those who involved in it. Social barriers are another big challenge in corporate 
sector of Pakistan. Appointments are made on the basis of social ties and personal relationships. 
Hence, it is proposed that regulatory bodies need to set strict criteria for key appointment within 
firms. Shareholders also have fewer voting rights that limit their power to control the firm. 
GOP needs to develop a policy regarding protection of voting rights of shareholders especially 
in family owned business.  
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The study also identified some drivers such as internal drivers (auditors’ independence, board 
heterogeneity, board independence, initiation of training and educational programs to raise 
awareness), regulatory drivers (enhancing and empowering professional regulatory bodies), 
motivational drivers (encouraging participation in events and conferences related to corporate 
governance) and collaborative drivers (enhancing partnership with international bodies) that 
can promote implement and compliance of CG practices in Pakistan. It is proposed that GOP 
should make a separate independent regulatory body that ensure the independence of auditors 
and BoDs. GOP can also provide subsidies for those firms that comply the CG practices in true 
spirit and punish the others. In addition, it is necessary to enhance the power of existing 
regulatory bodies (i.e. SECP, PICG, PSX etc.) to ensure true CG compliance. It is also 
proposed that there is need to take initiatives to motivate shareholders to take part in CG related 
events. For this, SECP and PICG can organize events in major cities of Pakistan and encourage 
shareholders to participate either physical or online thorough video conference. It is also 
observed that SECP and PICG have launched directors training program (DTP) to train the 
directors which is became mandatory in CCG 2017. The cost of DTP is too much which may 
hinder directors of small companies to get training certificates. Therefore, it is proposed that 
cost should be reduced and subsidized for such programs. In addition, GOP may motivate firms 
for CG compliance by giving them some tax rebate. The study also proposed that there is need 
to increase the collaboration with international regulator bodies such as OECD, IFC etc. to 
implement effective CG system in Pakistan. GOP may fund and send some candidates to get 
training from these international regulatory bodies and these candidates can offer their services 
to firms at low cost.  
6.9 Chapter Summary 
The findings of the quantitative analysis are presented in this chapter. The study achieved three 
research objectives in this chapter. (1) What are the barriers of good corporate governance 
practice in Pakistan? (2) What are the drivers to promote good corporate governance practices 
in Pakistan? (3) What is the nexus between CG compliance and firm performance?   
The primary data was collected from 105 respondents through survey questionnaires while 
secondary data was gathered from annual reports of sampled firms. The results of demographic 
information reveal that most respondents (39%) were aged between 31 and 40 years. In 
addition, most of the respondents (42.9%) were holding a manager’s position in their 
organization. The results of correlation analysis revealed the significant positive relationship 
between explanatory variable (CGI score) and dependent variables (ROA & ROE). The results 
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of EFA revealed that firm level barriers (lack of auditor independence, board ineffectiveness, 
lack of shareholders awareness), external barriers (political and governmental interference in 
business activities, weak legal control and enforcement, high level of corruption), social 
barriers (strong social ties among different stakeholders, interpersonal connections among 
BoDs), education and training barriers (lack of professional education and training among 
stakeholders) and legal barriers (fewer voting rights) can hinder good corporate governance 
practices in Pakistan while internal drivers (auditors independence, board heterogeneity, board 
independence, initiation of training and educational programs to raise awareness), regulatory 
drivers (enhancing and empowering professional regulatory bodies), motivational drivers 
(encouraging participation in events and conferences related to corporate governance) and 
collaborative drivers (enhancing partnership with international bodies) can promote good 
governance practices in Pakistan. The chapter also presented that CGI score has significant 
positive relationship with both ROA and ROE. At the end, study proposed a model of good 




CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the study. The section two summarizes the main thrust of the study 
while section three highlights the main contributions of the study. The section four presents the 
recommendations to improve the CG practices in Pakistan. The limitations and area for future 
research are presented at the end of this chapter. 
7.2 Conclusion of the Study 
The study highlights the pros of robust CG systems in Pakistan; however, the attainment of 
these pros can be compromised by various institutional determinants. Drawing on institutional 
and agency theory, this study pursues comprehending how CG can be regulated and reformed 
to improve good CG practices in Pakistan? Therefore, it was necessary to explore the 
institutional determinants of good CG practices in Pakistan. This study also identified the 
barriers and classified the drivers to promote good CG practices and examines, in addition to 
examine the nexus between CG compliance index and firm performance through a sample of 
PSX listed firms.  
Drawing on the lenses of institutional and agency theories, the study explores key institutional 
(formal and informal) determinants of corporate governance practices in Pakistan using the 
methodological framework recommend by Creswell and Clark (2007) that are essential to 
comprehend in order to promote good corporate governance practices. The study finds eight 
aggregate institutional determinants of good corporate governance practices i.e. political, legal, 
culture, values, shareholders’ awareness, voting, auditing and board in Pakistan. The study 
finds that the political invulnerability and political influence are affecting the true practices of 
corporate governance in Pakistan. In addition, the study highlights that good CG practices are 
also affected due to high levels of corruption within the country It is noteworthy that political 
invulnerability advances the latitude of existing knowledge, however, it has not attracted much 
attention particularly in emerging countries. The study finds that PSX listed firms lack true 
spirit CG compliance. Most firms are unaware of the benefits of CG practices and do not have 
enough resources. Due to political influence and corruption, the enforcement is not there. The 
regulatory measures pointed at concentrating on Pakistan’s corporate governance problems 
must be institutionally based. In addition, the regulators do not have required skills, expertise 
and power to enforce CG provision in a true spirit which causes ineffectiveness of CG reforms. 
Similarly, it is necessary to gear the efforts of enforcing compliance in developing countries, 
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especially Pakistan, with reforms and introducing new regulations (Okike, 2007). In 
developing countries, corporate governance regulatory strategies must systematically employ 
globally, regionally and locally accepted principles of good corporate governance in order to 
produce more efficient and easily implementable regulatory and administrative governance 
mechanisms. 
The study finds that the institutional culture has a critical effect on corporate governance 
practices in Pakistan. Discussions have revealed that the culture of Pakistani society has 
negatively influenced the quality, direction and practice of corporate governance. In addition, 
there is no protection for organizational whistle-blowers, hence, CG related problems are not 
detected at an early stage. The study also finds that family systems and interpersonal 
connections have great importance and affect the corporate governance practices in Pakistan. 
In addition, the appointments are made on personal and family connections rather than merit, 
consequently, firms lack transparency. The study also finds that shareholders lack awareness 
of the potential benefits of corporate governance practices. In addition, the rights of minority 
shareholders are only protected in law, not in reality. The active participant in AGMs is not 
there. Consequently, the voicing is not there. In addition, the voicing mechanism does not affect 
the corporate governance practices in Pakistan. The study also finds that BoDs are not 
independent and diverse, and interlocking exists between BoDs. Mostly, the family members 
are appointed as independent non-executive directors. At the end, the study finds that the audit 
function is not effective. The auditors lack independence and audit committees are not 
composed of independent directors. Hence, the authenticity and creditability of auditing are 
questionable. The institutional determinants acknowledged in this study have been 
significantly neglected in CG codes in Pakistan, therefore, it can be argued that the CG codes 
in Pakistan is unfamiliar to the obligatory business demands. Researchers documented that 
sometimes political and social forces surpass economics forces in shaping corporate destiny 
(Warren, 2003) and CG practices (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Judge et al., 2008). The findings 
also reveal that the legal infrastructure and regulatory instruments are present in Pakistan to 
successfully promote good corporate governance, but that compliance and enforcement related 
issues remain the key impediment. 
In addition to qualitative analysis, the study also employed quantitative analysis to identify the 
most influential barriers to and drivers of good corporate governance practice in Pakistan and 
examined the nexus between CG compliance and firm performance among PSX listed firms. 
The study identified five major barriers i.e. firm level barriers (lack of auditor independence, 
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board ineffectiveness, lack of shareholders’ awareness), external barriers (political and 
governmental interference in business activities, weak legal control and enforcement, high 
levels of corruption), social barriers (strong social ties among different stakeholders, 
interpersonal connections among BoDs), education and training barriers (lack of professional 
education and training among stakeholders) and legal barriers (fewer voting rights). These five 
barriers are the most important barriers which are affecting the implementation of good 
corporate governance practices in Pakistan. Patel (2006) argued that there should be an 
effective system of checks and balances on boards and managerial behavior to promote a good 
CG system in emerging countries.  Regarding drivers of good CG practices in Pakistan, the 
study identified four key drivers i.e. internal drivers (auditors’ independence, board 
heterogeneity, board independence, initiation of training and educational to raise awareness), 
regulatory drivers (enhancing and empowering professional regulatory bodies), motivational 
drivers (encouraging participation in events and conferences related to corporate governance) 
and collaborative drivers (enhancing partnership with international bodies). Similarly, Causey 
(2008) argued that there must be awareness and clarity regarding board independence, strong 
internal control mechanism and audit functions in order to achieve good corporate governance 
system. Judge et al. (2008) also argued that the greater the extent of law and order in a country 
and the more the culture emphasizes global competitiveness, the higher the corporate 
governance legitimacy. The Government of Pakistan should delicate more power to regulatory 
bodies to ensure true compliance and promote CG practices. The findings of the study reveal 
that CG practices can be increased by motivating the stakeholders to participate in CG related 
events. In addition, CG practices can be promoted through effective collaboration with 
international regulatory bodies. Whilst these drivers are by no means absolute, they may direct 
the path of improvement for CG in the developing world, especially in Pakistan.  The findings 
of multiple hierarchical regression analysis reveal that CGI score has a significant positive 
relationship with both ROA and ROE. Hence, CG practices can increase the firm’s 
performance among the listed firms of Pakistan. At the end, this study proposed a model for 
good CG practices in Pakistan that identifies institutional determinants and the most influential 
barriers of CG practices which restrain the effectiveness of CG reforms and hinder the enabling 
of the business environment in Pakistan. The model also identifies the most important drivers 
of good CG practices in Pakistan which can increase CG compliance and ultimately increase 
firm performance.  
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We argued that corporate governance practices are governed by institutions and do not appear 
out of nothing. In modern organizations across different countries, the expression and format 
of governance are reflections of their institutional environment. Two classes of institutions 
(formal and informal) and their associations with CG in the context of Pakistan have been 
analyzed. Most prominently, these institutions are inter-reliant, interact with and affect each 
other. Consequently, in theorizing on CG in emerging countries, especially Pakistan, it is 
imperative to mention that the overall nature of the country’s institutional environments is not 
harmonized with good CG principles, both at the firm and national levels. Institutions matter 
in reshaping corporate governance in Pakistan; however, Pakistan has not achieved required 
level of CG compliance despite enormous efforts. It can be due to lack of interests from firms 
or lack of enforcement in real sense. Evidence reveals that institutional environment still matter 
and persuade firms despite globalization. Therefore, CG models cannot be treated and 
comprehended in isolation form institutional reinforcements (Guillen, 1999). Actually, CG 
cannot be formulated in seclusion but exposes the fundamental institutions which influence the 
firm structures, responsibilities and rights of directors and managers and structure these are 
systematized in distinct nations. 
7.3 Contributions and Implications of the Study 
Given these key findings, this research contributed new knowledge and insights by going 
beyond what was obtained in earlier studies in terms of theory and literature, and practice and 
policy. 
7.3.1 Theory and Literature 
The study contributes to and encompasses the extent of institutional theory. The institutional 
theory has already identified the capacity of institutions to control behavior of economic agents 
(Douglass, 1990; Scott, 2013) and has received increasing interest among scholars regarding 
its role in the evaluation of CG issues (Aguilera, 2005; Roe, 2003). In addition, an emerging 
literature affirmed that CG is persuaded by the vigor of institutional factors (Adegbite et al., 
2013; Nakpodia, Shrives, et al., 2018) in the business environment (Adegbite & Nakajima, 
2011; Judge et al., 2008). Consequently, various categorizations such as legal, political and 
economic institutions (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011; Okike et al., 2015) and sociological, 
historical and political institutionalism (Leicht & Jenkins, 2009), have been widely espoused 




Notwithstanding these developments, this study was inspired to explore the capacity and 
robustness of the key institutional determinants and categorizations in order to expound CG 
practices in an emerging country such as Pakistan. In addition, this interest was inspired by the 
positions of some scholars (Fukuyama, 2006; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
2004; Przeworski, 2004) who question the applicability of institutions and institutional 
determinants. Scholars further postulated that it is the conditions that reinforce institutions, 
more than institutions affecting the CG practices and direction. The findings of this study (see 
chapter five) are in agreement with the views and support the applicability of institutions 
(Nakpodia, 2017; Owoye & Bissessar, 2012; Sorour & Howell, 2012), confirming their 
significance in adding to existing knowledge concerning the institutional theory of CG. 
It is noted that CG literature is limited in developing countries (Armitage, Hou, Sarkar, & 
Talaulicar, 2017; Berglöf & Claessens, 2006; De Nicolò, Laeven, & Ueda, 2008; Mangena & 
Tauringana, 2007), hence, this study adds to the existing CG literature. Majority of CG studies, 
in emerging countries particularly in Pakistan, are exaggerated on the empirical and limited to 
secondary data. Additionally, this study contributes to CG literature by employing both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. Due to the scarcity of CG studies in developing countries, 
it is challenging for multiple national corporations to comprehend the challenges of CG in these 
countries. Thus, a key motivation of this study is to address these challenges among developing 
countries and contribute to existing knowledge.  
7.3.2 Practice and Policy 
The study also has major contributions towards practice and policy. In Pakistan, the foremost 
corporate governance regulation was introduced in 2002 by SECP, a principal based regulatory 
approach, and was recently reformed in 2012, in which SECP made provisions mandatory for 
listed firms. However, many scholars and practitioners have identified concerns and challenges 
regarding CG practices in Pakistan (Fatima et al., 2018; Khan, 2014; Samza, 2016). This 
antecedent assessment was supported by participants of the current study, consequently, need 
arises to introduce a regulatory approach that could promote good CG system in Pakistan. The 
chapter five highlighted the CG challenges which are faced in the country. In Pakistan, the 
corporate governance code was introduced with a principles-based approach (comply or 
explain), however, SECP has made it mandatory in the recent reform in 2012. Indeed, it was 
apparent that most companies are not complying with corporate governance practices in a true 
spirit and are performing tick box practice. It indicates that a rule-based approach is also not 
helpful in the context of Pakistan while a principles-driven approach is effective in presence of 
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robust institutional elements and free information flow (Arjoon, 2005; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). 
Therefore, it proposes the need for integration of the elements of rules based and principles-
based approaches in Pakistan. Both approaches can adequately strengthen each other to spawn 
optimum outcomes of CG system (Arjoon, 2005; Sama & Shoaf, 2005). The combination of 
both will help in boosting the CG system in Pakistan.  
7.3.3 Implications of the Study 
The study has some important implications for policy and practice. The findings of study 
highlight that existing CG literature is dominated by agency theory perspective in emerging 
economies including Pakistan which is not sufficient. Hence, need arises to conduct CG studies 
from alternative perspectives in emerging economies including Pakistan because these 
emerging economies have different institutional context as compared to developed countries.  
SECP and other regulatory bodies such as PICG and PSX can play their role by providing 
funding and initiating such research in Pakistan at national level. However, a rigorous policy 
is needed for such initiative. The study finds some macro-level challenges such as political, 
legal and cultural etc. all of which make the institutional environment uncertain. The study also 
finds that core difficulty in Pakistan is principal-principal agency problem due to high 
ownership concentration. The effective judicial system can help in reducing such conflicts. At 
present, the judicial system of Pakistan is not effective and provides opportunities to majority 
shareholders to expropriate the minority shareholders. GOP needs to reform the judicial system 
to punish such expropriation. A firm level governance solution would help in reducing conflicts 
and attracting more investment in emerging economies especially Pakistan. GOP and 
regulatory bodies (SECP, PICG) need to work together with firms to reduce the CG issues.  
In Pakistan, CCG 2012 required at least one independent director while it is increased to two 
independent directors in new CCG 2017. The problem is not about numbers, it is about true 
and fair compliance of CG code. It is proposed that SECP and PICG need to set a strict criterion 
regarding appointment of independent directors and it should be mandatory for firms to take 
approval from SECP before appointment of independent directors. There should be an 
autonomous body to determine the suitability of independent directors to the board. Recently, 
SECP and PICG have launched directors training program (DTP) to train the directors which 
is became mandatory in CCG 2017. However, it is observed that the cost of DTP is too much 
which may hinder directors of small companies to get training certificates. Therefore, it is 
suggested that such costs should be reduced, and government should subsidize for such 
programs. SECP may collaborate with international training organizations for such initiatives. 
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The professional and highly trained board can have important implications for the firm through 
attracting investments and ultimately for economic growth of the country. In addition, GOP 
may motivate firms for CG compliance by giving them some tax rebate for high CG 
compliance. The study finds that auditing process in not effective in Pakistan, hence, 
government needs to make strict criterion regarding appointment of internal and external 
auditors. It is pivotal to launch awareness programs regarding CG practices. The policy makers 
may include CG subjects at university level. This will help in promoting CG agendas and 
motivating the students who will be future leaders at different firms. Political involvement is 
quite high among PSX listed firms and appointments are made on political connections which 
comprise the merit. A policy should be introduced to limit the political influence. The SECP 
and PICG can play an important role in this matter. Corruption is another contributing factor 
towards poor CG practice in Pakistan. Law enforcement agencies should take strict action 
against corruption. Policy makers should protect minority shareholders through policy reforms 
and provide them voting rights especially in family owned business. Regulators and firms need 
to work together to address these CG issues in Pakistan.  
7.4 Recommendations of the Study 
Based on qualitative and quantitative analyses, the study has proposed the following four 
recommendations in the areas of business environment, government, regulation and 
institutional reinforcement. It is recommended that there is need to create an enabling business 
environment. Regarding the enabling environment, both government and firms need to play 
their part and there is need for interventions in areas of infrastructure, the legal system and 
human development, among others. Key stakeholders such as shareholders, auditors and 
directors must be trained and educated to appreciate awareness and development in corporate 
governance. In addition, the power and capacity of various regulatory bodies such as SECP, 
PSX and PICG need to be enhanced to discharge their role effectively.  It is also recommended 
that politics should be separate from business.  Due to the overwhelming influence of the 
Pakistani government, it should be committed to promote a good corporate governance system 
(Goergen, 2012). It is also essential to delineate the boundary between business and 
government. In addition, it is the responsibility of government to establish robust governance 
systems through creation of rigorous corporate governance practices in government 
organizations. It is also recommended to use independent regulatory agencies, preferably 
foreign agencies, to increase the enforcement and CG compliance. It is assumed that these 
independent agencies may be more effective compared to local regulatory agencies due to their 
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independence. It is also recommended that the government provide some subsidy or resources 
regarding CG compliance to cope with huge CG compliance costs34. The code of corporate 
governance should be amended and adjusted according to the socio-economic factors and 
institutional environment of Pakistan. The CG code must reflect key institutional elements and 
many of them are presented in this study and inform CG practices in the Pakistani business 
environment. It is recommended that existing institutions be reinforced, and advances must be 
made regarding formal and informal institutional domains. Corruption is underlying these 
institutional challenges. In Pakistan, there is an anti-corruption agency, called the National 
Accountability Bureau (NAB), however, its accountability process is also questionable. 
Institutional forces shape corporate governance practices; hence, it is recommended to make 
necessary adjustments based on these institutional forces.  
7.5 Limitations of the Study and Agenda for Future Research 
Although the research has important implications for developing countries, especially Pakistan 
adequate caution must be exercised in making generalizations. This is a Pakistani case study. 
Due to the sensitivity of CG issues, participants were not drawn from all sectors of the Pakistan 
economy. Some participants were afraid to talk on this sensitive issue and have not given their 
consent to record their interview. Although, the principles of corporate governance are 
applicable to all listed firms of Pakistan, however, is challenging to obtain data from the whole 
population. Nevertheless, whilst the findings of this study are not easily generalizable, given 
its contextual dimension, it nevertheless offers significant analytic generalizability (Creswell 
& Clark, 2011; Yin, 2009). In this study, the research has also employed a qualitative mixed-
method approach to data collection and analysis. Future studies may employ alternative 
methodologies to further validate or challenge its findings. The study has drawn the sample 
from PSX listed firms through a survey questionnaire and future research may be conducted 
on listed vs non-listed35 firms of PSX. In addition, there is also opportunity to draw a sample 
from SMEs. In Pakistan, the studies related to CG are somewhat scant and have neglected the 
SEOs, hence, it provides an opportunity to conduct further studies to evaluate the dynamics of 
CG in SOEs. Finally, as suggested by Steger and Hartz (2005), it is imperative to make some 
further efforts to explore corporate governance from economic and sociological theories which 
may add to existing knowledge. 
                                                          
34 The majority of businesses are not complying with the CG provisions due to lack of required resources and 
costs.  
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Appendix B: Questionnaire – Semi-Structured Focused Group 
Board Structure and Sub-committees 
1. What is your view about the influence of Board Structure and Sub-committees (Audit 
Committee, Remuneration Committee) on Corporate Governance (CG)? 
o Board Composition 
o Sub committees 
o Board Independence 
2. What is your view about level of ownership concentration in Pakistan Stock Exchange 
(PSX) listed firms and its effect on CG? 
 
3. How do you appraise shareholders’ awareness of the board’s performance and 
governance practices? 
 
Transparency and Disclosure (T& D) 
1. What is your opinion about T & D of CG in the PSX listed firms of Pakistan?  
o Suitability of Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) Code of 
Corporate Governance  
o Effectiveness of Internal Control 
o Level of T & D 
Shareholders’ Rights 
1. What is your view about Shareholders’ Rights especially minority shareholders’?  
o Protection of shareholders’ rights by the PSX listed firms  
o Protection of shareholders’ rights by Legislation (Companies Ordinance 1984). 
Legal and Regulatory System 
1. What is your view about the Legal and Regulatory System of Pakistan? 
o Assessment about Corporate Governance Reform 2012 
o Assessment about stakeholders’ level of CG awareness 
o Assessment about the level of co-ordination and interaction between regulatory 
bodies 
o Assessment about support of reforms by the contemporary legal system 
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Socio Economic Factors and CG 







Level of CG Compliance and Financial Performance 
1. What is your view about Compliance and Financial Performance (FP)?  
o Level of compliance in the PSX listed firm 
o Nexus between Corporate Governance Code Compliance and Financial Performance 
 
Determinants of CG 
1. In your opinion, what are most influential determinants in good corporate governance 
practices in the PSX listed firms of Pakistan?  
o Economy of Pakistan 
o Weak infrastructure 
o Culture  
o Religion 
o Weak legal controls and enforcement 
o Less experience and relevant education 
o Poor T & D 
 
Improvement in Corporate Governance 






Appendix C: Interview Card 
 
Introductory explanation 
First welcome the participant and icebreaking. Introduce the research project 
starting wing introduction, outline aims and objectives of the research project. 
Address any potential questions and assure anonymity and confidentiality of 
information. Seek permission for audio/video recording of interviews. With 
the permission of the interviewee the questions are presented as below. 
 
 
Board Structure, Shareholders’ Awareness 
 What is your view about the influence of Board Structure and Sub-
committees (Audit Committee, Remuneration Committee) on Corporate 
Governance (CG)? 
 What is your view about level of ownership concentration in the Pakistan 
Stock Exchange (PSX) listed firms and its effect on CG?? 
 How do you appraise shareholders’ awareness of the board’s performance 
and governance practice? 
 
Transparency and Disclosure (T& D) 




 What is your view about Shareholders’ Rights especially minority 
shareholders’?  
 
Legal and Regulatory System 




Socio Economic Factors and CG 
 How do you evaluate the effect of socio-economic factors in the 
adaptation of corporate governance? 
CG Compliance and Financial Performance 
 What is your view about Compliance and Financial Performance (FP)?  
 
Determinants of CG 
 In your opinion, what are most influential determinants in good 
corporate governance practices in the PSX listed firms of Pakistan?  
 
Improvement in Corporate Governance 
 In your opinion, what can improve corporate governance practice in 
Pakistan? 
Closure 




Appendix D: Survey Questionnaire 
 
Corporate Governance, Compliance and Performance Nexus 
 
Part One: Level of Corporate Governance Compliance 
Please indicate the level of your agreement on the compliance of each of the provisions of the Code of 
Corporate Governance 2012 (CCG) within your organization. Please circle or tick your answer. 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Uncertain, 4 = Agree, 5 = strongly agree 
 
A. Audit 
1. The Audit Committee should consist solely of independent 
non-executive outside directors.  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The Audit Committee of a listed company shall meet at 
least once every quarter of the financial year.  
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The company should have a formal policy on external 
auditor rotation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The Chairman of the Audit Committee shall be an 
independent director, who shall not be the chairman of the board. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. The secretary of the Audit Committee shall either be the 
Company Secretary or Head of Internal Audit. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. A Human Resources and Remuneration committee should 
be introduced. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. The internal audit function may be outsourced by a listed 
company to a professional services firm or be performed by the 
internal audit staff of the holding company. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 




8. No former CEO should serve on the board. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. BoDs should meet at least once every quarter of the year.  1 2 3 4 5 
10. The board of directors of each listed company shall have at 
least one and preferably one third of the total members of the board 
as independent directors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Executive directors, i.e. working or whole-time directors, 
should not be more than 75% of the elected directors including the 
Chief Executive 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. All directors should attend board meetings or have a valid 
excuse for non-attendance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. As per CCG 2012, a director can serve on the board of 
seven listed companies at the most at any one time. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Board members should be elected annually. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Shareholder approval should be compulsory to change 
board size. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Any casual vacancy on the board of directors of a listed 
company shall be filled up by the directors at the earliest but not 
later than 90 days. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. All written notices shall be circulated at least seven days 
prior to the meetings, except in the case of emergency. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. The Board of Directors shall clearly define the respective 
roles and responsibilities of the Chairman. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. The Board of Directors shall clearly define the respective 
roles and responsibilities of the CEO. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. The Chairman shall ensure that the minutes of meetings of 
the board of directors are appropriately recorded. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. The Chairman and CEO shall not be the same person.  1 2 3 4 5 
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22. The Chairman shall be elected from amongst the non-
executive directors of the listed company.  
1 2 3 4 5 
23. There should a mechanism for undertaking annual 
evaluations of the performance of the Board. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
C. Charter /Bylaws 
 
24. Shareholders should act by a non-unanimous written 
consent. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Shareholders should be allowed to call special meetings. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. A simple majority but not a supermajority vote should be 
required to amend charter/bylaws. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. A simple majority but not a supermajority vote should be 
enough to approve a merger.  
1 2 3 4 5 
28. The company should not be authorized to issue blank check 
preferred stock. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. The Board should not have right to amend bylaws without 
shareholder approval except under limited circumstances. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. Shareholders should have the right to vote on directors’ 
appointments to fill vacancies.  
1 2 3 4 5 
31. Shareholders should have cumulative voting rights to elect 
directors. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
D. Directors’ Education 
 
32. The CFO should have a post graduate qualification in 
accounting and finance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
33. The CFO should have five years of experience of handling 
the financial or corporate affairs of a listed company or a bank or a 
financial institution.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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34.   The company should encourage board members to attend 
professional training programs.  
1 2 3 4 5 
35. It will be mandatory for directors of listed companies to 
attain certification under any SECP approved director training 
program (DTP).  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
E. Executive and Directors’ Compensation 
 
36. Directors’ remuneration packages shall encourage value 
creation within the company and be subject to prior approval of 
shareholders/board as required by the company’s Articles of 
Association.  
1 2 3 4 5 
37. The appointment, removal, remuneration and terms and 
conditions of employment of the CFO of listed companies shall be 
determined by the Board. 
1 2 3 4 5 
38. The appointment, removal, remuneration and terms and 
conditions of employment of the CS listed companies shall be 
determined by the Board. 
1 2 3 4 5 
39. The appointment, remuneration and terms and conditions 
of employment of the Head of Internal Audit (IA) of listed 
companies shall be determined by the Board.  
1 2 3 4 5 
40. There shall be a formal and transparent procedure for fixing 
the remuneration packages of individual directors.  
1 2 3 4 5 
41. No director shall be involved in deciding his/her own 
remuneration. 
1 2 3 4 5 
42. The company's Annual Report shall contain details of the 
aggregate remuneration separately of executive and non-executive 
directors, including salary/fee, benefits and performance-linked 
incentives etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
F. Ownership 
43. If any director, CEO or executive of a listed company or 
their spouses sell, buy or transact, whether directly or indirectly, in 
shares of the listed company of which he is a director, CEO or 
1 2 3 4 5 
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executive, as the case may be, he shall immediately notify in 
writing to the Company Secretary of such transaction.  
44. Each listed company shall determine a closed period prior 
to the announcement of interim/ final result and no director, CEO 
or executive shall, directly or indirectly, deal in the shares of the 
listed company in any manner during the closed period. 
1 2 3 4 5 
G. Progressive Practices 
 
45. A board-approved CEO succession plan should be in place. 1 2 3 4 5 
46. The Board should have independent outside advisors. 1 2 3 4 5 
47. The Board should include independent directors.  1 2 3 4 5 
48. Director term limits should exist. 1 2 3 4 5 
Part Two: Barriers to good governance practices in Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) 
listed firms 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement as to whether each of the possible barriers below negatively 
impact the CG practices in Pakistan. Please circle or tick your answer. 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Uncertain, 4 = Agree, 5 = strongly agree 
 
1. Lack of Auditors’ independence 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Board ineffectiveness  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. Institutional Culture of Pakistan 1 2 3 4 5 




1 2 3 4 5 
5. Weak legal control and enforcement 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Lack of Shareholders’ awareness 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Lack of resources for CG compliance 1 2 3 4 5 
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8. Lack of Shareholders’ rights protection especially minority 
shareholders 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Lack of protection for Whistle blowers 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Lack of professional education and training among 
stakeholders 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Fewer voting rights 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Low AGM participation 1 2 3 4 5 
13. High level of corruption 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Nepotism or Kinship culture 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Wobbly/unstable economy of Pakistan 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Strong social ties among different stakeholders 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Interpersonal connections among BoDs 1 2 3 4 5 
Part Three: Drivers of good corporate governance practices in PSX listed firms 
Pease indicate the extent of your agreement as to whether each of the possible drivers below positively 
impacts the CG practices in Pakistan. Please circle or tick your answer. 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Uncertain, 4 = Agree, 5 = strongly agree 
1. Auditors’ independence 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Internal control and Risk Management 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Provide protection to whistle blowers 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Enhancing and empowering professional regulatory bodies 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Board heterogeneity 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Board independence 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Encouraging participation in events and conferences 
related to corporate governance)  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Enhancing partnership with international regulatory bodies 
i.e. OECD, IFC to promote CG in Pakistan 
1 2 3 4 5 
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9. Provide accounting and auditing education to internal 
stakeholders 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Initiation of training programs for directors, raise 
awareness and education for CEOs, directors, shareholders and 
board members 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Establish corporate governance education programs at 
universities 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Promote CG research in Pakistan 1 2 3 4 5 
Part Four: Demographic information 
Please place a tick in the appropriate box in each of these questions  
1. Age group  
a) 30 years or less 
 
b) 31 to 40 years 
 
c) 41 to 50 years 
 
d) 51 to 60 years 
 
e) Above 60 years 
 
2. Position within Organization 
 
a) Senior Manager  
  











a) PhD or Equivalent  
  
b) Masters or equivalent 
 





















5. Experience within job 
 
a) 5 years or less 
  
b) 6 to 10 years 
 
c) 11 to 15 years 
 
d) 16 to 20 years 
 
e) Above 20 years 
Thank you once again for your time and efforts in completing this questionnaire. If you have 
any comments, please mention them below: 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Thank You 
 
